INTERVIEW | Renegotiate Indus Waters Treaty: Former CWC chairman

During his tenure as chairman of the Central Water Commission from 2008 to 2011, AK Bajaj played a pivotal role in the intricate negotiations surrounding the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) with his Pakistani counterparts, overseeing the implementation of numerous key projects.

In an interview with Jitendra Choubey, Bajaj delves deep into India’s strategic desire to renegotiate different aspects of the treaty. He articulates how India can harness the precious waters of the Indus Basin, navigating the complex legal frameworks established by the current agreement. Excerpts:

Can you explain the historical context of IWT?

After Partition, control over major canal head points remained with India, particularly at Ferozepur in Punjab. The British had established a complex canal system to irrigate Punjab, which raised significant concerns among Pakistani leaders about India’s control over its water resources. In response, on several occasions, Pakistani leaders sought the help of negotiators involved in the partition, including Lord Mountbatten, to advocate for a treaty that would hold India accountable for water flow.

As the UK lost its colonial influence after World War II, the United States intervened to encourage the newly independent nations of India and Pakistan to come to the negotiating table. In 1955, the US appointed the World Bank to facilitate these negotiations and brokered the deal in 1960. Interestingly, the World Bank has not brokered any such treaty elsewhere. For instance, the Nile River, which flows through three African countries, has no water-sharing treaty. This treaty served as a geopolitical entry point for the US into South Asia.

Was the treaty fair?

I believe the treaty was somewhat lenient towards the lower riparian state. Our leaders at the time did not negotiate effectively to secure more water from the western rivers. Instead of agreeing on water sharing per river, both countries divided the rivers. The three western rivers — Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus — were allocated to Pakistan, while India gained absolute control over the waters of the eastern rivers — Satluj, Beas, and Ravi.

The treaty included a clause for regular visits by the Pakistan commissioner to the Indian side to monitor compliance, regardless of whether India violated the treaty, and mandated the regular sharing of water data to help manage floods in the lower riparian country. The western rivers provide a total of 80 million acre-feet of water, of which India can use only up to 3.6 MAF for non-consumptive purposes.

India has full control over the eastern rivers, which have a total of 33 MAF water. The treaty includes clauses that impose strict restrictions on India regarding water storage. It permits only diurnal storage for a few hours, resulting in limited electricity generation. In the Baglihar project, for instance, India aimed to store water up to 25 million cubic meters, but Pakistan permitted only 13 MCM. Our energy requirements have increased significantly. Additionally, a controversial provision of the treaty mandates that the outlets of projects must be higher, leading to increased siltation, rendering the current projects less effective.

If renegotiation happens, what would be India’s major demand?

According to our internal technical assessment at CWC, in a renegotiation scenario, India aims to hold water for at least a week to generate sufficient electricity. Additionally, India shall push for the creation of storage to hold 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) of water as per the current treaty.

Why did India not go for the abrogation of IWT?

It is a step-by-step approach. Two years ago, India issued notices to Pakistan to renegotiate the treaty and amend certain clauses, but Pakistan did not respond. In light of the recent terrorist attacks in Pahalgam, India sent another notice indicating that it would keep the treaty in abeyance. If the situation escalates further, India may unilaterally abrogate the treaty. Even the Vienna Convention also states that if relations between two countries become sour due to a humanitarian crisis, a country can withdraw from the treaty.

How many projects has India planned in the Indus Basin? Why are these projects not meeting their timelines?

According to the current treaty, India must build dams to store 3.6 MAF of water. However, Pakistan has not allowed India to construct the Bursar storage dam on the Jhelum River, which would store 0.5 MAF of water. Although India has initiated the Pakal Dul Project (1,000 MW), it is falling behind schedule.

How technically and financially feasible is it to retrofit these projects to store more water?

Technically, it is not possible to retrofit the projects. During the construction of the dams, Pakistan closely monitored the progress, preventing India from making enhancements that would allow for increased storage in the future. This means that a run-of-the-river project cannot be converted into a storage project.

What immediate options does India have if it puts the Indus Waters Treaty on hold? What options are available for Pakistan?

India can pursue projects that have been stalled for a long time due to objections from Pakistan. One such project is the Tulbul navigation project on Wular Lake, which has been planned for 30 years. India can begin creating storage for 3.6 MAF of water for non-consumptive use, as permitted by the treaty.

Additionally, India can create further storage without the treaty and transfer this water to the eastern rivers through tunnels. On the other hand, Pakistan will be at a disadvantage. Pakistan will need to develop large storage projects to manage water during the lean season, which will be expensive.

Will the World Bank intervene to help maintain the treaty?

If Pakistan seeks to renegotiate the treaty with India, it may invite World Bank observers to safeguard its interests. Pakistan knows that India holds the upper hand in any renegotiation, as India is the upper riparian state and tends to maximize its advantages.