Marital status can’t snatch away rights

The judiciary often comes in for criticism for its patriarchal attitudes, justifiably so. Nonetheless, it is also a fact that the same institution, more often than not, serves to remind us of anachronistic beliefs that are entrenched in the collective psyche of society and initiates course correction. Several progressive judgments bear testimony to this, the latest being one delivered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

While disposing of a petition filed by a married woman seeking the job of her father, who died in harness, on compassionate grounds, the court found fault with a circular issued by the State Road Transport Corporation that made a married daughter ineligible for such a benefit. An unmarried daughter or a married or unmarried son was eligible. Terming the evident bias unconstitutional, the court ruled that a daughter continues to be part of her parents’ family even after marriage and cited instances of daughters taking care of parents after marriage. It also pointed out that no such distinction was made in the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens’ Act. This is not the first time a verdict of this nature has been delivered. Many courts have issued similar judgments recently. For instance in the Vimla Srivastava vs State of UP case, the Allahabad HC had held that a married daughter cannot be excluded from the definition of a family.

One wonders why this discrimination comes up regularly in respect of women. Nothing explains it except that those holding positions of authority are caught in a time warp. Government job on compassionate grounds is definitely not a right, as clarified by the Supreme Court. It is a benefit given to a family so that the members do not slip into penury upon the sudden demise of the breadwinner. There can be other aspects such as the financial position, government benefits and pension being received, etc., to determine if a member of the family requires a job on compassionate grounds. But surely, denial of benefit on the basis of marital status of a daughter cannot be a criterion.