Agnipath: Put it to a four-year test

Let me start by saying there is little doubt that the military requires restructuring, particularly the 1.2 million-strong army. A leaner military would lead to manpower cost savings that could be utilised for modernisation and technology adoption. The Agnipath scheme is designed to reduce salary and pension expenditure, although the government is reluctant to admit that this is the primary factor behind its decision.

There are two competing narratives about Agnipath. The first terms the scheme as “transformative” and “a new idea of a new era” that would have a “positive impact on the human resources management of the armed forces”. The second narrative, voiced mainly by military veterans, warns that the scheme will erode the ethos of the military and blunt its winning edge. Both narratives take an extreme position, and as usual, the truth lies somewhere in between.

The advantages of the Agnipath scheme have been brought out in the briefing held on June 14. It would lead to a more youthful and technically-adept military force. By picking only 25 per cent of Agniveers for permanent absorption, the military will get the best people to form the core of the junior leadership. After serving for four years, the Agniveers will go into civil society “where they can contribute immensely towards the nation-building process”.

There are also challenges. What is the ideal mix of Agniveers and permanent soldiers in an army that faces both external and internal threats daily? What would be the motivation level of Agniveers, a majority of whom know that they will be out of the military after four years? Is a six-month training period sufficient for soldiers, many of whom would be straight away pitched into life-and-death situations along the borders or in counter-terrorism operations? Would the military’s attractiveness as a career reduce, leading to a dilution in the quality of recruits?

While the military leadership says that it is cognisant of these challenges, it is not entirely sure how these issues will play out in the future. The Agnipath scheme is a complete change in the human resource management process, and its implications cannot be accurately forecast. Perhaps some of us are overstating the challenges but caution is required when the stakes are measured in terms of the quality of the military efficiency. It is therefore suggested that the scheme be put through a testbed before its final adoption.

The first four years of the Agnipath scheme should be devoted to assessing the new system’s impact on the military’s operational capability. Our primary concern should be that the ethos and effectiveness of the military are not diluted. Everything else is secondary.

A four-year period involving approximately 1,80,000 Agniveers may appear to be a somewhat excessive exercise, but anything less may not yield the correct results. We must go through one complete life cycle of Agniveers to fully understand how they will fit into different roles, from combat to logistics to technical services. Each of these roles requires different skills and adaptation to different conditions. The four-year period would also enable an accurate assessment of how successfully the retiring Agniveers can transition to a satisfactory second career.

After four years, the military should conduct a comprehensive review of the Agnipath system and present its findings to the government. As stated earlier, the focus should be on assessing if there has been any dilution in operational effectiveness. Thereafter, the government should be open to changes, including major modifications to the system, where required. If all works well, the scheme can be genuinely termed transformational.

How responsible should the government be towards the welfare of retiring Agniveers? There is an argument that the sole focus of militaries is to win battles. If short-term soldiers are required for that, so be it. Recruits join on a voluntary basis and are aware of the terms of service, and the military is not an organisation meant to prepare people for future jobs.

This view could have some merit but it misses the larger relationship between a soldier and the state. There is a mutual obligation between the soldier and the nation that is often referred to as the “military covenant”. A soldier prioritises the nation’s needs above his own, including putting himself in harm’s way in the pursuit of his duties. In return, the nation promises him dignity, respect, and terms of service that will provide him and his family with appropriate compensation for his sacrifices. This should be the guiding principle even for soldiers who leave service, and the nation must respond to their needs.

The Agnipath scheme has the approval of the government and the three service chiefs. The anger on the streets has forced the government to make some accommodative changes and announce measures for post-retirement employment of the Agniveers. However, it is also clear that the scheme will be implemented.

The onus to make the scheme a success lies primarily on the shoulders of the younger military leaders who command units and sub-units. They must strive to ensure that military professionalism remains at the highest level. At the same time, the political leadership must also understand that there is a uniqueness to those who serve in the military.

A US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences report says, “When the chips are down, there is no rational calculation in the world capable of causing an individual to lay down his life. On both the individual and collective levels, war is, therefore, primarily an affair of the heart. It is dominated by such irrational factors as resolution and courage, honour and duty and loyalty and sacrifice of self.” That spirit must not be lost.

The writer retired as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian army’s Northern Command