The complexity of India’s relationship with Myanmar was best illustrated by New Delhi’s expression of a ‘deep concern’ at the dethroning of Aung San Suu Kyi and taking over the reins of government by the Tatmadaw, as the army in Myanmar is known. India has also expressed the hope that the rule of law and spirit of democracy will be upheld in Myanmar. Finally, New Delhi declared it was watching the situation.
All pious words. The art of diplomacy has two main components — the first is idealism and the second is securing self-interest. Jawaharlal Nehru’s role behind the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement was an excellent example of the first one while India’s response to decades long travails of Suu Kyi is a showpiece of the second. The reason is simple. Insurgency in the northeastern States has become a headache for successive governments in New Delhi and for containing it, the cooperation of the Myanmar army is necessary.
Dalai Lama, Suu Kyi
So India has every reason not to feel perturbed over the coup in Myanmar in spite of the expression of ‘deep concern’. This is nothing new in India’s Myanmar policy. New Delhi has never disowned Suu Kyi, daughter of legendary Burmese freedom fighter Aung San and his wife Daw Khin Kyi, the latter being a former Burmese ambassador to India. Suu Kyi was allowed to stay in India for a long time when Burma was under military rule and she had studied in Delhi’s Lady Shri Ram College. But New Delhi never tied its knot with Suu Kyi in the manner it did in the case of the Dalai Lama. The comparison points out to a puzzle. A similar attitude towards the Dalai Lama might have ensured China’s neutral attitude towards the northeastern Indian ultras. In turn, it would have helped the cause of democracy in Myanmar.
But for the last 30 years, India’s Myanmar policy is marked by indecisiveness and this is noticeable even now. This was best exemplified by two developments in 2006. APJ Abdul Kalam, the then President of India, visited Myanmar. On being questioned whether he had raised the issue of Suu Kyi’s detention (she had spent 15 years in jail) with the then Burmese junta chief General Than Shwe, Kalam replied, “I have discussed the matter. India was very friendly with her father. Naturally, our people are interested in her wellbeing. The General said he will take up India’s interest with his team and he will come back to us.”
But the cat was soon out of the bag. Shyam Saran, the former foreign secretary accompanying Kalam on that tour, later disclosed “The issue was not part of the official talks between Dr Kalam and General Than Shwe”. It was officially clarified later that the issue of Suu Kyi’s release came up during an informal chat between the two leaders at the airport lounge just before Dr Kalam’s departure from Yangon.
Northeast Puzzle
This anecdote is enough to understand India’s Myanmar policy, which has till now failed to deliver what India wants. The northeastern ultras are still operating with impunity, though with minor setbacks. The Burmese junta has taken some halfhearted steps against the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN). Some time ago, some middle-level functionaries of the NSCN (Khaplang) were deported to India along with some cadres of People’s Liberation Army of Manipur, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, one faction of the ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).
Although SS Khaplang is no more, his faction of the NSCN is still operating from the Sagaing division of Myanmar. To keep the Burmese junta in good humour, New Delhi often gives wide publicity to joint Indo-Myanmar operations against ultras on both sides of the international border. But there is another side of this coin. The junta is reported to have surreptitiously released high ranking personnel of the ULFA of Assam and the UNLF of Manipur, who were captured in some of these operations without informing the Government of India.
Tatmadaw Scores
Still, in the estimate of Indian policymakers, the Tatmadaw has always scored over Suu Kyi or her National League for Democracy (NLD). In 2008, when pro-democracy movement in Myanmar was at its height, General Maung Aye, the then number two man in the Myanmar army, was given a red carpet welcome in New Delhi. In the late 1990s, India had started selling arms to the junta government in Myanmar, which culminated in 2015 when New Delhi decided to sell light artillery guns, mortars, radars, rocket launchers and gunboats to Myanmar. Through a recent decision, light torpedoes have also been added. New Delhi now sells $100 million worth of armaments to Yangon while China’s share in the same sector is only around $47 million.
Recent developments indicate that India and the Tatmadaw have reasons to come closer. The Myanmar army’s attitude towards India started to take a qualitative turn from the time Suu Kyi started to lean towards China. The reason was clear. Both the parties, the army as well as the NLD, were vying for the common space in the national body polity – support of the majority Bamar community. In addition, the Myanmar army was not as subservient to any external power in the sense some other armies of South Asia kowtow to external interests. The result was three consecutive phases of the Operation Sunshine, joint Indo-Burma military operations, which struck at various northeastern Indian ultras’ camps in Myanmar jungles resulting in death and capture of a good number of insurgents.
A Rider
But there is a rider. The Tatmadaw is not known to be hard on the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN. Not many reports indicating loss or damage to the NSCN(I-M) faction have come out. It is suspected to have given this faction the much needed ‘back-up’ territory in Myanmar, where its cadres may take shelters during Indian army’s operations. Secondly, so far as the geopolitics over oil and gas is concerned, the Tatmadaw does not seem to feel any necessity to cater to Indian interests. The junta under Min Aung Hlaing, its present chief, is still continuing the previous policy initiated by its former chief Than Shwe to supply an overwhelming bulk of its energy reserve to China instead of India.
Realpolitik, however, dictates that for an unhindered completion of its infrastructural projects in Myanmar like the Sittwe port and the Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Project, New Delhi must maintain a cordial relation with the Tatmadaw. But the philosophy and the state structure that Tatmadaw represents does not match with India’s democratic sentiments.
(The author is a senior journalist and commentator specialising in politics and international affairs)
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