Imran’s problems mount as TTP attacks increase

Yogesh Gupta

Former Ambassador

IF Pakistan had hoped that the attacks of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) against its armed forces would cease after the occupation of Afghanistan by the Taliban, recent violent incidents have falsified those myths. On October 20, four Pakistani security personnel died when a roadside bomb exploded near the Afghan border. That same morning, a sepoy succumbed to militants’gunfire at a checkpost in Hangu district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

According to Pakistani media reports, the year 2021 has registered a sharp increase in terror-related fatalities. Between the second and third quarters of 2021, there was a 73 per cent rise in such incidents, mostly targeting Pakistan’s armed forces. Of the nine terror attacks in September, eight were claimed by the TTP, which is operating unhindered from Afghan areas bordering Pakistan, now under the control of the Taliban. The latter continues to be reluctant, for ideological and strategic reasons, to pressure the TTP to cease attacks and has advised the Pakistan government to talk to the TTP directly.

Despite the advice of the opposition parties and armed forces, which have lost a large number of personnel to the TTP attacks, Pakistan PM Imran Khan authorised talks with the TTP leadership. But the latter has rejected these overtures and resolved to continue its fight for the establishment of a Sharia state in Pakistan. Now the TTP is feeling much more emboldened about its jihadi cause with the victory of the Taliban and consolidation of several splinter groups and ethnic Pashtun and Baluch organisations in its fold.

Imran Khan’s headache has increased with the deterioration of his relations with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Qamar Javed Bajwa, over the removal of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed as Director-General (DG) of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). While Bajwa wanted to replace Hameed with Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmed Anjum, Imran is keen to continue with Hameed as DG, ISI, and appoint him as the next COAS after Bajwa retires in November, 2022. According to certain reports, Imran favours him as he had helped his party in winning the last elections in July 2018 and he hopes that Hameed would replicate that favour again in 2023. Bajwa, reportedly, has his own ambition of seeking another term beyond November 2022 and wants to have his own favourite as DG, ISI.

The Pakistan army has maintained a façade of unity despite internal differences. The army has seldom allowed any civilian prime minister to dictate the military appointments against its will. Whenever the latter has done so, he has paid a heavy price.

Given that Imran Khan is opposed by numerous political parties and extremist groups, like the Tehreek-e-Labbaik and others, and that he rules with a thin majority, the likely result of any continuing confrontation with the army for him is obvious. His government is already facing many problems due to poor governance, strains between key institutions and a polarised polity.

Imran Khan’s popular support is tenuous as Pakistan’s economic situation has floundered with the failure of its negotiations with the IMF for disbursal of the next tranche of $1 billion over its refusal to raise new taxes. Pakistan has witnessed a sharp depreciation of its currency (8.8 per cent from July 2021 to October 18), worsening fiscal situation, high inflation and unemployment.

Pakistan’s relations with the US have deteriorated over its duplicitous support for the Taliban as the latter has cut off most military and economic assistance. Imran Khan is flustered by the refusal of US President Biden to talk to him and his downgrade of the USA’s relationship with Pakistan to the “narrow talks on Afghanistan” instead of a “broad-based” relationship desired by Islamabad.

To mollify Washington, the Imran Khan government is in talks to support the USA’s counterterrorism efforts by allowing the use of its airspace to conduct military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan against the Islamic State (IS) and other adversaries in exchange for “help in managing the relationship with India”. While Pakistan may get some economic benefits such as the revival of some US assistance and the loosening of the IMF conditionalities over its remaining loan, such military collaboration will not be to the liking of the Taliban, which has already conveyed its opposition.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan continues to be riddled with political, economic and humanitarian disasters as the food, health and electricity situations there remain precarious. The international community has cut off most economic assistance and is insisting that the Taliban government must establish an inclusive government, respect the human rights of its women and minorities and prevent terror groups from using its territories against its neighbours. The Taliban has not complied with most of these conditions.

Pakistan’s efforts to seek international recognition of the Taliban government have not made much headway. There is a threat of the migration of a large number of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran, if the humanitarian situation worsens further.

China remains concerned about the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and TTP militants against its interests in Xinjiang and Pakistan. At the last China-Pakistan Economic Corridor meeting on September 23, 2021, China reportedly expressed indignation at Pakistan’s failure to provide adequate security to its project personnel. It asked Islamabad to take “real action”, resolve project funding issues, like payments owed to operators of independent power projects, impose new taxes on power generation companies and increase incentives for the Chinese companies. No new major projects were announced at that meeting.

The failure of the Pakistan government to respect the primacy of the military, maintain cordial relations with the key countries and internal stability is likely to weigh on its continuance in power. Imran Khan has survived so far with the support of the military. If his differences with the COAS are not resolved quickly, even that support may wither, forcing his government to totter before long.