After about two years of tension following the Balakot air strike and revocation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, there have been some forward movement in India-Pakistan ties in recent months. The Times of India's Vivekanand Ojha spoke to former diplomatVivek Katju on the status of India-Pakistan bilateral ties, as well as some other important foreign policy issues.
Q: Do you think there is a Biden administration role in recent developments in India-Pak relations?
A: The letter from the Prime Minister was on the occasion of the Pakistan National Day, and while it was a letter of greetings, I would not characterise that as particularly warm. So, also, Imran Khan's reply was not warm. As our Prime Minister laid out his concerns, Imran Khan responded with his concerns. The ceasefire agreement, or the reiteration of the ceasefire agreement by the DGMOs of India and Pakistan, was clearly a product of intense negotiations behind the scenes.
My own experience has been that while other countries may encourage India and Pakistan to go on a more cooperative path to reduce their tensions, yet India has till now never allowed any third party to intervene in the nitty-gritty of these negotiations, which have always been bilateral. I don't think that the Modi govt will depart from that practice. It is one thing for a third country to convey messages between India and Pakistan, but it is quite another thing when it gets into the negotiations aspect. I don't think that there is scope for any other format except bilateral.
Q. Can India take the Imran Khan govt seriously given that ISI is running the show?
A: The civilian government can never be taken seriously, unless there is a clear signal that the Pakistan Army is behind a particular aspect of that country's India policy. Because, Pakistan's India policy is ultimately decided in the General Headquarters by the army commanders led by the army chief. Now, in this part of the negotiating process, it seems to me that the Army is fully involved. Had that not been so, the first matter that emerged from the negotiations would not have been a statement by the army chief. So, clearly, the army is on board. This is distinct from Mr Modi's first attempt at improving ties with Pakistan where he focussed on the civilian leadership.
Q: What about Pak's U-turn on trade proposal?
A: There has been a U-turn on Pakistani import of certain commodities, but that indicates that there is a constituency in the army as well as in the country's political leadership which is against making what they see as concessions to India unless there is forward movement - from their viewpoint - on Jammu and Kashmir.
I do not see any scope for reversal of the decisions that were announced on August 5th, 2019, in respect of Constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir. Certainly, I don't see PM Modi's government, or for that matter any government, restoring the special status. Yes, there has been an indication from the government that it may restore statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. Now, the question is, will Pakistan be satisfied with this. At the moment, a great tussle seems to be on within Pakistan - within the army as well as within the political leadership - on this issue.
Q. It was feared that the Biden Administration would be tougher on India, especially in relation to alleged human rights issues in Jammu and Kashmir.
A: It was clear from the beginning that there is bipartisan support in the United States for closer ties to India because the interests of India and the US coincide in large measure and in large areas, especially in the security sector. Both countries are very concerned about the rise of China and India's participation in the QUAD summit and the strengthening of the QUAD is a clear indication of this concern.
Yes, there was an element of concern in New Delhi that the Biden administration will focus more on human rights concerns related to minorities and the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The Biden administration has not ignored these aspects, but I think it has decided to articulate it in a quiet way and it would be engaging the Indian authorities in private conversations as well, because there is a degree of concern in the Democratic Party, especially in the more liberal sections of that party.
Q: Given the Biden Administration’s changed attitude towards Iran and Russia, how soon before India can buy Iranian oil?
A: India wants close security ties with America and the defence relationship is moving well. But, at the same time, India wishes to retain its autonomy in respect of acquiring high defence systems which are appropriate to its needs, and therefore, there is every indication that it will resist, as it has been resisting, all pressures that come from the United States regarding this deal. If the Biden administration chooses to go very strong on this, then the Indo-US relationship in the defence sector will inevitably suffer, and I think the Biden administration knows this. So, they will have to craft out a way.
As far as oil purchases from Iran are concerned, I think the Biden administration's engagement with Iran to get back into the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) has begun. It will take time, but once it concludes, the Biden administration will embark on lifting sanctions on Iran, including in the oil and gas sector. I think that is the time when India-Iran relationship in the hydrocarbon area will become more robust.
Q: After the military coup in Myanmar, there seems to be tremendous pressure on India from western democracies to take a hardline stand against the military.
A: We don't have the luxury of being at a distance from Myanmar. We are a neighbour, and we have security interests in Myanmar. We can't be unmindful of China-Myanmar ties. In the past, we paid a price because of our policies in Myanmar in 1988-89. We paid a price when we embarked on a full-hearted policy, completely ignoring the ground reality in Myanmar. So, this time around, I think we got to have a dual approach. In the first place, we must maintain our engagement with the Myanmar generals, even while we publicly and privately make it clear to them that we are very unhappy with the developments that have taken place. But the engagement with the generals must continue.
Secondly, we must keep our engagement with the democratic forces in Myanmar, because that engagement too is essential.