Between 2017, when the last party congress took place, and now, a lot has changed inside China and its relations with the world. In this context, what happens during the party congress becomes highly significant as it will reflect China’s self-perception and its aspirations as a major power. (AP)Written by Avinash Godbole
The People’s Republic of China evokes a mix of awe, anger and caution, across the world. It is either thought of as an authoritarian, repressive, non-democratic and national-chauvinist party-state or as a model of rapid development, seen through its clean and wide roads, gigantic development projects, high-speed railways and other technological achievements, or its rise as a major power. The driving force behind all of this is the Communist Party of China (CPC), which will hold its 20th national congress, usually referred to as the party congress, beginning on October 16.
At the end of the party congress, Xi Jinping will walk down as the general secretary of the party for an unprecedented third time. He will be accompanied by six other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). This will be one of the two major events marking the change of leadership in China — sometime in March next year, China’s government leadership will also change at the National People’s Congress (NPC). Then, in all likelihood, China will have a new premier while the president will remain the same.
Between 2017, when the last party congress took place, and now, a lot has changed inside China and its relations with the world. In this context, what happens during the party congress becomes highly significant as it will reflect China’s self-perception and its aspirations as a major power. For the CPC, the party congress is a place to not only shuffle its leadership, but also to review its work since the previous congress and set the tone for the next five years. This is presented through a report by the general secretary. In 2017, Xi’s speech lasted close to three and half hours and one can expect it to be more or less the same this time around as well. In 2017, the speech centred around the themes of “the Chinese Dream”, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The second theme was of increasing China’s role in innovation. The third was the presentation of the new principal contradiction in China, which focused on addressing inequality and other quality of life issues in China.
In his third term as the general secretary, Xi would be leading a vastly different China compared to what he started off with in 2012. At that time, China’s economy was slowing down but stable without the visible cracks in sectors like housing, among other others. Unlike today, household consumption was still rising and new export businesses were still setting up shop. Back then, the domestic business environment in China was also positive unlike now. While China’s suppression of human rights among minorities was known, it had not taken the form of mass detention centres in Xinjiang. Its relations with Hong Kong were based on the basic law which it has now completely redrawn under the Hong Kong National Security Law.
Globally, China was seen as a rival/competitor and not as a disruptor. Its relations with neighbours have worsened and its image as a responsible power has taken a beating after Covid-19 and its support of Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. The act of firing missiles over Taiwanese territory after the US House speaker’s visit has not gone unnoticed as well. There is bipartisan consensus in the US that China is no longer a benign power and Europe has also changed its approach to China in recent years.
While all this happened, Xi managed to bring the party to the centre of everything in China once again. He effectively ended the party-versus-state debate and began to head nearly every critical organisation which gave him the title of “chairman of everything”. In the party’s internal politics, he eliminated the leadership competition which manifested as factions and the pulling down of rivals through rumours. Xi took on the domestic corruption challenge but also turned it into a political cleansing campaign. While doing so, the idea of collective leadership in China ended and in order for everyone to support Xi, the notion of “core leader” was brought back after a gap of 30 years. He has cleaned up the Chinese military to a large extent, putting several high-ranking officers behind bars for taking bribes. On the other hand, Xi’s China has also arrested human rights lawyers and curbed feminist groups and put CCTV cameras inside university classrooms to curb the spread of foreign ideas.
China’s intentions are to become powerful, like every major power. However, it faces external constraints with trade wars and global slowdown. To expand China’s power in the backdrop of global challenges and a domestic economy that is slowing down, along with low domestic consumption, is a tough task. Add to this the negative business environment since the pulling out of the Ant Group IPO, which links with Xi’s barbs against what he called the “disorderly expansion of capital”. In addition, the more recent zero-Covid policies have disrupted any sense of normalcy in China and have caused serious anger and frustration among ordinary Chinese citizens.
In another few days, more than 2,000 delegates will assemble in Beijing to take forward policies on many of these issues and approve the doctrine for the next five years. At its centre one can see the notion of common prosperity which encompasses the objective of reducing China’s internal inequalities. This may be achieved through a dual circulation strategy that focuses on increasing domestic consumption, innovation and domestic competition. This will also be an era when China will make efforts to influence the world, first by undermining the liberal order and then gradually aiming to replace it. This will also be reflected in what Xi says on October 16. That’s why the 20th party congress is an important event to follow for the world.
The writer is Associate Professor and Associate Academic Dean JSLH, JGU