Facing pressure from the trade war with the U.S. and an economy hit by the pandemic, China’s leadership appears to be taking a tougher line on issues related to sovereignty from Taiwan to the India border, says Jayadeva Ranade, a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, who has been tracking China for three decades. Beijing is unlikely to change course and pull back, as doing so would hurt the credibility of the leadership which is already under pressure, he said.
How unusual is the current situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), given the number and scale of stand-offs since last month?
The situation is certainly different. Firstly, these have occurred at multiple points along the LAC, from Ladakh to Naku La in Sikkim. I also associate the activation of a new diplomatic front by Nepal against us as a part of this. It is a new kind of activity that the Chinese have created on our northern borders. Since Xi Jinping has taken over, the nature and kind of intrusions that we have been seeing have altered. They have become more firm, and appear to have been premeditated and planned.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has attributed the tensions to differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control. Do you share that view?
I would disagree with that, for the simple reason that in quite a few of these places, there have been no such intrusions and there has been no instance of a difference in perception of the LAC. Galwan Valley, which is one of the main points of confrontation, has not witnessed an intrusion for the last 15 to 20 years.
Why is China is opening a new front in Galwan?
The construction of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi road certainly would have been one of the factors together with the upgrading of our defence logistics infrastructure. These are points of concern for the Chinese. In addition to that, what has occurred in the recent past is growing Chinese stakes in the region, particularly with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.
After the revocation of Articles 370 and 5(A) of our Constitution, the Chinese got more apprehensive. Of course, the Pakistanis would have egged them on, which is why we have seen the Chinese taking the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council on four occasions so far. With their close ties with the Pakistanis, they may have decided that they need to safeguard their interests in these areas.
How do you see the current situation being resolved?
If we show not only our determination to hold ground but also maybe apply pressure in some areas on China, it could cause a rethinking in Beijing to come to some kind of an understanding with us. But that is unlikely in my point of view.
As far as the talks are concerned, they’re not going to give in easily. Our position is we want status quo ante so that means everyone goes back to their earlier position. Which begs the question, why did the Chinese do this in the first place? Given the domestic political situation inside China, can Xi Jinping afford to go back or to disengage or to withdraw, now, once again, having done that earlier in Doklam [in 2017], and not find people who are critical of his action?
How do you assess President Xi’s position internally after the pandemic?
There are two factors that are causing concern. The first is the economic situation. The way the U.S.-China trade war is developing is aggravating that. Unless Mr. Xi is able to tackle that, domestic criticism will continue. Second, the sources of voiced discontent, the intellectuals, the academics and the students, I don't think they are reconciled to the situation. Neither are those Communist Party cadres, serving or retired, who don’t want to return to one man rule.
A lot depends on the level of discontent within the Communist Party, particularly its middle and higher echelons, and I don’t know how much of that has really been sorted out. Look at the fact that he has created a new central small group under Guo Shengkun, who is Secretary to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, his right hand man, to look at the political stability and political situation in China. These indicate that President Xi Jinping himself knows that there are problems ahead, and that his own position is not 100% secure.
Do these internal challenges influence China’s external postures, whether on Taiwan or with India?
I have no doubt that this tougher line has come about because of the perception domestically that the two centenary goals as they call it — the China Dream and catching up, if not surpassing, the U.S. by 2049, are slipping out of the grasp of the leadership. I think the perception among the Chinese people that the leadership didn't have a firm grip of the situation is one of the real key factors why Mr. Xi has opted for a much tougher line. The U.S.-China factor is another.
So it has happened that with Hong Kong he has taken a tough line. With Taiwan, he is applying pressure. In the South China Sea, he has started sending PLA Navy warships there. I think what we are seeing on the borders with India is similar. So that does bring us to the question, can he afford to pull back and face criticism from within China, if he is doing this to shore up his credibility?