10 years after 26/11: We are better prepared

India and Indians felt the 26/11 terror attacks in a way they had felt no attack before that. In one part, this had to do with the sheer brazenness of the attack. In another, it had to do with the targets. And in still another, it was because almost all of it played out live on 24x7 news television. As unfair as it is to compare tragedies, this was India’s own 9/11, and the images of the Taj Mahal hotel burning were seared across the collective psyche of the nation.

As India remembers the 10th anniversary of 26/11 — it is an attack the nation, its leaders, and its people would do well to never forget — three questions need to be addressed.

One, whether another attack of this scale and magnitude can be mounted against targets across the country. The simple answer is yes. The 26/11 attacks, which happened a decade ago, were not particularly sophisticated from the point of view of weaponry or the modus operandi. Since then, several technologies have become better, and also accessible to terror groups. The use of drones for such attacks, for instance, is a worrying and frightening prospect. Nor have the motives for terror attacks dissipated in the past 10 years. Pakistan continues to foster and support terror groups targeting India, and even those directly involved in the 26/11 attacks continue to thrive in that country. Back then, ISIS wasn’t the force it is now. Put simply, the motives remain (and have only become stronger), as do the threats (which have only increased), and the limits of possibility for such attacks have expanded.

The second question is about whether such attacks can be prevented. No country can claim to possess the ability to prevent all terror strikes. True, many are foiled, but one in 10, 20, perhaps even 100 succeed. The odds are stacked against the defenders and in favour of the perpetrators. The former have to ensure none of the attacks succeed; the latter needs to have just a fraction of their attempts succeed. The 26/11 attackers took the sea route; not surprisingly, the Indian Coast Guard has significantly strengthened its overall presence, and especially that in the Western region, where the number of ships in its fleet has increased from 74 in 2008 to 134 currently.

India’s coastal areas, including those near big cities (both Chennai and Mumbai are on the coast and have busy and strategically import ports) are better protected now than they were in 2008, but they are not entirely safe (and perhaps, never will be). For instance, not all small boats have been fitted, as had been suggested after 26/11, with tracking and communication equipment. Still, the Coastal Surveillance Network envisaged after 26/11 is at least partly in place, although Mumbai police’s own coastal police stations are nowhere near capable of doing what they are expected to. At a more macro level, the Natgrid, conceptualised as a sort of national intelligence database, and which was to connect 21 existing security databases, is in a state of suspended animation.

The answer to this question is therefore: not all.

The third is about the responsiveness and response of the country’s security agencies. On that front, there is better news. The first responders are always likely to be the local law enforcement agencies. The 2008 attacks revealed that they were woefully equipped, and trained. That has improved now — from flak vests to automatic rifles and machine guns to even RPGs in some cases, local police departments are now better equipped than they were in 2008. Many of them also have specialised commando forces. Maharashtra, for instance, has its own elite unit, Force One.

The National Security Guard (NSG) has been training some of these units and also conducting drills for them, although it is worrying (and perhaps, a sign of inadequate planning) that many of the new commando units set up by police departments to handle 26/11 kind of situations have seen no action at all.

A recent audit by the NSG of the preparedness of these specialised units in dealing with such attacks has found that seven states (Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Delhi, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka) are ready, while almost all others are not (the NSG has ranked their preparedness “average” or “below average”). As for the NSG itself, the delay in both taking the decision to send the unit, and the further delay in its actual deployment cost India dearly in the 26/11 attacks. Since then, India has worked on putting in place a better (and faster) decision making process and also worked to create regional deployment centres for the NSG. The country’s security forces, then, can be expected to respond faster and better to an attack than they did that day in November 10 years ago.

letters@hindustantimes.com

First Published: Nov 24, 2018 17:18 IST