How invasion of Ukraine could transform nuclear landscape of Asia

In an important statement last week, the former prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, called for a national debate on hosting American nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. In South Korea, which is electing its president this week, front-runner Yoon Suk-yeol has talked of strengthening Seoul’s nuclear deterrence against both Pyongyang and Beijing. Taiwan, which is in the cross-hairs of President Xi Jinping’s regional strategy, is reportedly developing a nuclear-powered submarine that could offer some deterrence against a Chinese invading force. Australia, which is working with the UK and the US to build nuclear-powered submarines, is accelerating the project after the Ukraine invasion.

Putin’s public command to his generals at the end of February on putting Russian nuclear forces on alert soon after he launched his invasion of Ukraine was a message to the US and NATO to stay out of Ukraine. Putin, however, was preaching to the converted. After all, Washington had made it clear that it had no intention to fight Putin’s armies on Russia’s borders. The threat of escalation to the nuclear level was very much in the mind of NATO’s military planners when the alliance refused to be drawn into a firefight with Russia in Ukraine. No wonder, that President Joe Biden did not respond to Putin’s nuclear escalation by putting America’s nuclear forces on a higher alert.

You could argue that Washington was unimpressed by Putin’s nuclear threat because Russia too is aware of the dangers of nuclear escalation. Moscow is also conscious of the fact that there are two nuclear weapon powers in Europe — Britain and France. Although the British and French arsenals are modest they do figure in Moscow’s nuclear assessments. Russia is also aware of the “nuclear sharing” arrangements between the US and some European allies — Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Under this framework, European allies host US nuclear weapons on their soil and authorise their armed forces to deliver American nuclear weapons on Russia. Nuclear sharing also involves continuous consultations on nuclear doctrine and the planning of nuclear operations.

Europe’s immediate focus, in the wake of Russian aggression against Ukraine, is not nuclear weapons but strengthening conventional deterrence to stop Putin’s adventurism in the continent. The US and its allies are also pursuing a “hybrid war” that boosts Ukrainian resistance against Russian armed forces and raises military, economic, and political costs of Moscow’s aggression.

Putin has certainly shaken Europe out of its prolonged holiday from geopolitics, and is forcing it to commit more resources to the defence of Europe and strengthen the continent’s unity against Russia. Nothing illustrates the dramatic shift in European mood than the German decision to discard its entrenched pacifism and embark on a course of rearmament.

In Asia, similar trends are unfolding. The widely discussed prospect of China emulating Russia and invading Taiwan has begun to concentrate the minds of Asian leaders. But unlike Europe, Asia has had a forewarning of the perils of great-power chauvinism and territorial expansionism. After all, China had been nibbling away at the territories of its neighbours whether it was in the South China Sea or in the great Himalayas. China has broken its commitments on Hong Kong and absorbed it forcibly.

Last month’s twin developments have only sharpened these concerns. One was the unveiling of an “alliance without limits” between Russia and China at a summit meeting in Beijing on February 4. Many in Asia, including India, continue to hope that Russia will play an independent role in the region. But the summit saw an unprecedented commitment by the two sides to stand by each other. As Putin becomes more dependent on China, Russia is bound to back Xi Jinping’s ambitions in Asia.

Taiwan is far more important for Asian (and global) security than Ukraine is for Europe. Taiwan sits at the heart of the Western Pacific and straddles the sea line of communication in the world’s most dynamic economic arena. It is the main source of silicon chips for the world. When China conquers Taiwan it will dramatically transform the geopolitics of Asia. No one understands this better than Shinzo Abe. After the Ukraine invasions, he articulated what was uppermost in the minds of many in Asia. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Abe called for an unambiguous American commitment to defend Taiwan. The current US policy does not explicitly state that its armed forces will come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked by China. Abe also called for a new debate in Japan on potential “nuclear sharing arrangements with the US. Abe, of course, is deeply aware of Japan’s entrenched “nuclear allergy”. But he is calling for a frank debate to deal with the changing Asian and global security environment after Ukraine. One element of the debate is the fact that nuclear weapons remain the greatest deterrent, especially against a vastly superior adversary.

Asian military planners know that Ukraine agreed in 1994 to give up the nuclear weapons that it inherited from the Soviet Union in return for guarantees on Kyiv’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Clearly, those legal guarantees were no substitute for nuclear weapons.

In the past, all the East Asian neighbours of China had toyed with the development of independent nuclear arsenals. The US actively discouraged Taiwan, South Korea and Japan to renounce nuclear weapons in return for American security commitments, including the shelter of the American “nuclear umbrella”. There is a growing concern in the region about whether the US nuclear umbrella or the so-called extended deterrence will work against the rapidly growing military power and nuclear clout of China.

This is the context in which China’s eastern neighbours are taking a fresh look at the nuclear option. Although Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have significant technological capabilities, developing a nuclear arsenal would be the last and most politically risky option. For now, their focus is on strengthening the military alliance with the US and boosting national defence capabilities including advanced missile systems.

On the nuclear front, the debate in Japan and South Korea is about potential nuclear sharing arrangements with the US. In Taiwan and Australia, the emphasis is on developing nuclear-powered submarines. The US too is debating the deployment of new strategic weapon systems in Asia that might encourage China to pause before trying to emulate Russia’s Ukraine adventure. One way or another, Russia’s war in Ukraine is bound to transform the Asian nuclear landscape.

The writer is a senior fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express