Why Russia isn’t the villain of the war

The Westernisation project that Boris Yeltsin and a young Vladimir Putin endorsed had a drastic course correction, the cornerstone of which was a reassertion of Russian greatness exemplified by Yeltsin’s angry remark that Russia was not Haiti. The initial euphoria of the Russians also evaporated and the nation moved towards adopting the Primakov doctrine that accepted Russia’s relative weakness, preparing itself with a long term-plan for resurrecting intricate alliance formation and taking cognisance of two invaluable assets that Russia enjoyed: Its huge nuclear arsenal and its veto power in the Security Council. The present unipolar world being inherently unstable, destabilising and aggressive, the emergence and consolidation of a multipolar world would be more just, peaceful and stable.

The suspicion of NATO being an aggressive organisation was strengthened by the former’s foray into the non-Western world. Its expansion up to the Russian border in phases, the regime changes attempted in Georgia and Ukraine and an open proclamation that both these countries would be made NATO members riled Russia. They led to the promulgation of the Russian red line with Moscow stating it would not tolerate any further NATO expansion.

Piliavsky is silent on the critical elements of this evolution. The EU expansion and the West’s encouragement and direct involvement in the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine, which began with the Orange Revolution in 2004 culminated in the illegal removal of a democratically-elected pro-Russian government. Putin considered the overthrow of a legitimate regime as crossing the red line. He immediately took control of Crimea which he thought — justifiably — would become a NATO naval base. This was the beginning of the Russian determination to create a buffer between NATO and Russia with Ukraine being neutral.

The Clinton administration’s policy of the eastward expansion of NATO, contrary to the firm commitment of the Bush administration, emboldened the George H W Bush Administration to attempt further consolidation of the Western Alliance. Alexander Grushko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister commented that “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have the worst serious consequences for Pan-European security.” Putin minced no words when stating that this would represent a “direct threat” to Russia.

Astonishingly, the US and its European allies ignored these Russian moves. Croatia and Albania became NATO members in 2009. Even the EU expansion continued.

Piliavsky forgets that Ukraine, being a huge landmass, is of great strategic importance to Russia and contrary to Western propaganda, any Russian leader would have done what Putin did on February 4. John J Mearsheimer comments, “Great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory.” The Monroe Doctrine and the Cuban missile crisis are good examples of such intolerance on the part of the US. The Russian reaction was predicted by George Kennan in 1998 when he said that NATO expansion was a “tragic mistake” and prophesied that “the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and will gradually reset their policies.”

Piliavsky conceals the fact that Ukraine, one of the poorest nations of Europe, is also one of the most corrupt nations in the world. Far from being a shining example of democracy, many nefarious acts are regularly performed here. There is a strong undercurrent of lingering fascistic instincts in an influential segment of the population which provides substantial support to populist and anti-Russian sentiments in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian government did not implement the Minsk Agreement (2015), which envisaged a reasonable power-sharing arrangement which would include Russians and the Russian language as it is spoken by 30 per cent of the population. In 2019, the Ukrainian legislature, instead of taking steps towards resolution, reiterated its desire to be part of NATO.

It has often been said that whoever controls oil controls the world. This is vindicated by the fact that the US even approached highly sanctioned nations like Iran and Venezuela for oil to offset the sanctioning of Russia. Paradoxically, Germany and a few others in Europe refuse to sanction Russian oil and the rising prices of gas and petrol would largely offset the shrinking Russian economy to 7 per cent, much less than many advanced economies suffered during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Piliavsky’s article does not mention the fact that for the Russians, it is hard to swallow the genocide in Donztsk — 14,000 people were killed in the last eight years. This act is comparable to events that happened in Georgia 14 years ago. Georgia is not part of the bandwagon of sanctions against Russia. The Western double standards stand exposed by the earlier allegation of genocide in Yugoslavia and the creation of Kosovo. Neither action had UN sanction.

NATO in the Cold War days adhered to the First Strike Doctrine because of the imbalance in the conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. But in the post-Cold War phase, when there were no such threats, the emergence of an offensive NATO beyond the shores of Europe in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria led to security considerations for Russia. If this elementary demand was accepted, the war would have become avoidable.

Both Germany and France tried their best to avert the war but lacked the courage to veto the US project,. The long-term loss of Germany from sanctions would be severe as after years of distrust, Angela Merkel brought about a healthy trading relationship which benefited both and was crucial for Germany’s growth and central role in the EU. With a higher cost of inputs and increased defence expenditure, the German growth rate would suffer. In contrast, Russia’s loss would be minimal as both gas and wheat is likely to be diverted to an ever-growing Asian market.

Finland and Sweden may join NATO but it would not alter the balance of power in Europe. The overuse of sanctions and especially its use against Russia since 2014 has led to a self-reliant Russian economy that is 80 per cent self-sufficient in consumer goods and impressive technological advancements in the gas and oil sectors. It has also greatly benefited from Chinese cooperation enabling it to offset the impact of sanctions.

Significantly, the entire continents of Africa and South America have no role in the conflict. The close allies of the US, Saudi Arabia and UAE along with two major economies of South America, Mexico and Brazil, and South Africa along with India and China did not support the General Assembly resolution of the collective West and abstained from voting. Together they constitute 85 per cent of the world’s population. Piliavsky overlooks the destabilising and inherently conflictual aspect of a unipolar world. The expectation is that a post-Ukrainian war world would see a return to a firmly established multipolar world which would provide for a stable world order.

The writer retired as Professor of Political Science, Delhi University