There have been many different reasons attributed to China’s aggressive actions at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to Hemant Adlakha, a professor at JNU’s Centre for Chinese and South East Asian Studies, who closely follows commentaries in the Mandarin language, the change in Chinese thought towards India came after 2017’s Doklam standoff.
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How has the Chinese narrative on the LAC standoff developed over the past month?
We have been following whatever is being reported, commentaries and opinion articles in the Chinese media, of course, other than Global Times (as it is in English). In terms of the Galwan incident itself, we know from our media reporting here that China is being accused for this offensive action and the brutal murder of our soldiers. In Chinese media, all the blame and reasons are being attributed to the Indian forces, to what they call India’s “continuous, consistent, provocative act on the western border and belligerence for the past, especially recent years”. When you look at the recent commentaries more closely, the comment is that the [Galwan incident] is different, even compared to the Doklam situation. I think Doklam perhaps was the game-changer for them. I think post-Doklam, the Chinese started revising their strategy, and wrote that China now must reassess, re-examine and reformulate its India strategy, primarily because they thought that India is now becoming a bigger irritant as far as China’s overall national policy is concerned.
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How was Doklam the “game-changer”?
First, one has to see the terminology that was used. The Chinese expression used for Doklam was crisis. Today, when they refer to the incident at Galwan, they speak very clearly using terms or phrases like clashes or confrontation. After Doklam, there were several commentaries that China was embarrassed during the crisis asking how could China let the Doklam crisis go on for so long? So that was seen as embarrassing and also kind of a failure for Chinese diplomacy or strategy. Now, post-15 June again, there is a divided opinion among China’s strategic affairs community whether to take problems with India, especially on the western border as a major contradiction for China’s national policy or strategy, or not.
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Between Doklam and now, Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met so many times, including at informal summits. It did seem that there was a period of actual peace and understanding between the two leaderships….
Well, I mean, you’re right that in the period between the Wuhan spirit to the summit in Chennai, it looked as if you know, there is some kind of a very peaceful and very cordial person to person rapport in the relationship between the two leaders. But I think from the Chinese point of view, the strategy on India for a long time is that somehow India has to be kept under control. The discourse is much more than that, India has been under a very strong political party rule and a strong leader for the last several years and many commentators have written about it that, especially in democracies… [there is]…much more rhetoric, that they they try to project externally their image of the country’s status globally, etc, etc. And that is what many commentators have attributed to the current leadership in India.
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In your understanding, what really are the reasons for China’s actions at the LAC?
In this context they have a short-term strategy and also a long-term strategy, specifically with India on the western border (Ladakh). The long term strategies are one, to prevent India from building or repairing roads, especially for the war purposes in Kashmir; two, to expedite construction of the China-Nepal rail-link, and three, to step up building naval and military bases in the Indian Ocean.
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In the short-term tactics, they point out that China must have a focused approach and be patient, whether it is border conflicts with India and or Indian trade ban or sanctions against China, etc. They say China must not spare any effort to resolve a conflict like situation by working on political and diplomatic channels for China must not allow border conflict at hand to slip out of control and turn into an unavoidable war. What they mean is that they still continue to see the problems on the border as a strategic issue, which can be taken care of politically or diplomatically.
They also say China must ensure that the Sino-Indian border issue does not in any way influence or jeopardise the larger and crucial strategic ongoing struggle with the U.S., as well as in South China Sea. And that China has now reached a strategic implementation stage where they have to also send clear signals to Taiwan.