The first fire brigade incident commander at the Grenfell Tower fire received no training in how to reverse the “stay-put” policy or in how to get children, old people and the infirm out of high-rise residential fires, the public inquiry has heard.
Occupants of the 24-storey block who called 999 were advised to stay in their flats long after the fire had started spreading through the facade. But Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station, told the inquiry he had never been trained into how to re-evaluate the advice that was offered to people stuck in the block nor received any training in how to change that advice to a full evacuation.
The stay-put advice was changed only at 2.47am on the night of the fire, but the inquiry has already heard that it was redundant by 1.24am. Dowden was in charge for around the first hour of the fire, until about 2am.
Dowden was asked by the counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett QC: “Did you ever receive any training in how to re-evaluate advice offered during fire survival calls throughout the incident?”
He replied: “Not that I can recall, no.”
Had he been trained in how to inform control to change the advice?
“Not any training,” he said. “I can’t recall that I received any training as to how that was done.”
Dowden asked: “Were you trained in what were exceptional circumstances?”
He replied: “No.”
The requirement for incident commanders to be able to adapt stay-put strategies is written into London fire brigade policy, the inquiry heard. Dowden said repeatedly he had not received training in this and other matters such as identifying fire spread through a building’s facade, which are also required by government policy for firefighters.
He also admitted he could not recall the last training he had had in fighting high-rise fires, which, his training record showed, took place on 23 March 2017, three months before the fire, or a previous session in September 2016.
He also said training had been increasingly delivered through computer-based simulation since officer training and firefighter training had been outsourced to the private company Babcock.
The inquiry heard that government policy states that incident commander training must include development of knowledge, skills and understanding on the impact of fire on the building’s construction layout contents and occupants’ behaviour. Asked if he had been trained in those matters, Dowden replied: “Again, no sort of practical input.”
Policy also states that the incident commander should follow the evacuation plan based on the fire risk assessment for a building unless the fire dictates otherwise, the inquiry heard.
Asked if he had any training as how to follow an evacuation plan, he replied: “Not that I can recall, no”.
Millett said to him: “It sounds as if you were taught a lot about what the policy contained but weren’t trained specifically in how to implement parts of the policy.”
“I would say it’s a fair comment.”
Dowden said he had received no training as an officer in looking out for early unexpected failure of compartmentation of a fire. When asked if he was trained in considering how plastic or aluminium window frames or panels can be subject to early failure, promoting fire growth and vertical and horizontal fire spread, he replied: “It’s difficult to say I’ve actually received training on that, but that would become hopefully apparent if that information was surrendered to us when we undertook familiarisation visits.”
Millett asked if he had received any training in what to look for on such visits.
“Not that I can recall, no,” Dowden said.
The inquiry has already heard that the fire spread quickly from flat 16 on the fourth floor after a uPVC window frame melted and the flames spread into the cladding system.
Seventy-two people died as a result of the fire on 14 June 2017. The inquiry continues.