Dreamworld inquest: Timeline of the key evidence from ride operators and police
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Day one
June 18, 2018
The inquest is told the Thunder River Rapids ride had broken down twice on October 25, 2016, hours before the fatal raft collision.
It heard a young ride operator did not know there was an emergency stop button (e-stop) within her reach. She was told "not to worry about that button, no-one uses it".
The inquest hears that a memo sent to staff a week prior, instructing them to only use e-stop if the ride's main control panel could not be reached.
It was revealed there was no drill training for Dreamworld staff for potential emergency situations and no automatic switch to shut down the ride if the water level dropped.
The inquest was told of previous collisions and incidents on the ride in 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2016.
Day two
June 19, 2018
Senior ride operator Peter Nemeth said he was "surprised" to learn the e-stop button could halt the conveyor within two seconds.
Mr Nemeth said he hit the slow stop button "two or three times" before two rafts collided and police told the inquest the slow stop button was probably pressed 10 seconds after the fatal raft collision.
Mr Nemeth said the ride was "more stressful" than others in the park to manage because the job involved monitoring so many things at once.
Day three
June 20, 2018
Ride operator Courtney Williams says she felt "pressured" by a park manager not to talk to police after the fatalities.
Ms Williams told the inquest she had 90 minutes' training on her first day operating the ride.
She said she "didn't know" the emergency button would stop the conveyor from moving and did not believe she received "sufficient training" from Dreamworld.
Senior ride operator Peter Nemeth told the inquest it was "impossible" to manage responsibilities, with 36 checks required in less than a minute. He said senior and junior ride operators had no first aid or CPR training.
Day four
June 21, 2018
Courtney Williams' barrister Peter Callaghan tells the inquest his client feels "highly distressed" after giving evidence.
Senior ride operator Timothy Williams told the Coroner's Court hearing he had not participated in any emergency drills or simulations since the fatalities in 2016.
He said he did not consider a water pump failure to be an emergency and would initiate a normal shutdown procedure.
The inquest heard there was no alarm to signal when a pump had malfunctioned and that staff used a stain on the wall or "scum line" to monitor the ride's water levels.
Day five
June 22, 2018
The family of two of the victims of the 2016 tragedy release a statement saying they are "devastated" by evidence at the inquest and hold Dreamworld completely responsible.
Dreamworld employee Chloe Brix told the inquest she heard "through gossip" a ride operator was fired after a collision on the Thunder River Rapids in November 2014 that was "almost identical" to the fatal 2016 accident.
Park technician Matthew Robertson told the inquest he reset the ride's water pump after its second breakdown hours before the fatal raft accident, because the park's electrical team was "distracted" with other problems.
Mr Robertson said he was not taught how to assess whether a ride fault could be dangerous and had to use his "own judgment".
He said technicians could be called to about 20 ride shutdowns in one day because of faults.
Topics: courts-and-trials, emergency-incidents, death, southport-4215, qld, brisbane-4000
