Opinion | Coalitions as a mixed menace to Indian democracy
4 min read . Updated: 16 May 2019, 02:53 PM ISTWhether multi-party rule is good or bad for India depends on the prevalent political circumstances
The 2019 general elections seem headed for a fractured mandate which would renew the coalition era that began in the late 1980s, but was interrupted in 2014 by a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) majority in Parliament. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam leader MK Stalin’s statement that his party won’t abandon its Congress partnership in a coalition arrangement appears to have ended any possibility of a non-Congress, non-BJP coalition at the Centre — for which Telangana Chief Minister K Chandrasekhara Rao has been on a mobilizing mission in recent days. But is a coalition government inherently bad for Indian democracy?
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has campaigned on security issues triggered by the Pulwama attack, perhaps to hide his regime’s performance on his 2014 vikas agenda. In contrast, Dr Manmohan Singh, who led a coalition government of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) from 2004 to 2009, returned to power in 2009 on the back of its achievements. Many would argue that Dr Singh’s record in his first term was way better than that of Modi’s regime despite the latter’s one-party majority government. In short, India’s experience does not support the thesis that coalition governments are innately bad. Critics of one-party majority governments often cite the excessive abuse of President’s Rule during Indira Gandhi’s time as one of its shortcomings, a practice that the coalition era has effectively ended.
At present, two possible scenarios exist for India after 23 May. The first is the return of Modi as the Prime Minister of a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. Given the firm grip that Modi and Amit Shah have over their party, a BJP-led NDA cannot have anyone other than Modi as Prime Minister. Alternatively, there is a possibility of a UPA coalition led by a leader of the Congress or some other party.
Modi and Shah have repeatedly appealed to voters not to vote for a UPA option, mocking it as a “mahamilawati" (highly mixed up) alliance. Cited in support are the bickering and instability of past coalition governments that took office in 1977, 1989 and 1996. What is, however, never mentioned is that the BJP was part of two such unstable governments: the VP Singh-led National Front in 1989 and the Moraraji Desai-led Janata Party government in 1977. In 1975-77, the BJP, in its earlier Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) avatar, had merged with a broad Janata coalition and was part of the Desai regime. Thus, the BJP has been part of a khichdi in the past, and cannot brush aside its own contribution to instability.
Observers recognize Modi’s adamance as a vital attribute of his personality; also, he is seen as decisive by some and vindictive by others. But the management of a coalition government calls for an accommodative spirit. This comes in handy in dealing with what Dr Singh described as the compulsions of a coalition. Modi’s ability to cope with these remains untested. On the other hand, a similar possibility could arise in the case of a UPA government, though for reasons of the varying ambitions of regional leaders, as witnessed in 1977 or 1996. On both scenarios of either an NDA or UPA coalition, there is a fair chance of a mid-term election. If this happens, it could provide Modi an electoral advantage in those polls. If it happens on account of UPA instability, then it would present Modi with the opportunity of claiming an Indira moment: recall the way she returned triumphant in 1980 after the Janata coalition collapse. If it forms a government, the UPA would have to be careful not to allow such an outcome, for a mid-term poll under those circumstances could mean an ever-larger majority for the Modi-led BJP.
Regardless of the results on 23 May, the BJP will remain India’s most dominant party in the coming years. For the Congress, it is crucial to increase its tally to, say, 140 or 150 seats, if it is to sustain itself as the leader of the UPA. Only such a strength would let it outweigh the claims of key anti-BJP regional players. The Congress’s failure to stitch up a coalition in West Bengal, Delhi and even Uttar Pradesh would have direct bearing its final tally this time. Comparatively speaking, the BJP can bounce back from setbacks far easier than the Congress. Whatever electoral success the Congress has achieved lately in some states was driven more by anti-incumbency factors than the grand old party’s historical dominance. Yet, most regional parties are single-state based, with little prospects of further expansion.
A stable government might have its own benefits, but less stable governments are not threats to democracy. The Desai government (1977-1979), for example, undid regressive laws enacted by the Indira Gandhi government during the Emergency. By the same logic, if a future UPA government were to address issues such as lynching or sedition laws, these would be crucial interventions in India’s governance, especially consequential for those ranged against the perpetuation of majoritarianism.
Shaikh Mujibur Rehman teaches at Jamia Millia Central University, New Delhi, and is the editor of the volume ‘Rise of Saffron Power’