How Western powers contributed to Ukraine’s plight

First, the Russian invasion must be taken in the context of the withdrawal of the US and its allies from Afghanistan last year. Since the Obama administration, the US had been that it was no longer willing to act as the world’s policeman. But signalling the helter-skelter process and the ignominious outcome of a handover back to the Taliban (after 20 years and trillions of dollars wasted) were evidence of fundamental policy failures and weakened US commitment and ability. In contrast, had the performance in Afghanistan by the US and the Europeans been less chaotic, authoritarian leaders and expansionist states might not be so emboldened today.

Second, the Biden administration, in the weeks prior to February 24, engaged in announcements that were tantamount to war-mongering. Not only did the US and UK begin withdrawing families of diplomats from Kyiv as early as January 23, but the US also made public announcements on the expected date of the Russian attack. While this type of information was essential to share with intelligence agencies of allies and friends, to go public with such announcements may have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even if Putin had not intended to unleash his forces on Ukraine, he would have had little choice but to do so after such declarations from the US. Not acting after having been talked up in this way would have resulted in loss of face, both internally and externally.

Third, in the lead-up to February 24, we saw multiple leaders come out in favour of Ukraine. This was evident at the Munich Security Conference, where President Zelenskyy received a standing ovation. And lest people think this was little more than lip-service, the moral support was accompanied at least by some actions. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, for instance, took the important step of putting the approval process of Nord Stream 2 on hold, a courageous move that his predecessor had firmly resisted. Various friendly countries have provided a variety of assistance to Ukraine, ranging from aid to arms. But let us not over-glorify this assistance. Words of support and aid may perhaps have given Ukraine a false sense of security and optimism, but they would not have deterred Putin; that these words come without military support on the ground (or in the air) likely only increased Russian resolve.

Fourth, for all the frantic diplomacy and warning Russia of severe penalties should it violate Ukrainian sovereignty, empty threats seldom work, especially with strongmen. Former German Defence Minister, Annagret Kramp-Karrenbauer, understood this when she tweeted: “We have forgotten the lesson of Schmidt and Kohl that negotiation always comes first, but we have to be militarily strong enough to make non-negotiation not an option for the other side.” The West not only failed to give Ukraine the backing necessary to take on Russia, if actually attacked, but also failed to credibly signal enough military prowess on its own part that might have deterred Russian aggression.

Fifth, having issued failed warnings to Russia against invading Ukraine, the West turned to economic and personal sanctions. A debate immediately erupted among policy wonks on whether excluding SWIFT transactions would diminish the effectiveness of the sanction. But one way or another, this debate is really a second-order one: As one sanctions expert recently tweeted, “No sanctions are ‘nuclear’ in their effect; they’re just not that powerful.” Add to this the fact that most advocates of sanctions recognise that to see the effects of sanctions, one must exercise patience; the emphasis on the “long-term” was also clear in Biden’s speech of February 24. But what good is the long-term for Ukrainians, who are losing their lives to Russian artillery today?

Sixth, for all the big talk of sanctions from Western leaders, it is difficult to buy even their limited bite if one looks at the level of dependence of Europe on Russia for energy, and — even worse — the enmeshment of Russian money in the British economy. If Boris Johnson means what he says, then should he not — just as one example — be persuading the University of Oxford to give up the massive endowment it received to build the Blavatnik School of Public Policy? We have seen no sign of this, thus far.

Seventh, the entire Western strategy on dealing with Russia has been short-sighted — a classic instance of Europe and the US not being able to see beyond their noses, or in this case, the transatlantic region. Their weak and ineffective goading of Russia — and hapless refusal to protect Ukraine — will likely drive Russia further into the arms of China. And if the West was unable to curtail expansionism — on its own borders — by one authoritarian state on its own, what chance has it to preempt similar adventurism by China on Taiwan?

This brings us to our final point. As strong supporters of liberal values, we are disappointed to see India not standing up with Ukraine. But if events in the lead-up to the war are anything to go by, we cannot blame the Indian government for its fence-sitting. If the West could allow a potential close European partner to be treated in this way by an authoritarian power, then perhaps being perched on the fence is indeed the safest position.

(Mattoo is Professor at JNU and University of Melbourne. Narlikar is Professor and President at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Honorary Fellow of Darwin College, University of Cambridge)