Basketball is a game of giants. In the NBA, the average height of a player, as measured during the 2017-18 season, was 6’7”. That’s big, but not quite as big as the average hoopster who plays the centre position.
The centre — a behemoth who is at least 6’10’’ tall and weighs more than 110 kg — is usually the last line of defence, tasked with protecting the rim and occupying the low post, an area close to the basket.
The centre also happens to be the most productive position historically; the most powerful centres have been some of the best players ever — Bill Russell, Wilt Chamberlain, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Hakeem Olajuwon, Shaquille O’Neal.
Their main strength was their two-way game, which allied a strong post and rim defence to the ability to score in the paint. Centres typically played with their backs to the basket, received passes from the guards and then got to work.
Post skills
Chamberlain and O’Neal were unstoppable offensive forces who overwhelmed opponents with their brawn and muscle near the rim. Abdul-Jabbar and Olajuwon could do that too, but they had the advantage of finesse as well. The former would drag his opponents to the edge of the paint and then employ his un-guardable sky hook to score dexterously, while Olajuwon was a master of footwork and used a series of spins and fakes in the post area to befuddle opponents.
The other ‘bigs’ in the game were the power forwards, marginally shorter than centres but adept in the front-court. Tim Duncan, Karl Malone, Dirk Nowitzki and Kevin Garnett were some of the best in the role. These power forwards didn’t play as close to the rim as centres; they typically faced the basket when starting their moves, which included jump-shooting.
Post-play and strength near the rim were common to centres and power forwards in the past as NBA offences were largely methodical. Centres and power forwards were fed the ball by perimeter players whose job it was to handle the ball and play off these ‘bigs’. There were exceptions — Michael Jordan revolutionised the athletic guard position and played in championship-winning teams in which ‘bigs’ were role players. But, invariably, winning teams had great centres or power forwards.
Lately though, ever since the explosion in three-point shooting and the ban on hand-checking rules, guards have become more prominent in the NBA. The roles have reversed. Guards now dominate ball-handling and shooting; ‘bigs’ are asked to provide screens for facilitation of this guard-driven offence while retaining their paint-protection role. This evolution in the game has resulted in ‘bigs’ adapting and developing hitherto unused skills such as jump-shooting.
Case in point
In his first 500 NBA games played over seven years, seven-footer Brook Lopez attempted exactly 32 three-point shots and scored only four! In the 198 games played in the last three years alone, including this season, Lopez has attempted 1,032 three-pointers and converted 371 of them at a decent clip of 35.9%. This season alone, 70% of all of Lopez’s field-goal attempts were three-pointers. What’s more, he has converted them at a 39.1% rate, good enough for 33rd position in the league and the best among centres.
Lopez, who calls himself ‘Splash Mountain’, is both the archetype of the modern NBA centre and an extreme example of the evolution of the position. He and twin brother Robin (who plays for the Chicago Bulls) are large-boned bruisers who can defend in the paint and in the low block: they use their height to block shots at the rim and their bulk to make it difficult for opposing centres to score near the basket. Brook, unlike Robin, has refashioned himself as a gunner from long range and this has made him a vital part of the league-leading Milwaukee Bucks team.
Lopez provides what is today the pivot on which modern NBA offences operate — ‘space’. His propensity to catch and shoot from distance results in opposing centres being dragged away from the basket to contest him, and that leaves the lane open for All-Star teammate Giannis Antetokounmpo (the Greek Freak) to showcase his wares — interior scoring and bullying at the rim.
Coach Mike Budenholzer’s four-out offence, which features the Greek Freak handling the ball and moving towards the rim with four shooters surrounding him at the perimeter, has yielded rich dividends.
Weaknesses
There are some drawbacks that Lopez brings to the table as well. His girth and bulk help him deter players close to the rim, but Lopez’s Achilles heel is defending players like… Lopez himself. Other behemoth centres who can shoot the three, such as Minnesota Timberwolves’ Karl-Anthony Towns, Memphis Grizzlies’ Marc Gasol, Philadelphia 76ers’ Joel Embiid and Denver Nuggets’ Nikola Jokic, drag Lopez away from the paint.
Embiid and Towns embody the best of the centre crop today — they can be ‘stretch-fives’ if they want to, and they can also dominate in the paint. Embiid is a much better defender than Towns. Jokic and Gasol are finesse centres. Jokic, in particular, is one of a kind. He is a remarkable passer who facilitates the Nuggets offence as a ‘point-centre’, using his height and positional sense to direct his teammates, the guards in particular, on the offensive end. Gasol has similar skills but is growing older and is less effective. In his prime, though, he was a much better defender than Jokic.
Having a versatile shooting ‘big’ therefore does come with a compromise, especially when the centre is not mobile enough to defend at the perimeter too. Is this evolution of the centre necessarily a good one? That’s a discussion for another day.
What can be said, however, is that as more centres take to shooting the three and springing jump-shots, the art of post-play has become rare in the NBA. And there are risks with the dependence on jump-shooting ‘bigs’. In playoff situations, jump-shooting is not always a successful route to scoring — increased fatigue and the slower pace of the game makes it difficult to get open shots. Shooting percentages tend to be lower in the playoffs than in the regular season. During such scoring droughts, it is always better to use ‘bigs’ who can operate at the post as insurance options. But the decline in post-play means very few teams have this choice.