What India needs to do to plug its defence gap

Even as India aspires to become a $5-trillion economy, it is evident that it faces many national security inadequacies. The high dependency index on foreign suppliers (traditionally the former USSR now Russia) for major military inventory items is stark. This dependency induces a macro national vulnerability and dilutes India’s quest for meaningful and credible strategic autonomy. Furthermore, the current gaps in combat capacity expose the chinks in the Indian ability to safeguard core national security interests. The Galwan setback apropos China is illustrative.

DefExpo had an India focus — only domestic entities were allowed to participate. PM Modi asserted there that Make in India is becoming a success story in the defence sector and added: “Our defence exports have grown eight times in the last five years. We are exporting defence materials and equipment to more than 75 countries of the world. In 2021-22, defence exports from India reached $1.59 billion (about Rs 13,000 crore). The government has now set a target of $5 billion (Rs 40,000 crore).” This is an ambitious target and will demand mission-mode resolve to be realised.

Unexpected exigencies such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and other factors including the Covid that disrupted the global economy and related supply chains, further exacerbated by a weakening rupee add to the challenges faced by the Indian defence manufacturing ecosystem. The management of this extended turbulence across different axes will be the biggest challenge for governance. Cumulatively, these multi-layered challenges and the opportunities embedded in moving towards “aatmanirbharata” ought to provide the framework for an informed and objective debate about the way ahead though this kind of discourse has remained elusive.

A quick recap of the more recent defence-related events includes, inter alia, the commissioning of the indigenously-designed and built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant; the firing of an SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) from the INS Arihant; the radical decision to award the manufacture of a military transport aircraft (C 295) to a major private sector entity; the induction of the made in India Prachand LCH (light combat helicopter); and the conclusion of a deal with Russia to manufacture a Kalashnikov-type light weapon/small arms in India. These achievements have been applauded as the success of the indigenous effort.

However, an objective review of the “made in India” initiatives is revealing. Regrettably, India does not yet have the domestic competence to fully design and manufacture any significant combat weapon/platform and is dependent on the foreign supplier for the critical components that lie at the core of the combat index of the equipment in question. Thus, while it is commendable that India is now going to manufacture the C295 transport aircraft in a collaboration with AirBus, France, the reality is that the engine, avionics, landing gear, etc, will come from abroad and the integration will be done by the Indian entity. This is true for almost every major platform in the three services. While there are some promising green shoots — for instance, the 155-mm artillery guns being designed and manufactured in the country — meaningful indigenisation and credible “aatmanirbharta” calls for sustained funding support, fortitude and an ecosystem that will nurture this effort.

At the heart of this challenge is the grim reality that historically, India has not invested enough in the national research and development (R&D) effort. As per data collated by the World Bank, India has been able to allocate only 0.66 per cent of GDP (2018) towards R&D, while the world average is 2.63 per cent. The comparable individual R&D allocation (per cent of GDP) for some other nations is as follows: Israel 5.44; USA 3.45; Japan 3.26; Germany 3.14; China 2.4; and Turkey 1.09.

While the Modi government has identified national security as a major priority, the emphasis has been on earnest nationalist flourish, often with an eye on the voter. Composite combat and manufacturing capabilities have not been reviewed and honed appropriately. Thus, while India now claims that it will soon become a major arms exporter, the composition of such inventory leans towards the “soft” category (clothing, helmets, surveillance equipment) and yes, the Brahmos missile.

While there is an aspiration to add helicopters to this list — the ALH and the LCH — the reality check is that the engines for both these platforms are imported. Providing a sustained fillip to the national R&D effort across the board (state, corporate and academia) remains critical if India is to emerge as a credible military power and one would identify this as a high-priority issue for the national security apex — the CCS (cabinet committee on security).

India missed the industrial design and manufacturing bus, a national competence demonstrated by nations like South Korea and China, over the last five decades. Technological advances have made the design and manufacture of the semiconductor chip the new currency of national prosperity and military power. The US and China are now locked in intense competition in this domain and India is yet to acquire a profile that would be deemed relevant.

Paradoxically, Indian brain power is very visible in the global semiconductor/chip fabrication effort but more at the lower end of the food chain, often as employees of the global venture capitalists. Progressively changing this techno-strategic landscape in India’s favour should be accorded the highest priority in the national policy debate.

The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi