India’s Ukraine dilemma

While the prospects for defusing the crisis have risen amidst the planned summit meeting between US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin — brokered by French President Emmanuel Macron — it is important to remember that Central Europe is no longer just a piece of territory that Russia and the Western powers can divide into “spheres of influence”. Central Europe today has an identity of its own and the political agency to reshape European geopolitics. A grand bargain between Russia and the West will work only if it is acceptable to Central Europe.

As External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar meets all the Indian ambassadors in Europe this week, it is a good moment to review Delhi’s stakes in European security and elevate the importance of Central Europe in India’s geopolitical calculus. Putin has been deliberate in raising the military temperature around Ukraine. He has set forth a clear set of demands, in writing, to the US and NATO for a sweeping overhaul of the current European security order that Putin sees as hostile to Russia. At the core of his proposals is the demand for a dominant role in Central Europe. One can quibble on Putin’s wisdom on embarking on this risky geopolitical gamble, but there can be no misreading of what he is seeking. He wants to leverage the military tension for specific political ends. As the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, had said, citing Clausewitz, “war (or the threat of war) is a continuation of politics (by other means)”.

Continuing high-level conversations between Putin and Western leaders may yet lead to a de-escalation and substantive negotiations on European security. But the carefully crafted-military tension on the ground could easily spin out of control. The growing clashes between Ukrainian security forces and Russian-backed separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine could trigger an escalation that neither side wants.

As war clouds gather over Ukraine, there is much focus on India’s diplomatic balancing act, its unwillingness to publicly caution Russia against invading Ukraine, and above all its reluctance to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. This is not the first time that Russia’s approach to Central Europe has put Delhi in a tight corner. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, exposed an important tension in Indian diplomacy.

In Central Europe, India’s pragmatism in not offending Moscow (an important partner) runs against the utter unacceptability of Putin’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”, a continuation of the Soviet era policy of saying that the socialist states must subordinate their sovereignty for the sake of the “collective interests of the socialist bloc”. While Putin’s predecessors, Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev, abandoned this doctrine, he has sought to restore it in spectacular fashion by demanding a Russian say in Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation as well as a veto over Central Europe’s security policies.

The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 came amidst Jawaharlal Nehru’s thundering denunciation of the Anglo-French attempt to seize the Suez Canal. While Delhi minced words on the Russian invasion of Hungary many opposition leaders criticised Nehru’s ambivalence. That India needed the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council on the Kashmir question clearly shaped Delhi’s readiness to subordinate its foreign policy principles for political expediency; but it opened India to the charge of diplomatic double standards. The invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring of 1968 came at a time when Delhi was leading the Asian criticism of the US war in Vietnam. While Delhi twisted in the diplomatic wind to balance its political dependence on Russia with its commitment to national sovereignty, it was subjected once again to charges of geopolitical hypocrisy.

The prospective Russian invasion of Ukraine comes amidst India’s military tensions with China and Delhi’s continued dependence on Moscow’s military supplies. It also comes at a time when Delhi is trying to build an international coalition against China’s brazen attacks on the territorial sovereignty of its Asian neighbours. Delhi has no desire to see this coalition break down due to Russia’s aggressive actions in Europe.

For the moment, Delhi is in a safe corner by calling for diplomacy in resolving the Ukraine crisis. But if Russia does invade Ukraine, the pressure on India to rethink its position will mount. Any such review must eventually lead to an independent appreciation of the geopolitics of Central Europe. Five crucial factors must shape that review.

First, Russia’s claim for a broad sphere of influence in the region has no takers in Central Europe. Neither the former members of the Warsaw Pact like Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania, nor nations such as Ukraine and the Baltic Republics that were part of the Soviet Union want to be part of Putin’s reconstituted Russian sphere of influence.

Second, while Russia has legitimate security interests in Central Europe, they can only be realised through political accommodation. Moscow cannot enforce a sphere of influence against the will of its prospective members. Central Europeans have long memories of Russian regional domination and look to the West for guarantees on their sovereignty. Third, few Central Europeans buy into the French vision for “European sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy”. They bet that NATO, led by the US, is a better option than a Europe that is independent of Washington. They view with even greater distaste the prospects for Russo-German condominium over Central Europe. Fourth, while they are eager to be part of the Western institutions, Central Europeans resent any attempt by the US and EU to impose political values that run against their traditional cultures. Finally, Central Europeans are eager to develop sub-regional institutions that can enhance their identity. The Visegrad Four — Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia — is one of them. The so-called “Three Seas Initiative” brings together 12 European states running in a vertical axis from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Adriatic and Black Sea in the south.

These groups of states are at once a barrier and bridge between Russia and the West. They underline the complexity of European geopolitics and are valuable partners for Delhi in India’s long overdue strategic engagement with Europe.

(The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express)