Jason M Brodsky writes that the alleged plot to assassinate US ambassador to South Africa Lana Marks needs to be taken seriously.
Iran’s alleged intent to assassinate a US official on South African soil fits into a well-worn pattern of the regime using diplomatic cover to foment terrorism. Before a plot becomes operational, Tehran tends to look for three major conditions to be present in their theatre of operations: facility, friendliness and familiarity. South Africa’s relationship with Iran satisfies all three conditions.
As has been reported, the Iranian embassy in Pretoria was allegedly used to plot an assassination of US Ambassador Lana Marks.
While some observers have cast doubt on the veracity of the threat, Tehran’s ambitions to use Africa as a platform to attack US interests, as well as elevated Iranian activity in the country, suggest that publicly available information about this plot deserves to be taken seriously.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Esmail Ghaani has spent years cultivating relationships in Africa.
In fact, when the US first sanctioned Ghaani in 2012, the US Treasury Department highlighted his role in Africa, specifically mentioning that his authority covered financial disbursements to IRGC-QF elements on the continent.
Hamed Abdollahi
In June 2019, The Telegraph reported Tehran was in the process of establishing "a new terrorist infrastructure in Africa with the aim of attacking Western targets" under the auspices of the IRGC-QF’s Unit 400, training around 300 militants to carry out the operations.
Hamed Abdollahi, as a leader of Unit 400, was also mentioned in this reporting, given his senior role in the organisation.
Abdollahi, an IRGC-QF officer, has long been on the radar of US officials, having been sanctioned for overseeing those involved in the 2011 plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States.
Since Ghaani assumed command of the IRGC-QF in January, more finite reporting about Iran’s attempts to use Africa as a launchpad for attacks against the US has emerged.
Mere weeks after his predecessor Qassem Soleimani was killed, the head of US Africa Command warned that Tehran was planning retaliatory attacks against Americans in Africa to avenge his death. Thus, this ready-made terror architecture and intent provides the facility for Tehran to launch such an attack.
For South Africans, this should raise the question, "Why Pretoria?"
The answer is clear.
Tehran and its broader Axis of Resistance have used South Africa as a venue for operations in the past, and it has no problem acting unlawfully anywhere or any time.
Hamas has reportedly been recruiting supporters in South Africa since at least 1992. Hezbollah operatives led paramilitary training exercises there in 1999, and attempted an attack on Israeli tourists in Johannesburg in 2012.
Moreover, according to a leaked intelligence dossier compiled by South African security officials, "the Ministries of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Committees make use of the diplomatic bag to send arms to the Iranian Embassies abroad. These arms are then stored in the Embassy with the full knowledge of the Ambassador".
The document goes on to detail how Iranian intelligence officers are "placed abroad under the cover of a Foreign Affairs official” and usually "make contact with… already established Hezbollah or Hamas cells in a target country".
In 2018, Shin Bet accused Iran of using a Palestinian militant based in South Africa in plotting operations against Israel. Shin Bet alleged that Iranian intelligence "used South Africa as a significant arena for locating, recruiting and running" such activities.
There is also evidence to suggest that Iranian officials have sought closer ties with South Africa as a counter-measure to sanctions in order to obtain materials and resources for its arms and nuclear programmes. South African security documents mention how Iranian delegations — including one thought to be headed by Hassan Rouhani himself in 2005 — reportedly approached then-president Thabo Mbeki for assistance with its nuclear programme.
South African officials themselves have a history of complicity in illicit deal-making with Tehran.
A one-time South African ambassador to Iran was arrested for bribery in an attempt to help MTN receive a $31.6-billion licence to operate in Iran. MTN also stood accused of bribing a former Iranian ambassador to South Africa, Javid Ghorbanoghli.
It’s this friendliness and familiarity which provides Iran with an opening to plot terror operations, and has been its modus operandi. Tehran used Austria as a planning base for the 2018 plot to bomb a gathering of Iranian dissidents outside Paris.
A report by the US Library of Congress’ Federal Research Division mentioned that "Vienna… is allegedly full of MOIS (Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security) agents. It is because of the continuous good relationship between Iran and Austria since the Revolution".
This explains the involvement of Assadollah Assadi, who stands accused of spearheading the operation. Naturally, he was a third counsellor at the Iranian embassy in Vienna. South Africa, having similarly warm relations with Tehran, is thus fertile territory for Tehran.
Scarce details
Piecing together the strands of public reporting paints a concerning picture: the deployment of the IRGC-QF’s Unit 400 in Africa before Soleimani’s death; the involvement of Hamed Abdollahi, who has specialised in planning for high-profile assassinations, in establishing such a structure on the continent; a warning after Soleimani’s death from US military officials that Iran plans to use Africa in a revenge attack; and the permissive environment that South Africa affords for Iranian operations.
While public details of the alleged plot against Ambassador Marks remain scarce, those who minimise the prospect of this type of activity occurring on South African soil don’t account for these developments and trends, or the threat they pose to South Africa’s relationships and security.
Iran’s long bloodstained record of such operations makes these allegations all the more credible.
-Jason M Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.
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