Shalini Chawla

Distinguished fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Twenty years of the unfinished Afghan war have seen frequent phases of despair, occasional optimism and development of a civil society which started to ascertain its political and civil rights, the inspiring voices of the liberated Afghan women, and on the other hand, expanding Taliban influence, its growing legitimacy with the major regional powers and the group’s deepening confidence in its ability to dominate Afghanistan and run it on its ideological terms and conditions. Ironically, all the major regional powers and the United States have had channels of communication open with the Taliban, except the Afghan government. As the timeline for the complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan is approaching, there are serious concerns and apprehensions regarding the future of Afghanistan as the developments on ground are indicative of nothing less than the probability of a civil war, unless there is rethinking and initiatives from the US and the international community to exercise control on Taliban’s relentless moves.

Looking at the current realities, the post withdrawal scenario indicates Taliban dominance and the growing engagement of two major regional powers in Afghanistan — Pakistan and China. Pakistan, that shares a strategic partnership with the Taliban, is trying to shift the blame for the violence in Afghanistan on ISIS. In a recent interview to TOLO News, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said, “If you try and create this impression that the violence is high because of Taliban again, that would be an exaggeration. Why do I say that? Aren’t other elements over there who are playing the role of a spoiler?” Although Pakistan did project itself as the facilitator of the US-Taliban deal, its commitment to peace and stability in Kabul remains questionable. Islamabad cherished its much applauded role (for some time) in the US-Taliban negotiations but failed to garner the desired brownie points for itself from the West. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was not convinced of Pakistan’s actions/moves to fulfil the FATF conditionalities and decided to retain Pakistan on the grey list in the recent meeting. Even though Pakistan’s projected posture has been that it wants a stable, democratic and sovereign Afghanistan, its actions present discernible contradictions and indicate little change in its true objectives in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been overly obsessed with the desire to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan. The military and the intelligence agency, the ISI, authored and executed the policy of strategic depth since the late 1980s through the 1990s, when it strongly backed the Taliban. Although Pakistan denies the concept of strategic depth, its actions and apparent objectives in Afghanistan belie the denial. Islamabad would want to have a dominant position in Afghanistan with a pro-Pakistan regime. In Pakistan’s view, a Pakistan-friendly Taliban rule would assist Islamabad in catering to the challenges of the lingering Afghanistan-Pakistan border issue based on the Durand Line. Extending its position on the issue, the fencing of the 2,640-km border with Afghanistan, which began in March 2017, has progressed rapidly despite a backlash from both sides of the border. For Pakistan, having a favourable position in Afghanistan would help it control the mutinous Pashtun voices within. And, most importantly, Pakistan’s strategic interests have little tolerance for New Delhi’s commended (by the Afghans) developmental engagement and soft power in Afghanistan. Pakistan remains deeply insecure of New Delhi’s presence in Afghanistan and feels India’s role in Afghanistan is ‘larger than it ought to be’, as Qureshi told TOLO News.

China, on the other hand, would want to expand its engagement in Afghanistan to pursue its security, economic and strategic interests. Unrest in Xinjiang and the support the Uyghur Muslims draw from the extremist forces in Afghanistan has persistently bothered the Chinese. Beijing established contacts with the Taliban in the 1990s to try and seek assurances from the group about not supporting the Uyghur militants to create unrest in the Chinese territory. China is facing international reactions and punitive actions on account of its repressive policies in Xinjiang and at this point of time, Beijing possibly cannot afford additional spillover impact of the Afghan instability in Xinjiang.

There has been expression of China’s policies against Muslims in the global jihadi discourse and this is something China would want to guard against in order to secure its presence not only in Afghanistan, but in the neighbouring region — Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. Also, from an economic point of view, Afghanistan’s inclusion into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would facilitate China’s regional economic portfolio. Options, including connecting CPEC via railway to Kandahar and the Kabul-Peshawar motorway, have been discussed. The untapped mineral wealth in fund-starved Afghanistan has attracted Chinese companies since 2007. A strong foothold in Afghanistan places China in a stronger position to contain the influence of the adversarial powers/competition — the US, Russia and India.

Despite apprehensions regarding the future of Afghanistan, China has the ambition and political will to expand its role in Afghanistan. Given the deep China-Pakistan alliance, it is realistic to assume that the two major facilitators for Chinese ambitions in Afghanistan are likely to be China’s astounding potential to continue investments despite frequent reports of its economic challenges and its consistently growing alliance with Pakistan. China also initiated a tri-lateral dialogue with Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2017. China will expect Pakistan to facilitate its efforts to convince the Taliban of non-violent positioning and assist its strategic presence, which will be built around infrastructure investments, extended military assistance and soft power expansion in Afghanistan.

Pakistan will be a cooperative partner for Beijing and will leverage Chinese presence in Kabul to expand its connections and influence not only with Afghanistan, but with Iran and Central Asia. Turkey, which is evolving as an ideological and military ally of Pakistan and also has Chinese support, has already expressed its willingness to extend its cooperation in Afghanistan. While both China and Pakistan have hitherto been keen for the US and NATO forces to leave Afghanistan, they are now uncomfortable regarding the possibly severe security fallouts of the emerging situation in Afghanistan. The China-Pakistan nexus is likely to cautiously expand in Afghanistan, raising challenges for India’s engagement built over the past few decades.