Major General H.S. Kler earned the reputation of being a brilliant professional who was outspoken to a fault. 

In India’s wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, there was a commander who seized the opportunity to make and shape history. Major General H.S. Kler, MVC, AVSM, wasn’t the ‘chosen one’ in both the wars, but that hardly ever stopped him from becoming the man of the hour. He was one of Indian Army’s best field commanders who became a legend in his lifetime.

General Kler was also my uncle. He was commissioned on 10 October 1943 in the Corps of Signals. He saw action in Burma (now Myanmar) and was awarded Mention-in-Despatches. Post-Independence, he quickly earned the reputation of being a brilliant professional who was outspoken to a fault. Many of his superiors perceived it as arrogance.

In July 1965, he had been the General Staff Officer 1 (GSO 1) of 19 Infantry Division, responsible for the operations in the Valley, for nearly two years. The new General Officer Commanding (GOC) misconstrued his confidence and plain speaking as arrogance and was keen to ‘fix’ him and get a replacement. Providence intervened. In July-end, Army Headquarters issued Lieutenant Colonel Kler’s posting order as Directing Staff at Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, a coveted appointment at this stage of service.

Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan’s plan to instigate a general uprising in Jammu and Kashmir, had been launched on 1 August 1965. Five task forces – Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin and Alamgir– were to operate in the Valley. Depending on their area of operation, the infiltrators were tasked with destroying bridges, cutting telephone lines, laying mines, ambushing convoys, attacking headquarters, destroying ammunition dumps, capturing isolated Indian Army posts, and creating unrest among the population. Our forces had no clue about the large-scale infiltration taking place. Lt. Col. Kler was in the process of handing over the charge to his successor.

But fate has strange ways of smiling on the men of destiny – 1 Sikh, by chance, had apprehended a suspect, who turned out to be the intelligence havaldar of one of the five task forces assigned to capture the Valley. He was responsible for marking on the map the entire Operation Gibraltar plan for his task force from the master map of the 12 Infantry Division of Pakistan. He had left his infiltration column to meet his relatives. Scared of being shot at, he started talking about a ‘grand plan’ and mentioned that a number of task forces had already infiltrated and were ready to strike at our undefended rear areas, including Srinagar.

No one believed him except the GSO 1 of 19 Infantry Division, who had an uncanny knack of reading the enemy’s mind. Lt. Col. Kler immediately ordered precautionary measures and earmarked units to intercept and destroy the task forces.

In the next 48 hours, all hell broke loose. Enemy infiltrating columns were all over the Valley. The precautionary steps taken by Lt. Col. Kler saved the day, but the situation was precarious. The handing and taking over of charge with the new GSO 1 was complete, but Lt. Col. Kler had no plans to run away from the situation. He told the worried GOC, “Don’t worry Sir, I will see this through.”

Over the next three months, he did exactly that. In two weeks, he coordinated the destruction of the task forces and then planned the counter-offensive to capture the Haji Pir Pass and the historic link-up with 93 Infantry Brigade at Poonch across the Pir Panjal Range. On 25 August, 68 Infantry Brigade launched a two-pronged attack from the west and the east to capture Haji Pir Pass. By 26 August, both the western and eastern prongs of the attack had got stalled. The Corps Commander was livid and gave a piece of his mind to the GOC 19 Infantry Division. Knowing who was running the show, the Corps Commander directly rang up the GSO 1 for his assessment. Lt. Col. Kler confidently assured him that setbacks notwithstanding, Haji Pir would be captured on 29 August. He was so confident that he wagered a bottle of Black Dog Scotch whiskey with the Corps Commander.

He did not pass on the censure of the Corps Commander to Brigadier (later Lt. Gen.) Z.C. Bakshi, Commander of the 68 Infantry Brigade, and his commanding officers. Instead, to boost their morale, he conveyed that the division and the corps commanders had absolute confidence in their success. Rest is part of the history books. Haji Pir was captured on 28 August and the link-up with 93 Infantry Brigade at Poonch took place on 10 September. Lt. Col. Kler got his bottle of Black Dog through a special courier sent through a helicopter. He proved that behind every successful commander, there are brilliant staff officers. He was awarded the coveted Ati Vishist Seva Medal (AVSM) for meritorious service, a rare honour for a lieutenant colonel.

After a stint as Directing Staff and Senior Instructor at the Defence Service Staff College, he took over 95 Mountain Brigade in Nagaland in 1968. Naga insurgency was at its peak with large gangs trekking to China via Myanmar to get weapons and training. Not the one to rest on his laurels, he organised the manhunt for the underground Naga General Mowu Angami, nephew of Angami Zapu Phizo, who had returned from China with a gang of 300 insurgents with new weapons. Brigadier Kler forced his surrender along with 165 insurgents on 15/16 March 1969.

His finest hour came in 1971 when he raced to ‘Dhaka in 12 Days’ to make history.

Lt Gen H.S. Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal.

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