C Raja Mohan writes | Russia’s setback in Ukraine: India must be alive to changes on the ground

All major powers are beginning to take a fresh look at the potential outcomes of the war and recalibrate their geopolitical calculus. India will not be an exception.

Triggering a fresh look at the war is the lightning offensive by Kyiv that saw Ukraine’s armed forces capture some key towns in the northeast of the country that have been under Russian occupation. Russia has formally acknowledged that it has pulled out of a large part of the Kharkiv region and is regrouping to mount a better defence of its territorial gains in the Donbas region. The latest reports suggest that Ukraine has regained an estimated area of nearly 3,000 sq km and is threatening to take more, including in regions in the eastern part of the country that have been under Russian control since 2014-15. But Ukraine has a long way to go before it can push the Russian forces back into their own territory.

There are moments in a war when the balance of forces shifts in favour of one of the belligerents. Are we at that moment now in Ukraine?

Until this weekend, the consensus view was that the prolonged stalemate between the two sides is likely to endure and that any plan for terminating the war must come to terms with that reality. Ukraine’s territorial gains in the last few days have made Kyiv’s victory a real possibility. Russia has by no means lost the war in Ukraine but it surely is losing ground. The probability of a Russian defeat in Ukraine may no longer be a trivial one.

This is not the first time that Russia had to pull back in the last seven months. After its initial multi-pronged attack on Ukraine on February 24, Russia hoped to quickly reach Kyiv and oust the government headed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy. But as the advance on Kyiv fizzled out, Russia decided to concentrate its forces to make a determined onslaught on eastern Ukraine. After some significant advances in the east and southeast of Ukraine, Russian forces got locked into a stalemate. Ukraine has now broken the framework of an extended “war of attrition”. With its major counter-offensive in the last few days, Ukraine has seized the political initiative in the war for the first time, raised the operational tempo, altered the terms of military engagement with Russia, and reaffirmed the demand for complete Russian withdrawal.

Zelenskyy was widely advised to settle for a territorial compromise with Russia by ceding the eastern part of Ukraine to Vladimir Putin. But he has increasingly sounded upbeat, tough and laying down new conditions for peace – including war reparations from Russia and a war crimes tribunal to render justice to the victims of Putin’s invasion.

Ukraine’s key supporters in the war are stating for the first time that it might be able to liberate most of the areas occupied by Russian forces, including the Crimean Peninsula that Moscow had taken in 2014. Not everyone is so hopeful. Ukraine might find it hard to consolidate its recent gains.

By advancing far too far into occupied territories and opening multiple fronts, Ukraine must now manage longer supply lines and will be vulnerable to Russian counter-offensives. But then success begets success and failure can feed on itself. For now, at least, there is no question that the global narrative on the war in Ukraine is beginning to change. For Delhi, five broad dimensions will be worth a close watch.

First is the nature of the debate in Moscow. All major wars have domestic political consequences for the belligerents, especially if you are losing or seen as losing by your own people. Until now, there has been considerable popular support for Putin’s invasion as the nation rallied behind the flag. It is an open question whether the retreat will change the terms of the domestic debate. While the liberals have no voice, early signs of criticism of the Russian military operations are now coming from the right-wing cheerleaders of the invasion.

Second, Putin will soon have to make major decisions on recasting Russian military strategy. Persisting with the present policy is no longer a credible course. Russia has taken heavy losses of manpower and equipment in the last six months. Putin could consider a general war mobilisation that he has avoided so far. Alternatively, he will have to escalate the confrontation to a higher level, including the potential threat to use nuclear weapons. He could, of course, cut his losses and sue for peace. All these options carry risks of their own.

The third is the impact of the military setback in the Russian sphere of influence. A major aim of Putin’s Ukraine war is to expand the Russian zone of influence in Eurasia. If Moscow is seen as failing in Ukraine, it could weaken the Russian influence where it is dominant now. Belarus could well turn out to be a test case. The president of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, who has crushed the popular democratic opposition with the help of Putin, might now find a resurgence of internal resistance.

Fourth, Putin had bet that the European dependence on Russian natural gas supplies will make it hard to sustain the initial united stand in favour of Ukraine. The Russian energy war was all set to shake up European politics, as energy bills rise manifold and popular discontent grows. Movements on the left and right in Europe are opposing the war, and many European governments would like to see a quick end to the conflict before the winter chill sets in. But the sense of Ukraine’s gains and sustained US pressure could compel the Europeans to stay the course. A lot will depend on how the US might help Ukraine build on the current military momentum.

Fifth, China will have some hard thinking to do as Russia struggles to regain the initiative in Ukraine. Putin and Xi Jinping announced an alliance “without limits” and “no forbidden areas”. Although Beijing has lent political support to Moscow in Ukraine, it has held back from substantive material support. A potential Russian defeat and the Western triumph in Ukraine would inevitably alter the nature of China’s relations with Russia as well as the US. That, in turn, will send strategic ripples across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.

In the last few months, Delhi’s focus has been on managing the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine and limiting its geopolitical impact on India’s security. The intensive diplomatic season this month – including this week’s regional summit in Samarkand and the annual session of the UN General Assembly in New York – should give Delhi a good sense of the changing dynamic in Ukraine and develop an effective response.

The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi, and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express

This article first appeared in the print edition on September 13, 2022, under the title, ‘A Setback for Moscow’