This is perhaps the first high-level ministerial visit after the outbreak of the Covid-19 in India. (Photo source: Twitter/@rajnathsingh)

By Rajan Kumar

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow is happening at a juncture when two of the biggest armies of the world are baying for blood at a high-altitude Himalayan border in Ladakh, and negotiations are underway to defuse the mounting tension. Apparently, he is visiting to attend the Victory Day parade at Kremlin in Moscow on June 24. This is perhaps the first high-level ministerial visit after the outbreak of the Covid-19 in India. Speculations are high that he would try to obtain a political assurance from Russia and request an expeditious delivery of critical weapons including the S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system.

Russia attaches high significance to this parade as it marks the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. This parade,scheduled earlier May 9, was postponed on account of rising coronavirus infections in Moscow. Commemorating victory and remembering lives lost in a war is a part of Russian political culture, something not so popular in India. Besides its patriotic sentiment, experts believe that the timing of this parade, just before the forthcoming constitutional referendum on July 1, will help president Putin drum up popular support which plummeted recently to 63 per cent from a soaring 85 in late 2014, according to the Levada Centre, a Russian polling agency. President Putin takes personal interests in the parade, and in its original format some of the global leaders were likely to participate, but due to pandemic, many will give a miss. The visit of sexagenarian minister Rajnath Singh and a 75-member tri-service contingent from India assumes significance in this context. He is likely to discuss emerging security issues in the region with his Russian counterpart.

The border tension between India and China places Russia in a difficult situation. Russia has exceptionally good ties with both countries. India’s relationship with Russia is unique, and despite some oscillations in the 1990s, the bonding has grown stronger over the years -culminating in Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership of 2010. In September 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was invited as a chief guest to the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. Some experts viewed it as a Russian attempt to balance China in its Far East region.

On the other hand, Beijing has embraced Moscow as comrade-in-arms, and their relationship is perhaps the best since the 1950s. Following economic sanctions from the West, Moscowdrifted towards Beijing which provides an immense economic opportunity and unwavering diplomatic support. They stand together on every conflict of global significance- be it Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine or North Korea. They defy unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Iran. Together they become a formidable force to reckon with in global politics.

Their bonding, nonetheless, is driven primarily by antagonistic policies of Washington. They are not necessarily natural partners and their interests diverge on several issues. First, Russia fears the rise of China as much as others do. Russia shares a border of 4,300 kilometres with China, and similar to India they have a history of confrontation in the 1960s. Second, the vast and sparsely populated Far East region of Russia, bordering China, induces the fear of Chinese immigration in future. There is a concern that the ethnic composition of the region may change completely in the coming years. Third, Russia fears the rising economic influence of China in Central Asia. One of the reasons why India was included in the SCO was to create a balance in Eurasia. Finally, there is a vast economic and demographic asymmetry between Russia and China. As China grows stronger militarily, the fear of Russia will magnify proportionately.

In contrast, Russia much like India believes in creating a multipolar world order based on norms of territorial sovereignty, non-interference and respect for international law. It is not comfortable with a bipolar order where Washington and Beijing dictate terms to other countries. India figures prominently in Russia’s worldview of emerging multipolarity.

Given the high goodwill that Russia commands in both New Delhi and Beijing, it would not be surprising if it persuades the two countries to de-escalate the conflict. It is believed that Russia had played some role in resolving the Doklam standoff in 2017through back-channel diplomacy. That standoff had occurred just before the upcoming BRICS Summit in Xiamen, China.

President Putin, unlike his American counterpart Donald Trump, does not believe in loudmouth diplomacy and tweet-mediations. He has made it clear that the two countries are capable to resolve the issue bilaterally. With a background in Secret Services, he knows what can be achieved through back-channel diplomacy. Russian presidential spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said earlier, “Certainly, we are watching with great attention what is happening on the Chinese-Indian border. We believe that this is a very alarming report. But we consider that the two countries are capable of taking necessary steps to prevent such situations in the future.”

Russia is watching the events carefully because the escalation of conflict may jeopardise Russian ambitions in the region. First, the conflict will put an end to the growing multilateral cooperation among the BRICS states. The rhetorical and high claims of the BRICS will appear hollow if two of its key members cannot manage their border issues. Russia has invested substantial diplomatic and material resources in the BRICS and it would not like this organisation to fall apart. Second, this conflict will push India closer to the US for its defence and security requirements. It will give a new push to this relationship, and the US would be the real winner as India becomes more dependent on military purchases and security support from Washington.Russia was already piqued by the growing defence ties and joint military exercises of India with the US. Therefore, it is in the interest of Russia to play a constructive role in de-escalating the conflict.

To sum-up, the three-day visit of Rajnath Singh gains significance for two reasons: first, keeping his Russian counterpart informed about the Indian perception of border conflict; and second, the possibility of expediting the process of acquiring critical weapons. Of course, the participation in the Victory Day parade amid pandemic is no less historic.

(The author teaches in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. Views expressed are personal.)