Gurjit Singh writes: Why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to China is a signal of Berlin’s autonomy

Scholz was preceded in Beijing by Vietnam’s Communist Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong, Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif and Tanzanian President Samia Hassan. For Beijing, the Scholz visit, last week, was encouraging given that China’s relationship with Europe has deteriorated over Uyghur human rights in Xinjiang and Chinese support to Russia in the Ukraine crisis.

As Europe’s largest economy, Germany is even more dependent on China in the first semester of 2022. German investment in China in this period was €10 billion. Bilateral trade rose slightly by 0.9 per cent to $173.57 billion. German imports are up by 54 per cent. Germany’s growth rate of 1.9 per cent jeopardises its medium-term plans.

Despite the Ukraine crisis and critical focus on China, German investment in China increased by 30 per cent in 2022. BASF, Hella, Robert Bosch all increased their investments and KfW (the German state-owned development and investment bank) is financing a €69.5 billion railway project linking North China’s Tianjin city and Beijing Daxing International Airport. China is buying 140 Airbus aircraft for $17 billion. Before the visit, Germany consented to Costco, the Chinese shipping company, investing in Germany’s largest Hamburg port, albeit with a reduced share

Scholz’s visit was also in the context of deteriorating US-China relations and bi-polarisation. Due to the Ukraine crisis, Germany quickly followed the US in strategic terms, breaching its engagement with Russia.

Verlässlichkeit und Vertrauen – diese beiden Werte spielen in der 🇩🇪 und 🇨🇳 Kultur eine wichtige Rolle. Sie sind gleichzeitig Grundlage für diplomatische Beziehungen und politische Partnerschaften. Es ist gut, dass wir uns persönlich getroffen und gesprochen haben.

— Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz (@Bundeskanzler) November 4, 2022

On China, it remains cautious since its economic interests are critical. Scholz began his Asia policy with a visit to Japan rather than China and then met with PM Modi in Berlin. China was not accorded primacy in German policy, but it remains important. The visit immediately after the 20th National Congress of the CCP seems ill-timed.

Europe is miffed that Germany is engaging China on its own. The joint Scholz -Macron visit was nixed by Germany. Scholz’s visit, with a business delegation, shows a replication of Angela Merkel’s policy. The ruling SPD believes that German enterprises cannot afford a decoupling from China, since they are already suffering due to the pandemic, the energy crisis and the delinking from Russia. The German Foreign Ministry is critical of China on human rights and is crafting a new China policy to challenge the systemic rivalry that the EU foresaw.

The Scholz visit indicated German strategic autonomy. The same autonomy is visible in the context of German relations with Russia.

How will Germany maintain its leadership of Europe, if it swings away for its own reasons? If Scholz intended to position Germany and possibly Europe as autonomous players in the ensuing US-China bipolarisation, he needed to pull many perceptive rabbits out of his Beijing visit.

On the eve of his visit Scholz, in an op-ed published in the FAZ that contextualised his visit. He acknowledged that the world had changed drastically since Merkel last visited China in 2019. The opportunity for a direct meeting with Xi was important to resolve the world’s outstanding issues and not because he thought of maintaining business as usual. China had hugely changed. And since China had changed, the German response must also alter.

Secondly, the world had also changed. Russia was a threat to be tackled with Chinese help. China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was reminded of its special responsibility to abide by the UN Charter principles and to influence Russia. This resembles what China says in its Global Security Initiative — though it’s yet to implement it — with Russia. Scholz spoke about multipolarity in the world and the need to expand Germany’s partnerships.

Germany had no interest in seeing the emergence of blocs once again and Berlin engages different partners. China should not be isolated nor could there be a cosiness with a Chinese-dominated world order. The importance of China as an economic partner of Germany and Europe remained. Berlin did not want to decouple from it. Germany would seek a more level playing field and diversification with China. “Risky dependencies” had developed, with respect to raw materials, rare earth, or cutting-edge technologies. German businesses were creating some alternate supply chains. Trade and investment between China and Germany will now seek a differentiated basis. Germany seeks diversification, and strengthening rather than “protectionism and withdrawal”.

Putin’s war is challenging the global peaceful order. In #Beijing, I asked President #Xi to bring his influence on Russia to bear. We agree that atomic threats are extremely dangerous. The use of such weapons would cross a red line. pic.twitter.com/xtgjgi35qX

— Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz (@Bundeskanzler) November 4, 2022

If China did not reciprocate, consequences would follow.

The fourth objective Scholz set was that contradictions between Germany and China could not be ignored, including civil and political liberties including in Xinjiang. About Taiwan, Scholz said that Germany follows the One-China policy and any change to its status must be peaceful and through mutual agreement.

Scholz said Germany’s China policy would be successful if it was in resonance with a European policy. It was his view that he had consulted with the EU, French President Macron and the US before his visit and there were several areas where China ought to play a role including dealing with the G 20, the SDGs and the like.

The Chinese readout agrees with much of what Scholz said. Xi is wooing Germany to keep its strategic autonomy. It did say that “there should be no self-imposed restrictions or unrealistic expectations” and publicly ignored the Taiwan and Xinjiang issues even though Scholz raised them.

The significance of this visit is that Germany has again shown its desire to attain strategic autonomy from the US. This was a goal of the German coalition and of German and European countries before the Ukraine crisis, which saw them all scurrying behind NATO and US leadership. With the Ukraine crisis at an impasse, Europe is paying the price both for sanctions and reduced energy supplies. Germany seems to be ready to not give up on China despite European and domestic opposition. It needs to save its economic development from the predations of war. Strategic options will follow the economic lead

(The writer is a former Indian ambassador to Germany)