On 11 May, 1998 the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government successfully conducted surprise nuclear tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan. It was the second nuclear test to be conducted, however, it officially made India a nuclear weapons state.

ThePrint asks: 20 years after Pokhran nuclear test, is India safer? 

India now seen globally as a ‘responsible’ nuclear weapons state

AVM Arjun Subramaniam (retd)
Retired Air Vice Marshal from the IAF, currently a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University

Nuclear weapons have been an acknowledged currency of power in a post-WW II era that was heralded using two of these weapons. Nuclear deterrence formed the core of the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers and the race to acquire limited nuclear weapons lay at the heart of numerous rivalries– India-China, India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran-Arab States, North Korea-South Korea being a few of them.

In my view, the acquisition of a modest arsenal of nuclear weapons that has grown in capability and reach has made India stronger in terms of state power. It also heralded the transition of India from being a diffident power with idealistic aspirations of a liberal world order that is devoid of nuclear weapons, to a power of consequence that understands the dynamics of a ‘realist’ world order.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and dynamic changes in the nature and character of war has seen India emerge none the safer despite possessing nuclear weapons. It has been seriously tested by adversaries who are adept at ‘waging war’ and managing the escalation ladder to stay well below India’s nuclear threshold levels.

However, decades after the ‘Buddha Smiled’, India can be reasonably sanguine that it is now seen as a ‘responsible’ nuclear weapons state with all the characteristics to support a place at the high table as a power of consequence and much potential.

From Smiling Buddha to Operation Shakti, how India’s power trajectory gradually unfolded

Seshadri Chari
Former editor, Organiser

Thirty years after Homi Jehangir Bhabha presented his suggestions on harnessing nuclear energy, Indira Gandhi approved conducting of the first nuclear test on 18 May 1974, codenamed ‘Smiling Buddha’. Twenty-four years later, five detonations (one fusion and four fission) carried out on 11-13 May 1998, codenamed Operation Shakti marked India’s entry into the full-fledged nuclear countries’ club.

After the 1974 tests, the Nuclear Suppliers Group imposed a technological embargo on India leading to research and further nuclear programmes being slowed down. But continued perseverance of scientists and political willpower resulted in Pokhran-2, widely welcomed by the people and the market but strongly condemned by US, China, Japan and the then Congress leadership.

The NDA government led by Vajpayee overcame the effects of sanctions and even repaid the nearly forty-four billion dollar loan to international lending institutions. The futility of punitive actions dawned upon the US administration and after a series of failed attempts to coerce India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty or roll back the nuclear programme, the US began negotiations for a new strategic relationship with New Delhi.

Twenty years after Pokhran-2, India is dealing with the US, China, Japan and other global institutions from a position of strength. Our nuclear technology is inching towards being world class and so is our safety standards and commitment to disarmament.

From Smiling Buddha to Operation Shakti, it is a gradual unfolding of India’s power trajectory and growth agenda.

India’s relationship with other nuclear powers has enhanced since Pokhran

Arun K. Singh
Former ambassador to United States of America

India is certainly strategically more secure today, and its global standing and relevance enhanced, than it would be without a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability. This is reflected in its subsequent relationships with other nuclear weapon powers.

France entered into a strategic partnership with India after the Pokhran tests in 1998. Cooperation in defence, space and nuclear energy were taken forward. The two issued a Joint Strategic Vision of Cooperation in the Indian Ocean on 10 March this year, during President Macron’s visit. They also signed an agreement for the provision of reciprocal logistics support between their armed forces.

The US after initial criticism and sanctions, entered into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India enabling across the board erasure of technology restrictions. It articulated support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, declared India a Major Defence Partner, and allowed force multiplier defence supplies. In 2015 the two issued a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region.

Relations with Russia, too, were consolidated further. The UK is looking at India as a major pole as it seeks to define global post-Brexit Britain.

The equation with China continues to be marked by competition and cooperation. Our nuclear capability gives India assurance in light of China’s growing economic and conventional military strength, and nearly five-fold disparity.

Pakistan continues with its asymmetric challenge, through terrorism, but it had signalled the capability to build a device way back in 1987 and was not motivated by the Indian tests.

Other nuclear powers also face sub-conventional threats such as 9/11 in the US, homegrown and internationally linked terrorism in France, UK and Russia, and ETIM in China.

Compiled by Deeksha Bhardwaj, journalist at ThePrint.