Many in the Indian strategic community have long complained about the West “pushing” Russia into China's arms. (Illustration by C R Sasikumar)As Moscow muddles through with its Ukraine invasion, the implications of a weakened Russia are coming into bold relief. With Russia’s traditional sphere of influence now under growing contestation, India will have to find new ways to secure its interests in Eurasia. After all, India has long hitched its Eurasian wagon to the Russian star. The Kremlin’s star, however, is dimming and it is not within India’s power to alter that dynamic.
Thanks to its close ties to the Soviet Union, India had privileged access to the Central Asian Republics in the Cold War era. But Delhi could not do much with that since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Absence of geographic access and limited trade and investment ties meant Delhi’s salience in the region has been underdeveloped.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Delhi has largely relied on Moscow to buttress its role in the region. India worked with Russia and Iran, for example, to counter the Taliban in Afghanistan in the second half of the 1990s. Russia had also actively campaigned for India’s membership of the SCO despite China’s reservations. Moscow bet that having India in the SCO will produce a better regional balance of power. Russia was also ready to supply arms to India during its military confrontation with China in eastern Ladakh in the summer of 2020.
China’s rapid rise in the new millennium, however, has begun to change the regional equations. China has not only become a leading economic partner for the Central Asian states, but its security ties with Moscow have deepened amidst the sharpening conflict between Russia and the West. And Moscow’s inability to quickly wrap up the Ukraine invasion is making matters worse.
Many in the Indian strategic community have long complained about the West “pushing” Russia into China’s arms. But the Russian state has been around for more than a thousand years, and it is quite capable of making choices based on its perceived interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin did his sums on Ukraine — in retrospect, it is quite clear that he got them wrong.
Whether Putin was “pushed” or “jumped” into Chinese arms, the consequences for India are the same. Putin’s Ukraine war has set off three negative trends. First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has alarmed its close neighbours. If Russia can claim that Ukraine had no right to independent existence and invade it, Moscow could do much the same to other republics that were part of the Soviet Union.
In early August, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev posted a tweet proclaiming that after defeating Ukraine, Moscow should take back lost lands to revive the “mighty and invincible Russia”. “Under Moscow’s indivisible hand, with the Slavic people at the head, we will proceed to the next campaign to restore our motherland’s borders, which, as you know, do not end anywhere,” Medvedev said. He claimed that Georgia “didn’t exist at all” before becoming part of the Russian empire in the 1800s and that Kazakhstan is an “artificial state”.
Kazakhs did not need Medvedev’s tweet — which was pulled down a few minutes after it was posted — to remind them of the potential implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Kazakhstan has been wary ever since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the occupation of Crimea in 2014. The war in Ukraine has intensified its efforts to enhance its “strategic autonomy” from Russia.
The Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took Russian help to put down a revolt in January. But he refused to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine a month later and recognise the “independent” republics that Moscow set up in eastern Ukraine. Nor is he willing to break international sanctions to help Russia. Tokayev is stepping up the engagement with Europe, Turkey, and China to reduce the traditional dependence on Russia.
Second, as Russia weakens, conflicts are breaking out within its Eurasian sphere of influence. In the last few days, two founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — have been at each other’s throats on their disputed border. The dispute has been there for long; what is new is Russia’s declining capacity to control and mediate such conflicts.
Equally important have been the clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia — two dialogue partners of the SCO. This conflict has raged for a while. Although Armenia is one of the closest allies of Russia, Moscow has been unable to counter the offensive by Azerbaijan and Turkey against Yerevan. There is much sympathy for Armenia in the US and Speaker Nancy Pelosi rushed there last week to express solidarity, including potential military assistance.
But no one is better placed to capitalise on Russia’s vulnerabilities than China. On his way to the Samarkand summit last week, Xi Jinping stopped at Nursultan, the capital of Kazakhstan. In a joint statement issued at the end of his meetings with Tokayev, Xi announced China’s strong support for Kazakhstan “in safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in taking reform measures to preserve national stability and development.” You don’t have to be a strategic genius to figure out who the statement is directed at.
Until now, it has been the practice to denounce the US itch for intervention and regime change in the name of promoting democracy through “colour revolutions”. After Ukraine, the region’s fears of meddling are not focused on the distant power, the US, but on Russia next door which seems intent on restoring its past glory.
For India, the ideal situation would be one in which Russia is at peace with the West, manages the turbulence in inner Asia, keeps Chinese power in check, and facilitates India’s engagement with the region. The new reality is very different. Whether Delhi likes it or not, Russia is locked in an unwinnable war with the West, is increasingly beholden to China, and struggling to retain its traditional primacy in inner Asia.
As it took over the chair of the SCO last week, it is abundantly clear that India can’t play a consequential regional role by holding on to the Russian coattails. In the last year or more, Delhi has signalled the desire to develop an autonomous role in the region.
In November 2021, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval convened a meeting of his counterparts from Central Asia in Delhi to discuss the Afghan situation. Last January, Delhi invited the five Central Asian leaders to participate as special guests at the Republic Day celebrations but the Covid surge in January prevented their presence in Delhi.
India has long looked at Iran to gain geographic access to inner Asia. It must now tie up with its Arab friends like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pursue large-scale regional projects in Eurasia. India is also renewing its engagement with Turkey, which is emerging as an important force in Central Asia, which was once known as Turkestan. The European Union, which is stepping up its engagement with the region through its eastern initiative, could also be an important partner for India in the region. The Eurasian vacuum created by the weakening of the Russian sphere of influence is unfamiliar geopolitical terrain for India, but it is full of new possibilities as well.
The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express