Even after 11 rounds of talks between the protesting farmers and the government, the great divide remains. The farm leaders continue to take the maximalist position of seeking the repeal of the three Central farm laws, even when the Union Agriculture Minister talks about discussing the laws clause by clause. Both sides have taken rigid positions from where any early and easy resolution doesn’t seem forthcoming. While the government has made it abundantly clear that it is ready to discuss everything except the repeal of the three laws, the farm leaders won’t be accepting anything but the abrogation of the three Central legislations. And as the leaders, both political as well as farm, fail to find a middle ground, it’s the common farmers, hailing mostly from Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, who have been forced to stay in their makeshift tents at Delhi’s borders since 26 November.

Analysed closely, the situation is a classic case of how not to handle an issue. The government failed to comprehend the concerns among a section of farmers, especially from Punjab, regarding the three farm bills passed by the Central government in September 2020. Farmers were uneasy about talks of MSP and mandis being terminated. The farmers’ agitation actually gained momentum on these two points. Today the government is ready to give in writing that it is not going to end the MSP and mandis. But the question is: Why did it fail to reach out to farmers when these issues were first raised and the protests were confined to Punjab alone? Why did Central government ministers not reach out to them then?

The farmers’ stir could have been handled much better had the government dealt with it initially—and with empathy. The government seemed to have been misled by bureaucratic advice of letting the agitation lose steam on its own, and failed to act on time. And by the time it woke up to the gravity of the situation, the agitators were already on the borders of Delhi and the agitation had become much more than the issues of MSP and mandis. Whether one agrees or not, the fact is the farmers’ protests have acquired a certain political colour today. It has also become a prestige battle where no one wants to be seen to be conceding. This explains why even after the government’s repeated assurances that the MSP and mandis won’t go away, and also its readiness to discuss the three farm laws clause by clause, there is no movement in the talks. The farm union leaders’ “my way or highway” stand won’t be beneficial for the farmers’ cause.

What’s ironical, amid the ongoing protests, is that the track record of the Modi government on MSP isn’t bad at all. In fact, on the issue, the Modi government has done much more than the previous dispensation. MSP payment to farmers for paddy rose by 2.4 times to Rs 4.95 lakh crore between 2014 and 2019 under the Modi government, as against only Rs 2.06 lakh crore under the previous Congress-led regime between 2009-2014. MSP to farmers for wheat increased by 1.77 times during 2014-19 to Rs 2.97 lakh crore, as compared to Rs 1.68 lakh crore in the 2009-14 period. Also, MSP payment for pulses rose by 75 times under the Modi dispensation, to reach Rs 49,000 crore, in sharp contrast to Rs 645 crore under the UPA-II.

To its credit, the Modi government, in July 2018, announced MSP at 1.5 times the cost of production for 14 kharif crops. This was based on the recommendations of the Swaminathan Commission and National Commission of Farmers, 2006, which the previous dispensation failed to implement despite being in power till 2014. Here, one needs to clarify that the role of MSP in Indian agriculture is overhyped. It, after all, relates to just over 6% of farmers, with an overwhelming majority of small farmers not going to the mandi to sell their produce.

The current stalemate is tragic in the sense that the issues involved are serious for our agriculture and its future. Over exploration of groundwater table, consequent need to change cropping pattern, glut of procured wheat and paddy and related storage capacity and lower market price than the MSP are the core issues defying serious discussion due to the vested interest of the farmers in the MSP and mandis and the government’s failure to anticipate it. Any compromise, which seems probable, will only prolong the wait for the agricultural reforms. The government will have to find better ways to deal with the farmers and their concerns, perhaps in piecemeal.

The Modi government has failed on two fronts: One, it didn’t reach out to farmers when they first raised their concerns. But even more important than that, it should have engaged farmers and their leaders while formulating the three laws. What the Agriculture Minister proposes to do now—to discuss the farm laws threadbare, clause by clause—he and his team could have done before September.

The Centre’s second failure is even more significant: the battle of perception. It’s something this dispensation should look at more seriously. Despite doing reasonably good work for the farmers, the government still struggles to shrug off its pro-trader image. The government is often seen wanting in putting the facts across. It sometimes gives the impression that it doesn’t care; at other times, it is seen as being helpless. The government needs to beef up its defences in dealing with perception wars and need for a wider consultation on such measures.

Be that as it may, first the CAA stir and now the farm protests give the government enough reason to look inwards and see where it has gone wrong. Both the measures were desirable and well-intended, yet faced resistance due to a lack of sufficient communication on the purpose. It seems to be a complex function of the government’s overconfidence and absence of a responsible opposition at the Centre to keep the government on toes. The country can’t afford endless protests and agitations, especially when the economy is badly hit by the Covid-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown.

The writer is a former IPS officer and the editor of the quarterly magazine, ‘Dialogue’. The views expressed are personal.

The farmers’ stir could have been handled much better had the government dealt with it initially—and with empathy. The government seemed to have been misled by bureaucratic advice of letting the agitation lose steam on its own, and failed to act on time. And by the time it woke up to the gravity of the situation, the agitators were already on the borders of Delhi and the agitation had become much more than the issues of MSP and mandis.

Assembly elections are often seen as a sort of weather vane to gauge the mood in between various general elections. This is not necessarily accurate—recall the 2008 Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh elections that the BJP swept only to lose the 2009 general elections. And more recently, in 2018 the BJP lost the three states, only to sweep the general elections.

However, having stated that, there is no denying that political pundits look at the Assembly elections to check the popularity of a government at the Centre. Post the lockdown the Bihar elections of November 2020 were keenly watched to see if the impact of a lockdown that saw thousands of migrant workers trudging on the road from the metros back to Bihar would have an impact on the vote. Would the migrants blame the Prime Minister for their troubles, for not giving them enough warning to rush back to their homes in the villages before they lost their jobs in their cities. For not helping them as they trekked across state boundaries carrying all their belongings on their back.

Interestingly, they did not blame the PM for their woes as the BJP went on to get the highest number of seats in that election. Just as the voters of Uttar Pradesh did not blame PM Narendra Modi for the demonetisation of 2016 in the elections that followed a few months later (the BJP swept UP in the 2017 polls), the voters of Bihar too did not seem to lay the blame at PM Modi’s door. Instead, it was Nitish Kumar, the sitting CM, who bore the brunt of their anger, for not ensuring that the people of Bihar were given adequate buses and resources to return home, and for not providing enough jobs in the state in the first place so that the citizens of the state would not have to go out to look for work. In the end, the PM’s teflon coating remained intact. The general impression is that he means well, that he has the right intent, and if the delivery is botched up (as it often is, while implementing lockdown, an unwieldy GST, a badly execution demonetisation), then it is not his fault but the fault of the bureaucrats and those responsible for executing his intent.

Given this background, it is virtually impossible for any state leader to win against PM Modi, but there have been some instances where the BJP has been defeated (ever since Modi became PM) and not just by regional satraps like Arvind Kejriwal, Mamata Banerjee, and even Nitish Kumar (2015); but also by the Congress—in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Punjab.

Which is why one is watching the Mamata Banerjee vs Narendra Modi battle in West Bengal very closely. Yes of course, it is not a CM vs PM battle but since the BJP has not put up a CM face and since it is Modi’s face on most of the state hoardings and he is the party’s star campaigner, it is safe to assume that this is a Mamata Banerjee vs the Modi-Shah duo battle. And the feisty leader from West Bengal seems to be matching the PM on rhetoric, drama and mass connect.

If the BJP fails to grasp the state, will it have an impact on the next general election. Probably not. It may not even have an impact on the next state polls in Uttar Pradesh due next year. But it will send a strong message to the Opposition that the Modi juggernaut can be halted. For, if the BJP wins West Bengal then its sweep over the North, East and most of West will be established and Home Minister Amit Shah will point his Ashwamedh Rath to the South. We are told Tamil Nadu is his next big target after West Bengal. Hence it is important in the battle of optics and perceptions for the Opposition to hold on to West Bengal. And it could not have found a better general to lead the charge than Mamata Banerjee. 

The current situation at Kerala’s Sabarimala templehas its genesis in the application made by S. Mahendran against the apparent violation of the traditional ban upon seeing the picture of former Devaswom Commissioner Chandrika conducting a rice-feeding ceremony of her granddaughter in the presence of her daughter at the Sabarimala temple in 1990. He filed the public interest litigation (PIL) before the Kerala High Court which upheld the ban in 1991. This formalisation was challenged in 2018 by the Indian Young Lawyers Association before the Supreme Court which delivered its judgement in favour of the petitioners declaring the restriction on women as invalid on 28 September 2018.

The judgement of the Supreme Court led to a movement which vigorously opposed the judgement. It must be kept in mind that the Supreme Court treated the case as one of gender discrimination and thus saw itself as striking a blow for emancipatory modernity against discriminatory tradition. The elite discourse in India is overwhelmingly in favour of modernity and Kerala is considered one of the most progressive states in India. This agitation must be considered extraordinary in view of the fact that the state of Kerala, by several indices, such as literacy (94%), life-expectancy (74.9 years, and the highest), rate of infant mortality (5.59 per 1,000 live births) and so on, is considered one of the most progressive states in India. It is also, perhaps, India’s most religiously diverse state with the following religious demographic: Hinduism 55%, Islam 26% and Christianity 18% (Census 2011). Furthermore, the ratio of unmarried women to the population is also the highest in India while the per capita income is sixty percent higher than the national average. In other words, Kerala is among the most literate, prosperous, progressive, and modern states of India. Its daily paper Malayali Manoroma, published in the language of the region, Malayalam, almost matches the nationwide circulation of The Times of India, India’s most widely read English daily (Trak.in, 2014). One would therefore expect that the decision of the Supreme Court would be welcomed by such a state.

The response from Kerala, however, was counterintuitive and took the form of state-wide protests against the decision of the Supreme Court. Women particularly were active participants in this agitation and many of them joined it in large numbers with the slogan ‘Ready to Wait,’ the obvious implication being that they were ready to wait till they were past the reproductive age to embark on a pilgrimage to Sabarimala (Ranipeta, 2018).

Right after the Supreme Court decision of September 28, 2018 a voice of protest was raised by a Hindu outfit on October 15, 2018 when the Shiv Sena threatened to stage mass suicide, a threat which was not followed up (IANS, 2018). Protests intensified with the formal opening of the temple when some women within the reproductive age bracket tried to enter the shrine in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court but were forced to return from the halfway point. A New York Times female journalist was also forced to return as well despite heavy police protection. A women’s rights activist, Rehana Fathima, managed to go up to the Valiya Nadappandhal but was forced to return owing to violent protests. Emotions ran so high that even a woman past her reproductive age was forced to return (Deepika, 2019). The next noteworthy incident took place on December 17, 2018 when four transgender women were allowed to enter the temple after being initially blocked. No biologically-born woman had been able so far to uphold the verdict of the Supreme Court. That happened on January 2, 2019 when two women Bindu and Kanaka Durga ‘made history’ by setting foot inside the sanctum santorium of the Sabarimala temple. They were escorted under heavy police protection, which included a posse of one hundred policemen under the direct supervision of Malappuram Deputy Superintendent of Police, Jaleel Thottathil (Deepika, 2019). This outcome, however, was secured through a ruse, after these two women had been passed off as transgenders to get them past the agitators (BBC News, 2019).

The state government of Kerala then tried to counter this agitation by organising a Women’s Wall as to express solidarity with the Supreme Court judgement. It consisted in forming a ‘620 km human chain’ stretching from the Kasaragod to Thiruvanthapuram in favour of the removal of the ban (BBC News, 2019). The agitators, against the Supreme Court judgement, responded by organizing their own version of the wall as a counter-protest. In anticipation of the left-wing coalition government’s Wall scheduled for January 1, 2019, the Sabarimala Karma Samithi, backed by the BJP, organised the Ayyappa Jyothi—their own human chain with lamps from Kasaragod to Kanyakumari on 26 December 2018—in protest against the decision of the Supreme Court (TNM Staff, 2018). 

As protests mounted, a number of petitions were made to the Supreme Court to review its decision on Sabarimala which it had thrown open to women of all ages. On February 6, 2019 it relented to review its judgment in the matter at a future time, but without suspending the operation of its existing decision. These petitions urging reconsideration of the judgement were opposed by the Kerala’s Left Democratic Front government. Another interesting development around this time is represented by the decision of the Travancore Devaswom Board to inform the Supreme Court that they no longer opposed the original decision. It should be noted that the Devaswom Board is not a totally autonomous body and includes appointees on it by the government (Mathur, 2019).

The Sabarimala Temple then opened from February 12-17, 2019 for the five-day monthly poojas for the Malayalam month of Kumbhom under heavy security. Thereafter, the Sabarimala issue gradually receded into the background as campaigning for the national elections, scheduled for April 11 to May 23, 2019, intensified. The attitude of the BJP, which went on to prevail electorally, is worth noting in the context. According to some observers, the BJP was a bit ambivalent on the issue. On the one hand, the Hindu configuration of the case had an obvious appeal for the BJP at the regional level. However, the BJP seemed to have held back for fear of being portrayed as opposed to women’s rights at the national level if it backed the agitation too enthusiastically. Now that the elections are over, and that the new parliament is in place, the issue shows signs of surfacing again. One of the earliest items for consideration before Parliament is a private member’s bill tabled by Premachandran on 14 June 2019 urging the government to undo the decision of the Supreme Court through legislation (Chatterjee, 2019). The election results in Kerala did not see a breakthrough of the kind the BJP expected, and which it did achieve in West Bengal where it is perceived to have made remarkable gains. Interestingly, the electoral beneficiary of the agitation turned out to be the Congress. The incumbent government, however, suffered badly in the elections and the new Kerala government has toned down its stance on the Sabarimala issues following the election.

CONCLUSION: THE BAN, THE RESTRICTION AND HINDUISM

The ongoing controversy surrounding Sabarimala is of great potential significance for Hinduism. It involves several historical, legal, social, political and other dimensions.

The rest of this paper will examine only one issue, namely, whether the exclusion of women of reproductive age at Sabarimala involves gender-discrimination. In other words, does the restriction placed on women of reproductive age from participating in the Sabarimala pilgrimage violate the principle of gender equality? In order to answer this question, we will need to have a clearer understanding of the equality principle, or egalitarianism. It is important to distinguish among three forms of egalitarianism: monothetic egalitarianism, polythetic egalitarianism, and synthetic egalitarianism.

As these descriptions are perhaps being introduced for the first time in this discourse, it might be useful to say a few words by way of explanation.

Let us take the hypothetical case of a father who has a son and a daughter of approximately the same ages and decides to make a settlement of his property. If he divides his one house equally between his son and his daughter, then it would be a case of monothetic egalitarianism. Let us now suppose that he has two houses, more or less similarly equipped and in the same locality. He now divides these houses between his son and his daughter assigning one to each of them. This is a case of polythetic equality. The point to note here is that if he had decided to divide both his houses down the middle to his son and his daughter, then this would have been a case of monothetic egalitarianism. If he now gives one house to his son and another to the daughter while also allowing free access to both houses to each of them on special occasions, then it would be a case of synthetic egalitarianism.

It might be helpful to clarify the distinction between the three forms of egalitarianism further, as they are crucial to the argument of the paper, this time with the cruder example of bathrooms. If men and women have equal access to a unisex bathroom, then it would be a case of monothetic egalitarianism. If, however, men and women both have separate bathrooms assigned to them, equipped with similar facilities, then it would be a case of polythetic egalitarianism. Finally, if men and women have separate bathrooms with the understanding that each could use the bathroom of the other in a crisis, then that would be a case of synthetic egalitarianism.

How do these distinctions help us understand the Sabarimala impasse on the issue of gender equality?

Those who insist that both men and women should have equal access to the Sabarimala shrine are advocating monothetic egalitarianism. Those who insist that there is no need to do so are arguing that just as the Sabarimala shrine of Ayyappan is open only to men, there are also other shrines of Ayyappan which are open only to women are arguing for polythetic egalitarianism. The main point to keep in mind here is that both these forms of egalitarianism are non-discriminating. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the real issue of Sabarimala is not equality versus inequality, it is really a case of monothetic equality versus polythetic equality.

It does not take one long to see how the complexion of the case under discussion is altered by the introduction of these distinctions. Here are some of the issues which arise if the concept of polythetic egalitarianism is taken on board along with that of monothetic egalitarianism. Consider for example the question of tradition and modernity. Sometimes the Sabarimala issue is considered as one of clash between tradition and modernity. But, by now, modernity itself has become a tradition with its own agenda of monothetic equality, while tradition seems to finetune the concept of equality in a way which might help modernity deal with the issue with greater sophistication. It is also ironical that perhaps the most modern state of India, in terms of education, infant mortality rates and female empowerment, namely Kerala, witnessed such a vigorous defence of the Hindu tradition and that too, by women, against a law which was supposedly intended to liberate them. The West seems to intellectually acknowledge, only a notion of monothetic equality, while Indian ethics contains conceptions of both monothetic and polythetic equality. Does gender equality, in other words, mean that only unisex bathrooms are non-discriminatory? Feminism also becomes involved in this issue. Is feminism too white and Western for India? Would ‘womanism’ answer India’s needs better? Or does India need a feminism of its own?

This is the second and concluding part of the article, ‘Women and the case of Sabarimala pilgrimage’ (27 February).

The writer is the Birks Professor of Comparative Religion at the McGill University in Montréal, Canada. He is also associated with the Nalanda University in India. The views expressed are personal.

From all accounts, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s India visit went off very well. As the statements issued by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Secretary Austin suggest, the Joe Biden administration is going full steam ahead in the direction that the previous Donald Trump administration had taken regarding India. As Rajnath Singh mentioned in his speech during the joint press conference on Saturday that the visit was part of the process of realising the full potential of the India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. India-US ties were elevated to this level during the then President Donald Trump’s visit to India in February 2020 and it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Joe Biden is on course to enhance that policy even further. It is significant that Austin’s first overseas trip as Defense Secretary was to India, which should explain the importance that Washington is giving to its defence ties with New Delhi, including defence cooperation, military to military engagement, information sharing and mutual logistics support, as stated by the Indian Defence Minister. In this respect mention was naturally made of the foundational agreements signed by India and US, namely, LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA. These agreements have helped India forge a military partnership with the US and will help—in fact is already helping—India get access to cutting edge weapons as well as communication systems. Significantly, Gen Austin talked about India being the “central pillar of our approach to the region”. It would not be wrong to interpret this “region” as extending beyond South Asia and spanning the Indo-Pacific. After all, it is this region where the international rules-based order is coming under maximum pressure because of China and India is on the forefront of countering that threat.

It’s important that Austin’s visit was taking place inside a week of the first meeting of the four heads of state and government of the countries that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, otherwise known as Quad. And though this visit was specifically about India-US defence partnership, it was but natural for the two ministers to speak about the Quad. Not once, however, the C-word was uttered by the two, even though the subtext of their speeches was all about China. That Austin visited India so soon after the Biden administration took office is proof that countering China has been put front and centre of Biden’s foreign policy. The talk at the joint press conference was however about the need to have an “international rules-based order”, the importance of having a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, or sharing the “vision for regional security in the Indo-Pacific”. India went a step further and true to its wont talked about “non-traditional challenges such as oil spills and environment disasters, drug trafficking, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing” in the Indo-Pacific, thus proving once again how uncomfortable it still is about being seen to be aligning with the US in an increasingly bipolar world. The world order while striving to be multipolar, is functioning inside a bipolar construct of US vs China, and no fig leaf of multipolarity or talk about “unregulated fishing”—fishing?!—will hide the fact that India does not have a choice but to align with the US, which it is doing already, and that the Quad is all about countering China. However, as long as India’s traditional diffidence, or habit of sitting on the fence does not impact its policy, fig leaves too are acceptable.

As for the Quad, it must go beyond meetings, either virtual or in-person. All four parties need to push to formalise it into a security alliance and work in association with other countries in the region as well as other “democratic” powers that want to get active in the Indo-Pacific region. For this an Indo-Pacific charter is necessary. An operational headquarters too will have to be identified. The aim of Quad is not war, but peace—containing China to maintain peace and to ensure that the world does not get rewritten with Chinese Communist Party characteristics. And for that a security alliance is necessary. China under Xi Jinping has delusions of grandeur and is aggressively pursuing an imperialist agenda. The world cannot afford to wait forever for the free and democratic world to come together to stop China’s aggression. It has to happen, and it has to happen now.

Former Commissioner of Police in Mumbai Param Bir Singh’s accusations about state Home Minister Anil Deshmukh in his letter to Maharashtra Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray reflects the rot that has set in the present system of the police administration almost all across the country and the nexus that exists between politicians and the police.

My friend from Ranchi, Philip Matthew, wrote to me saying he was bewildered that intellectuals in the country were shocked at the revelations that have come out of the Sachin Vaze controversy. As a businessman, he knows how the palms of administration need to be greased to get even honest work done.

While Param Bir Singh may have tried to become a whistleblower, peddling to his political mentor in order to save his skin, the fact remains that he was in a position to say ‘no’ and could have taken corrective steps. His own investigations into high-profile cases have put question marks and brought down the credibility of the Mumbai Police by many notches.

But my concern is not about the Vaze affair. This would surely reach a conclusion and bring some sobering effect on the system of patronage that has been the legacy of the British Raj. My concern is the feeling that a common man in this country gets any time they face such a situation. 

Has Independence done any good to the poorest of the poor? He has got voting rights and he votes when there is an emotional polarisation that prevents him from exercising his choice based on logical issues such as bijli, sadak, paani and good governance. Then those who are voted blame the voters, saying, ‘You get the government that you deserve’. And the system continues.

Nobody questions why even more than 70 years after Independence, we are still talking of providing basic facilities to the common man. It is abhorrent that so many people in the country are without toilet facilities, something that should have come as a basic right and been included in our human rights.

Ask any political representative and he would tell you that the maximum complaints he gets from people are about the high-handedness of the police. A young man has to ask his representative to intervene when his motorcycle is impounded by the police because getting it back is a tortuous process. A crime happens but the FIR is lodged depending on the power of the litigant or his ability to grease the palms of the right people. 

On most occasions, the police are seen as the official goonda machinery and the system of corruption and dadagiri goes on with the unbridled power enjoyed by a police thana in-charge. The daroga system has made the thana in-charge very powerful. Even the top of the police hierarchy has to go through him. He is the king and the lord of his area.

Policymakers, particularly political representatives, need to understand the deleterious impact that the fear of the police has on the common man. The test of this institution is whether it is the first stop for a person to lodge a complaint when an incident happens. Usually, the person would prefer to go to the local goonda rather than the police. He knows that going to the police will invite trouble and disturb his peace.

The biggest challenge facing decision makers today is to get this fear out of the poor and strengthen the institutions of governance at the grassroots. The state or its character is known by the face of its police—whether the thana in-charge and his men are humble and care about regaining the trust of the public.

If the police become an instrument to run extortion rackets in deference to political masters or even otherwise, the credibility of the state gets completely undermined. People get frustrated and lose faith in the system. In the longer run, governance becomes extremely difficult. Most people respect the law because they have faith in the system. This hemline of faith needs to be strengthened to strengthen democracy.

If police officials or other important officials of the executive get postings or transfers because of paying bribes, they can’t be expected to deliver honesty and accountability. They would use their tenure to extract money first to compensate themselves and then to make more money for their next postings. Politicians who are a part of this system would have no incentive to bring some order either.

In the age of neo-liberalisation, such a police force becomes antithetical to economic reforms. Business activities would not pick up unless honest entrepreneurship is encouraged. If a businessman has to pay to let his business exist, he would resort to cheating the system. He has to become dishonest to survive. Those who do not compromise would either leave the business or leave the country. 

While a few thrive due to the system, it is the government which suffers the most. We are already very low on global rankings given the levels of corruption and this system further ensures that the only people who remain in the country are crooks.  Most government officials treat businessmen as cheats and deal with them accordingly. But the time has come to change this mindset. Those who produce wealth must be respected if society has to progress to a better way of life. 

If a businessman seeks an appointment with concerned officials to get his grievances addressed, he finds it very difficult. I remember when Narendra Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat, business people used to get a red-carpet welcome. They were respected for the role they played. While they offered jobs to youths, the taxes they paid made the state rich enough to take care of the needy.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has brought hope by encouraging reforms. The system of licences has been eased and the government has tried to launch an onslaught on the Inspector Raj that stymied the system. Now registering a company is just a click away. The PAN card and other associated documents come to people automatically. The process of income tax assessment and scrutiny has also been simplified and made more transparent.

But such far-reaching reforms have not been undertaken at the level of the police. We must remember that policing is a state subject and all the states must come to a consensus on police reforms to make this possible. Using digital technology to bring more transparency such as the installation of CCTV cameras in police stations would definitely bring more transparency and accountability.

We have a provision of Special Police Officers too, but this is not enough. We need public accountability of the police. This can be done with an image audit of police thanas by a committee of senior citizens. Such an audit should have strong weightage while writing the ACR of police officials.

Many other suggestions have been given by experts on how to reform the police system. Since it is operating in society and has a huge influence on people’s minds, it must be held accountable to people. A better police force means a better image for the political party in power and stronger support of people. We have seen how a young police officer in his tenure can make so much of a difference and how people love him and respect him.

When the UPA was in power, Sonia Gandhi had tried to fix BJP leaders in Gujarat. There is a saga of how witnesses were created and cases lodged just to fix them since they posed a threat to the Gandhi family’s political hegemony. However, it did not work and the Gandhis were thrown out of power. One must remember that people indulging in corrupt practices and policemen acting as fixers for the political party in power get exposed sooner rather than later.

The writer is convener of the Media Relations Department of the BJP and represents the party as a spokesperson on TV debates. He has authored the book ‘Narendra Modi: The Game Changer’. The views expressed are personal.

The significance of the Armenian-Indian relations once again arose among the academics, journalists, and politicians both in Armenia and India amid the outbreak of the Nagorno Karabakh 44-day war. In the war, Turkey and Pakistan supported Azerbaijan, with the former doing so militarily and also by deploying thousands of Jihadists that were in Syria under Turkey’s demand. Pakistan did so by providing logistical and technical support on the ground.

Thus, these two aspects particularly turned the world media’s attention to the South Caucasus; alarmed by the danger of Turkey’s expansionism on the way to re-establish the Ottoman Empire and being aware of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement of his willingness to create a global Turkish Army.

A CULTURAL HISTORY OF INDIAN-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

Going back to history, the authenticity of the Indian-Armenian relations is known through history due to the Armenian community in India (Delhi, Surat, Madras, Murshidabad, and Kolkata). The earliest Armenian who arrived in India was Thomas Cana. He reached the Malabar Coast in 780 CE and was given trading privileges by the ruler of Kodungallur. Another important footprint can be found in the letter of the Court of Directors of the English East India Company (EIC) to Bengal about the Armenian Community: “Most certainly, they are the most ancient merchants of the world…sort of men that travel all over India and know almost every village in the Mughal’s dominions and every sort of goods with such perfect skill and judgment as exceeds the most ancient of our linen drapers”. Also, an Armenian historian Mesrovb Jacob Seth, who was educated at the Armenian College of Calcutta, mentions in his book “Armenians in India” that Armenians in India have not built colonies, unlike the Europeans. These essential historical facts are known to few in both Armenia and India and hence need further exploration. As we witness an Asian awakening amidst waning of the Western influence, nationalism is reappearing. And on that stance, both Armenia and India hold the legacy of one of the oldest civilisations in the world.

Indian presence in Armenia is not huge. However, it is remarkable since Yerevan hosts a growing number of Indians studying in medical school and otherwise after Armenia allowed visa-free entry for Indian citizens in 2017. Additionally, Indian restaurants are growing in numbers and one of the restaurants called “Indian Mehak Restaurant and Bar” in Armenia’s capital Yerevan delivered packages of cooked food to those forced to flee their homes in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Humanitarian support came from a 21-year-old Sanjay Yadav who, with his friends (medical school students), donated food and water for the Armenian soldiers. On an academic level, one of the authors Ararat Kostanian was invited for a webinar discussion by Usanas Foundation, India to reveal Armenia’s position during the war.

However, the relationship extends beyond the cultural linkages as both countries look towards a deeper strategic partnership that can preserve regional peace in the South Caucasus.

A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF INDIA’S PERSPECTIVE ON ARMENIA & SOUTH CAUCASUS

The breakout of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in September 2020 was watched closely by New Delhi. Despite a lack of an explicit South Caucasus policy, India, historically, has advocated a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The 20th century saw India as one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia in 1992. Consequently, New Delhi received three heads of state from Yerevan and also cemented a friendship and treaty cooperation in 1995. At the same time, India outbid Poland and Russia to win a defence deal for SWATHI Weapon Locating Radars in 2020 worth USD 40 million.

Though, having maintained a neutral stand on the conflict in the past, 2020 saw Indian social media coming out in strong support of Armenia. Not without coincidence, this can be attributed to a score of geopolitical convergences that India and Armenia now share. Both India and Armenia envision a rules-based order with respect for human rights and international law. This ideological concurrence opens up a string of other shared areas of concern for both.

Russia, France, and the US have long been working jointly to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict in South Caucasus through the OSCE’s Minsk Group. However, Turkey undertook a roguish role in the conflict leading to a disruption in this otherwise balanced approach to solving the conflict.

The reports of Syrian mercenaries via Turkey and Pakistani nationals allegedly supporting Azeri forces during the war exposed the possibility of a strong Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan nexus during the conflict. The government and social media in Islamabad also undertook social media attacks in their support for Baku, further highlighting the nexus. It also brings to fore a concern about the rise in Islamist extremism, something both India and Armenia want to counter.

This brings us to a major geopolitical concern that New Delhi and Yerevan share—the expansionist and imperialistic tendencies of Turkey and Pakistan. Ankara, in a bid to gain a stronger role in the energy politics of the South Caucasus and challenge Moscow’s domination, has sought an arrangement with Islamabad and Baku. What also helps is Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s and Imran Khan’s shared dream of being the leaders of the Islamic world. Hence, the triangle has become a major concern for Armenia and India.

Therefore, an enhanced partnership between Yerevan and New Delhi against this backdrop can prove to be useful for maintaining regional peace and security.

Armenia’s support to India on Kashmir and the growing Pakistan-Turkey-Azerbaijan nexus present a unique opportunity to Yerevan and New Delhi to enhance their partnership.

With such a strong foundation, India should formulate a strong South Caucasus Policy in defence, economy, culture and diplomacy. As India ushers in an era of defence indigenisation through ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ and ‘Make in India’, Armenia can prove to be a major market for military procurement. At the same time, both Armenia and India have the chance to join the anti-Turkey coalition of Greece, Cyprus, France, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Armenian and Indian political and military agreements, thus, have the potential of maintaining a balance of power and stability in the region.

Similarly, setting up a joint business forum and identifying areas of investment can also prove to be beneficial for both. In the age of tech and media, we should work upon creating opportunities to bring our youth together in interactions and by providing chances to them to create businesses and start-ups, especially in the IT sector where both Armenia and India are booming. On the diplomatic cum academic front, Armenian and Indian scholars/policymakers should work together in revealing the inhumane atrocities of Armenian and Bangladesh genocides.

It would be rational to argue that even though India and Armenia share friendly relations, improving it under the current geopolitical scenario may prove to be a strategic win-win situation for both countries.