An ‘atmanirbhar’ India can look the world in the eye

The West has, rightly, shown military forbearance in the face of Vladimir Putin’s onslaught on a sovereign neighbour accompanied by nuclear sabre-rattling. But in a rare show of unanimity, economic sanctions, unprecedented in severity, have been imposed on Russia. As the rouble crashed and Russia’s economy became unplugged, Putin described the sanctions as “akin to a declaration of war.”

International attention, riveted on tenacious Ukrainian resistance and refugee evacuation from its war zones, has also tended to focus on India’s noncommittal stand on Russian belligerence. Given its successive abstentions during votes in the UN Security Council and elsewhere, New Delhi has attracted criticism and even reproach from many quarters. While India’s abstentions may be hard to justify on moral grounds, they are certainly rooted in “realpolitik”. Citing India’s unique juxtaposition at the cusp of the east-west duopoly, our diplomats consider that the country’s vital national interests have been well served by its “balancing act.” The intricacies of the long-simmering Russia-Ukraine tensions are another factor that has discouraged India from taking a hard stand.

While Putin’s stated aim of “de-Nazifying” a democratic nation (headed by a Jewish president) may sound bizarre, Ukraine does have a past of collaboration with German occupying forces in WWII. Putin’s neurosis, however, relates to the violation of guarantees, sought and received on the dissolution of the USSR that NATO would not expand even “an inch eastward”. This solemn undertaking was violated when NATO enlisted, over a decade, 10 former Warsaw Pact members. By 2021, four more East European nations had joined NATO and Ukraine appeared to be on the verge of doing so. While the advance of NATO to its southern borders may have been seen by Putin as a dire threat to Russia, and to his dreams of “Russky-mir” — the restoration of Russia’s glorious past — his resort to unilateral coercive military action against a sovereign state was a deplorable act that deserved the universal condemnation that it received. The stance adopted by India has placed it amongst a minority of nations, alongside China and Pakistan. Seen widely as pro-Russian, this posture is likely to affect India’s international standing and bears reflection.

There is irrefutable logic in the argument that safeguarding the source of 60-70 per cent of its military hardware constitutes a prime national interest for India. Any interruption in the supply of Russian arms or spares could have a devastating impact on our defence posture vis-à-vis the China-Pak axis. Even after diversification of sources, India remains trapped in the Russian bear’s jaws, jeopardising the credibility of its “strategic autonomy”. The answers to India’s agonising dilemma lie in two drastic imperatives, which must receive the closest attention of decision-makers. They are: The “de-Russification of the armed forces” and the genuine “indigenisation of India’s defence technological and industrial base (DTIB)”. Let me elaborate.

The aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war saw Indian overtures for the purchase of modern weapon systems to Britain and the US. These were fobbed off with denial of credit and offers of WWII surplus equipment. Spurned by the West, India dropped like a ripe plum into the arms of Moscow’s military-industrial complex, which offered “friendship prices” on rupee payment for advanced weaponry. Thus, in the popular Indian imagination, the USSR — having proved itself a steadfast supporter in the UNSC — had become a cornucopia of cheap arms for India.

Few realise that this “honeymoon” ended with the break-up of the USSR in 1990. Shattered by the loss of many strategic industries to break-away republics, Russia’s military-industrial complex, in oligarch hands, has been struggling against inefficiency, poor quality control and deficient customer support. Even though many Russian corporations have been rescued from bankruptcy by large Indian arms contracts, the relationship has become brittle and transactional. While demanding “top dollar”, the operational availability of Russian systems remains depressed. It is time to initiate a process of progressive “de-Russification” of Indian armed forces; not to switch sources, but of becoming self-reliant.

Coming to the second imperative, by blindly stamping every piece of military hardware produced in India with the catchy “atmanirbharta” label, we are promoting dangerous self-delusion. It may be uplifting to see battle-tanks, warships and jet-fighters held up as examples of self-reliance, but what is never mentioned is that vital sub-systems like engines, guns, missiles, radars, fire-control computers, gear-boxes and transmission are either imported or assembled under foreign licences. Thus, while the public is led to believe that these platforms are “indigenous”, many of the critical components are imported and spares continue to come from abroad.

Attaining genuine “atmanirbharta” certainly does not call for becoming autarkic. But it does require selective identification of vital military technologies in which we are deficient and demands the initiation of well-funded, time-bound, mission-mode projects to develop (or acquire) the “know-how” as well as “know-why” of these technologies. Having failed for 75 years after independence to attain a degree of self-reliance in military hardware that would have undergirded our “strategic autonomy,” it is time for India to zero in on the reasons why we have failed, where peer-nations like China, South Korea, Israel, Taiwan and even Singapore have succeeded spectacularly.

The onus for this dismal situation falls on the politician, whose intense focus on the five-year electoral cycle and indifference towards national security has prevented the evolution of a long-term vision for India’s Defence Technology Industrial Base (DTIB). The bureaucracy’s incomprehension of military technology has allowed the defence science establishment to have its way without an iota of accountability for missing time, cost or performance targets. The key, however, lies with the military, which needs to look beyond its immediate operational needs and lend support to indigenisation. Only when it attains true “atmanirbharta” in arms, will India be able to look the world in the eye.

(The writer is retired Chief of Naval Staff)