Oxford school security report shows threat teams not always inquiring about weapons

Threat assessment teams at Oxford Community Schools only inquired about access to firearms involving troubled students half of the time after the November 2021 mass shooting at the high school, a long-anticipated independent report on the district's security revealed Monday night.

The 179-page report by Guidepost Solutions recommended threat assessment teams ask about weapons access and document that information in every assessment as required by its policy. But it also said the district needs to better filter reports of behavior to address conduct that actually presents a potential threat as it investigates cases at an unsustainable pace.

An Oxford threat assessment team documented that it only inquired about access to firearms in three out of the 20 assessments during the winter semester of 2022 but in 21 out of the 28 assessments during the fall semester of 2022. The report also noted that firearm access was inquired about in only two of the 44 suicide assessments that the district provided to Guidepost for evaluation.

"The district's policy appropriately requires assessment teams to inquire about a student's access to 'dangerous instrumentalities' and firearms," Guidepost noted in the report.

The report documented several other security concerns, including requiring that all staff, including faculty, vendors, contractors, visitors and others onsite, should go through the weapons detection system Evolv with no exceptions. It also found the public address system at Oxford High School does not provide coverage or intelligibility for emergency notifications in some locations.

Superintendent Vickie Markavitch issued a statement late Monday night, saying: "Oxford Community Schools District continuously strives to better its practices in providing a safe environment where students can receive an education that challenges them to achieve their maximum potential. We are appreciative for the assessment Guidepost Solutions has shared and will begin reviewing the 179-page report and their suggestions. Once we have reviewed the report and have determined what should be adjusted in our recovery plan, we will share that updated plan with our school community."

The Guidepost report is the first post-shooting security review and assessment of the Michigan district since the Nov. 30, 2021, attack at Oxford High School, where four students were fatally shot and seven others, including a teacher, were wounded by a lone student gunman.

It, however, is not an investigation into the actual attack — a separate report is due in June and is expected to address school safety and security policies and practices that were in place at the time of the shooting; interactions with the shooter before the shooting; and actions taken by school officials before, during and after the shooting.

Monday's report included an evaluation of security improvements and practices the Oakland County district had in place as of Nov. 30, 2021, and has adopted in the last 17 months. It identified gaps in the district's security plans and made recommendations for improvements. The report also concluded the district has no emergency risks that needed to be addressed immediately. It did, however, note areas that urgently needed to be addressed.

While Guidepost, an investigations, regulatory compliance, monitoring and security consulting firm, found the district has robust policies in many areas that surpass most schools, the security consulting firm called for the Oakland County district to make more than 50 recommended changes to address lingering security concerns as well as documented an incident where a contracted security guard left a folding knife unattended at the high school.

While at the high school, Guidepost investigators found the folding knife was left unattended by a contract security staff member. The district no longer uses that security company. The report recommended all security staff know that potentially dangerous items should not be brought onto the premises.

"This can be done through refresher training orientation for new staff members. If designated staff are approved to carry firearms onsite, this does not include permission for other weapons to be brought onsite," the report said. "If the items are authorized and necessary for work, a strictly enforced policy should be in place to ensure that items are not left unattended at any time unless properly secured."

The release of the Guidpost report comes 102 days after the security firm announced it had encountered "extraordinary" interference in its investigation into the attack and security practices. That complaint came months after educators and administrators at Oxford Community Schools were advised not to participate in interviews with Guidepost's investigation.

Last November, two former board members alleged the district did not follow its own threat assessment policies to prevent school violence before the Nov. 30 mass shooting at its high school. Later that month, then-superintendent Kenneth Weaver resigned.

Guidepost, which helped develop the University of Michigan's response to sexual assault complaints, was originally hired by the board in May 2022 to perform a full review of what happened at the high school on the day of the shooting and in the days leading up to the deadly attack. Guidepost interviews for the report began the week of July 25.

Oxford parent Danielle Krozek said it should not have taken 524 days to recognize and address many of these findings.

"I am taken back by the fact the district continues to forego engaging the (school resource officer) in a significant number of threat assessments, is not consistently assessing availability of weapons, which I understand to be a mandate," Krozek said, "and we continue to have staff, substitutes and volunteers not trained in ALICE.  These are foundational to our student and staff’s safety. Technology will not solve these specific gaps. Have we learned nothing from 11/30/21?"

Recommendations: More training, weapons screenings

Some of the report's other recommendations include:

Direct threat assessment teams to include school resource officers in threat assessments and, as applicable, suicide interventions.

Over the past year, Guidepost said there were several occasions when a school resource officer was not brought into the threat assessment process. With the potential of identifying a weapon in a search, and with the importance of having a law enforcement perspective for the safety of students, Guidepost wrote, it's critical that threat assessment teams are reminded — and directed — to include security resource officers in threat assessments and, as applicable, suicide interventions.

The district should better filter reports of concerning conduct and limit full threat assessments to conduct that presents a potential threat.

Guidepost said the district is conducting too many threat assessments for conduct that clearly does not present a threat. The district does 300% more threat assessments than a similar school of its size, the report found, calling the practice "unsustainable and unnecessary." It recommends identifying, at the building level, one or two trusted members of the threat assessment team who can filter reports of concerning conduct, elevating concerns to the full threat assessment team for review. Doing so will help ensure that the limited resources of threat assessment team members are used to investigate those matters that may present a threat to students and staff, according to Guidepost.

The district should search for all available information on students where a substantive threat exists.

The district should consider using its IT department to search the student's Google Drive and emails for potentially concerning conduct, the report said. While the district uses software designed to detect concerning conduct, a search of a student's electronic documents (emails and Google Drive) tailored to concerning conduct prompting a threat assessment could provide additional information and context to evaluate and resolve a potential threat properly. Additionally, the district should consider acquiring a software solution to proactively scan social media accounts for students for whom a threat or suicide assessment is conducted.

All staff, including faculty, vendors, contractors, visitors and others onsite, should go through Evolv with no exceptions.

Staff are currently not required to go through the Evolv biometric weapons screening system. Guidepost said the district is coordinating with the teachers union to determine whether that can be required. Guidepost noted that the Oxford Community Schools is preparing a policy on Evolv screening.

Guidepost recommends that the school resource officer report to both the school principal and the executive director of student operations, rather than the assistant superintendent of human resources.

The school resource officer is an employee of the Oakland County Sheriff's Department, not the district. When the school resource officer is on district property, the school resource officer reports to the district's building principal and the assistant superintendent of human resources in that order, but the school resource officer is only disciplined by the OCSD.

The district should complete the transition of historical threat assessments and suicide interventions into its new software-based assessment system.

When evaluating potential threats or suicide, Guidepost noted that context is critical, especially where the student was subject to a previous threat assessment or suicide intervention assessment. The district is transitioning from a paper-based system to an online system.

Until a new mass notification system is in place, the high school should consider limiting access to certain courtyards where the existing PA system has sound limitations.

In certain locations, the PA system does not provide sufficient coverage or intelligibility for emergency notifications based on best practices, the report found. The high school is installing a mass notification system for emergency notifications, but until it is active and properly tested, Guidepost recommends that persons limit access to the courtyards, where emergency communications have limitations.

OCS should reinstate school safety drills.

All district personnel, including volunteers, substitutes, coaches, volunteers and part-time staff, should be trained on ALICE and other emergency protocols. OHS should implement consistent Evolv screening for all school events and all attendees.

Guidepost noted that OHS posted school safety drills from March 7, 2019, to Nov. 11, 2021, but no drills were posted beyond that timeframe.

"In this regard, staff indicated that students had not been in the position to conduct drills due to trauma experienced from the events of Nov. 30, 2021," the report said.

Report finds security at Oxford ahead of most other schools

The district has added multiple security measures after the shooting and launched its three-year-recovery plan to address new safety and school security measures.

Guidepost found several current security measures at the high school "appropriate to the current risk environment and elements of foreseeability," saying current measures surpass most educational institutions across the United States. They include:

• The Evolv weapons screening system for the detection of firearms and large knives. Evolv is an AI-based touchless security screening system. Guidepost said the system is employed consistently during the school day and working properly and armed security staff are present at the Evolv screening areas throughout the school day, and after-hours coverage includes armed contract security staff during normal operations and additional contract security staff for high volume events.

• The high school uses electronic access control at major entry points and high-encryption badges, the report said. Guidepost said OHS also has a robust video surveillance system with strong coverage throughout the campus. After the students arrive, the exterior doors remain locked during school hours with free egress for occupants. Certain exterior doors have annunciators or alarms to notify security staff when the door is open.

• OHS continues to use the Nightlock barricade devices for classrooms and office areas and has posted the devices throughout the building. It has updated exterior door numbering, denoted the location of doors for access and affixed signage to direct visitors to the main office for entry. It also has 3M film to limit visibility inside the building from the exterior and is using door window shades or covers for classroom doors.

• OHS has posted bleeding control kits throughout the building and made training on bleeding control measures a priority, the report found. In April, the school board approved the district’s updated Emergency Operations Plan ("EOP"), which provides emergency management guidance across all schools. Guidepost's review of the draft EOP found that the plan complies with best practices and regulatory requirements.

Guidepost is holding three public meetings on Thursday to hear from the community.

• 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.: Oxford Township Board Room, 300 Dunlap Road, Oxford
• 3:30 p.m.-5 p.m.: Oxford Middle School Commons, 1420 Lakeville Road, Oxford
• 6:30 p.m.-8 p.m.: Oxford Middle School Cafeteria, 1420 Lakeville Road, Oxford

Oxford parent Andrea Jones said late Monday she was still reading and processing the report while looking ahead to Thursday's meetings.

"For this report to be released so late in the day, after being left in the dark for so long, it is a lot to take in," Jones said. "Going through, I have many questions and look forward to an in-depth review and discussion of this report on Thursday."

jchambers@detroitnews.com

Staff Writers Kara Berg and Kim Kozlowski contributed to this report.