The visit would come only two days after a planned release by Indonesian authorities on Nov. 28 of a first interim report on the Oct. 29 crash that killed all 189 people aboard when the Boeing 737 MAX 8 jetliner plunged into the Java Sea at a steep angle and high speed.

U.S. regulators, some pilot unions and various experts also are pressing for clarity and more information from Boeing about operation of automated flight-control systems on the jet, as well as explanations about inconsistencies between what airlines told pilots about a specific feature.

An Indonesian crash investigator Thursday also briefed the country’s parliament about information recovered from the 737 MAX plane’s flight data recorder. The 1,790 parameters captured by the black box have allowed investigators to at least partly reconstruct what had happened during the short flight after takeoff from Jakarta.

The data suggests a new stall-prevention system, called MCAS for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System and introduced by Boeing on the 737 MAX, erroneously kicked in, pushing the plane’s nose down to protect against a perceived stall, said Nurcahyo Utomo, an investigator with Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee.

The system activated after the flight control system believed the plane’s nose was inclined 20 degrees up from level flight. A system that vibrates the control yoke to alert the pilot about the risk of a potential stall , called a stick shaker, also activated, he said.

The pilot countered the nose-down maneuver and stabilized the plane, Mr. Utomo said. The jet continued to climb before the MCAS again pushed the nose down. Information provided to lawmakers suggested repeated nose-down input by the plane’s computers -- with weaker nose-up commands from the cockpit crew -- before the 737 MAX rapidly lost altitude and crashed.

The probe hasn’t been completed and no final determination has been made of why the plane crashed.

Since the accident, some regulators, pilots and others have publicly criticized Boeing for failing to highlight the operating principles and potential hazards of the MCAS system, which wasn’t installed on older 737 models. Brazilian authorities identified the stall-prevention system as different from that on an earlier 737 version, though Canadian regulators apparently didn’t spell out the change.

The MCAS has been under scrutiny after Boeing and U.S. regulators soon after the crash warned operators how to disable the system when it malfunctions.

The plane maker is working on a software fix, expected to be released in coming weeks, according to U.S. government and industry officials.

The changes are intended to prevent the system from kicking in when a single sensor system indicates an aircraft’s nose is pointed too high, it is flying at a dangerously slow speed and is in imminent danger of losing lift.

Boeing Thursday reiterated it was confident in the safety of the 737 MAX family and was working with investigators to fully understand what had caused the accident. It wouldn’t discuss Lion Air’s planned visit.

Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg has denied the company intentionally withheld information about the stall-prevention feature and said Boeing had described its relevant function in its manual.

A spokesman added Boeing has discussed MCAS functions with more than 60 operators at several conferences around the world since 2016.

The continuing crash probe, led by Indonesian authorities, is delving into aircraft systems, pilot actions, maintenance issues and other factors. Final conclusions are bound to take many months.

Safety experts also are questioning operation of a second automated feature, called elevator-feel shift or EFS, and whether it may have played a role in the crash. It is intended to prevent cockpit crews from mistakenly pulling up the nose of an aircraft that is already in a stall.

The system is described differently in aircraft manuals used at Southwest Airlines, American Airlines and United Airlines, according to pilots, some safety experts and documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Descriptions of the amount of manual force required to overcome EFS commands and raise the nose under some conditions vary from manual to manual for older and newer 737 models. So do the language describing the EFS’s hydraulic forces and the extent of automated opposing forces pilots would feel when trying to pull up the nose.

After the accident, according to one person familiar with the details, Boeing used an engineering ground-simulator to demonstrate to Southwest management pilots various flight trajectories, some apparently mimicking portions of the accident trip.

The EFS activated in at least one of those simulations, this person said, but it is unclear whether it kicked in when the simulator was replicating specific Lion Air maneuvers.

A spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration, which is participating in the overall crash probe, declined to comment on the investigation’s status or functions of the automated systems. He said the agency may take further actions depending on the results of the investigation.

Indonesian authorities said they were continuing to search for the plane’s second black box, the cockpit voice recorder.

—Andrew Tangel and I Made Sentana contributed to this article.

Write to Ben Otto at ben.otto@wsj.com, Robert Wall at robert.wall@wsj.com and Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com