Balakot has been a game-changer. And it was a long time coming. There was adequate justification for taking such action after Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001. The government had, in fact, mobilised forces for an ‘Operation Parakram’ then, but it fizzled out under international pressure. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks demanded counter action too, but nothing materialised. The Balakot operation shows that future terror strikes will not go unpunished. But there’s a dichotomy in government measures to take on terrorism. We have secured the borders, but our internal security architecture needs attention.
There are forty-three terror outfits currently active in the country. They can’t be negotiated with. Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed has gone on record saying: “Jehad is not just about Kashmir…. I will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan”. How does one deal with this kind of threat? Only a well-defined policy and stringent laws can strengthen the internal security apparatus. But we don’t have a clear-cut anti-terror policy. A clear enunciation of policy would ensure that there is no humiliating surrender like in the case of the IC-814 hijack in 1999.
Our anti-terror laws have been weakened over time. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), 1987 was repealed and substituted by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002. Eventually, even that was substituted by the feebler law—the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), which was actually a 1967 legislation amended in 2008 to incorporate terrorist offences. The UAPA doesn’t even have the word terror in it!
The internal security apparatus remains as fragile as it was five years back. Only cosmetic improvements have taken place. While there has been some improvement in Police infrastructure, grassroots policing continues to be in shambles. States are apathetic and the Centre is indifferent to these concerns. The Supreme Court’s directions to reorganise and restructure the police have not been implemented in letter and spirit. Our leaders forget that the first responder to any terrorist crime is the local police station.
Internal security remains as fragile as it was five years back. Only cosmetic changes have been made.
Our intelligence operations have also been non-aggressive. We are repeatedly told that our capacity to launch covert operations across the borders was dismantled by former-prime minister I.K. Gujral, but what did our policy makers do since then, for the last twenty years?
A National Counter-Terrorism Centre, modelled on the American institution, was proposed in the wake of 26/11 to coordinate efforts of the Centre and states. The states had reservations on its proposed mandate. But their legitimate objections could have been negotiated, and the NCTC set up.
At the state level, intelligence organisations have become highly politicised. They are catering to the requirements of the political leadership. Coastal security too needs attention. A three-tier security plan was drawn up a few years back. While the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard components are broadly in position, the third tier of marine police is still struggling to take shape. A National Maritime Authority is also yet to be set up.
It is high time we set our house in order by defining our internal security doctrine. In-house reforms, even if difficult to implement, would provide better protection to the citizens.
(The writer was director general, BSF; DGP Assam and DGP Uttar Pradesh)
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