The fact that Stube survived and is physically able to live a functional life is a testimony to modern western battlefield medicine.

But how he and many of those directly affected by the 20-year war in Afghanistan feel today is testimony to modern western political and military failure.

In 2008, commentators were speculating as to whether the right process was being pursued in regard to the pacification and rebuilding of Afghanistan. It was basically a path of military action against the Taliban, coupled with civilian development and aid programmes to support the civil community.

However, even back then, there were senior figures who raised warning flags as to the efficacy of this pursuit.

In September 2008, the former EU envoy to Afghanistan, Francesco Vendrell stated his belief that many mistakes were being made in the management of the war and that the then Bush-led US administration was misleading itself.

Lt Col Ray Lane, recently retired senior bomb disposal specialist with the Irish Defence Forces, had served twice in Afghanistan, first in 2002 and later in 2008. As he himself has stated, in 2002 he could have had a meal out in Kabul, such was the level of stability. By 2008, any movement around Kabul had to be in full battle order and there was to be no opportunity for coffee or chatting with local communities.

Lane, like many other Irish and European soldiers who served there, were working hard to limit the casualties among the civilian community as well as in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. There were many successes in this area and a lot of training done with the Afghan police and army to improve their competence in this area.

But perhaps greater attention needed to be given to mentoring and training to the higher echelons in the Afghani military and political establishment.

There is no doubt that the Afghan security services had the means by which to fight the Taliban and indeed defeat them. However, they lacked one crucial thing needed to win a fight – they lacked the will to win.

This lack of will comes from the top down. No matter how much armament, munitions, technical proficiency, without a leadership who believes they can win, you have nothing.

So why did the leaders have such little faith? Perhaps because they had relied too much on Western military support and that of the US in particular. US soldiers of all ranks often complained about the lack of enthusiasm of Afghan leaders at both tactical and strategic levels in engaging in the fight.

However, there is more to it than that. Field operations against the Taliban were normally prosecuted by using a mix of precise application of special forces attack and air power. All western ground forces had access to air strikes to call on whenever they came under attack.

Indeed, Sgt Greg Stube, whom I mentioned earlier, is one example of not only a soldier whose life was saved due to such air power, but the battle he was engulfed in was turned around by the application of such power on the battlefield.

Therefore, this begs the question at the higher strategic level, why didn’t President Joe Biden leave US air assets in place while he drew down the majority of US ground forces from Afghanistan?

Certainly US intelligence estimates have been woefully inadequate in the predication of how long the Afghan forces could hold out against the Taliban, estimating another three months at least.

This was largely based on manpower estimates and weapons capacity. The intelligence assessments took no proper note of the leanings and will to fight of the Afghan generals.

Through cronyism and appointments due to tribal loyalties rather than military capability, the Afghan military leadership was hollowed out and eroded from the inside out.

The Taliban took advantage of this and won a PR war by communicating with such leaders through tribal networks to sap any vestige of a will to fight. Who wants to be on the losing side, who wants to be the last soldier killed in the war? The Taliban used this sentiment to good effect.

By not building capacity within the upper echelons of the Afghan military and political establishment, and creating a real link between them and civil society throughout Afghanistan, the seeds of defeat were sown.

Now the US administration, under President Biden, has taken its first serious foreign policy mis-step by continuing a bad move commenced by President Trump. The blunt withdrawal of US troops en masse has left chaos in its wake and damaged US prestige.

Perhaps the Taliban will now act cleverly and not engage in mass blood-letting. The ball is now in their court. For if they can provide a level of stability in the region, the West will end up doing business with them.

But the ordinary Afghan people deserved better than this. However, so too did the Kurds who were also deserted by the US on the killing grounds of Syria.

Make no mistake, this has been a blow to both US and Western prestige after one of the longest wars in history.

Like Sgt Greg Stube, we might ask what was it all for?

Declan Power is an independent security and defence analyst with wide experience of conflict in Africa and the Middle East