History is full of anonymous heroes. You can run from history, dread it, hate it, but never ignore it. The strongest choices require the hardest wills, only then will you come out trumps. The Sisyphus story is a timely reminder to most people who think they are too clever by half.  Avaricious and deceitful, Sisyphus was famed for being the craftiest of men. As a punishment for his trickery, King Sisyphus was made to endlessly roll a huge boulder up a steep hill  The maddening nature of the punishment was reserved for King Sisyphus due to his hubristic belief that his cleverness surpassed that of Zeus himself. This is the biggest learning for most arrogant men who believe in personal aggrandisement.

One of the principal players in India's Independence and Partition was Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of undivided India and the expeditious de-coloniser. Many in India reckon that he acted as an enabler as far as the vital Gurdaspur link is concerned and equally for the same reason, he is reviled in Pakistan. Soon after the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh and Indian troops landed at Srinagar airport to hold a city under siege and begin the process of repulsing the raiders the next day, Lord Louis Mountbatten went to Lahore on November 1, to offer a plebiscite to Mohammad Ali Jinnah on the future of Kashmir, but the latter rejected it.

Mountbatten’s private secretary, Allan Campbell-Johnson’s memoir, ‘Mission with Mountbatten’, highlights the state of play — After the viceroy returned from Lahore, he told him of what had passed between himself and Jinnah: “Mountbatten…told me he was very pleased with his three-and-a-half hour talk with Jinnah at Lahore…He told him that he considered the prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar in any force was now remote.

This led Jinnah to make his first general proposal, which was that both sides should withdraw at once and simultaneously. When Mountbatten asked him to explain how the tribesmen could be induced to remove themselves, his reply was, ‘If you do this I will call the whole thing off,’ which at least suggests that the public propaganda line that the tribal invasion was wholly beyond Pakistan’s control will not be pursued too far in private discussion…On inquiry, Mountbatten found that Jinnah’s attitude to a plebiscite was conditioned by his belief that the combination of Indian troops in occupation and Sheikh Abdullah in power meant that the average Muslim would be far too frightened to vote for Pakistan. Mountbatten proposed a plebiscite, under United Nations Organisations auspices, whereupon Jinnah asserted that only the two Governors-General could organise it. Mountbatten at once rejected this suggestion, stressing that whatever Jinnah’s prerogatives might be, his own constitutional position allowed him only to act on his Government’s advice”(p.229). Mountbatten though had a sense of fair play and to defend his actions he wrote a top secret and confidential aide memoire for the Indian delegation which was to do all the talking at the United Nations. Excerpts:

Kashmir

I freely confess that I envisaged the possibility of serious trouble in Kashmir from the start if the state acceded to one Dominion or the other without ascertaining the popular will. I therefore made every effort open to me to induce the Maharaja of Kashmir to ascertain the will of his people by any accepted means and quickly acceded to one Dominion or the other. For the choice, I felt, must lie with the people; the geographical compulsions to which I have referred to in connection with Junagadh did not, of course, apply to Kashmir, which was from this point of view, obviously free to accede to either Dominion.

I tendered this advice personally to the Maharaja when I visited him in July 1947. I told him that I appreciated his particular difficulty in being a Hindu ruler with a Muslim majority population, but urged him to find out what his people wanted, and accede one way or the other, preferably before August 15. I instructed Col Webb, the Resident in Kashmir, to continue to give his advice after my visit and he subsequently reported that he had done so, but to no avail.

I myself also gave the same advice to the prime minister of Kashmir, Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, and when he came to Delhi, I put him in touch with both Sardar Patel and Mohd. Ali Jinnah, as representatives of the two future governments (the latter with Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel’s knowledge). When nothing happened by the end of August, I asked Lord Ismay who had gone to Kashmir for a holiday, to try once more and induce the Maharaja to make up his mind, but His Highness skillfully evaded Lord Ismay’s attempts to give advice. The Maharaja was apparently incapable of coming to any decision. He did nothing. Events were left to take their own course.

In the middle of October, I saw Sheikh Abdullah, and also advised him that there should be no accession until the will of the people had been ascertained. He said that this was also his own view.  The policy was fully in accord with the views of my government.

Absence of Pressure

My government put no pressure to bear on the Maharaja to cause him to accede to India. Visits by Mahatma Gandhi and Acharya Kriplani (then Congress president) to Kashmir have been quoted in support of a claim that Indian representatives (though admittedly not members of government) did bring pressure to hear. All that I can say with regard to Gandhi’s visit is that he gave me his personal promise that he would not discuss political matters of this kind at all.

Kriplani’s visit took place in May 1947 and I am assured by my government that the question of accession was not discussed at all and that the only question of major importance that was discussed was Sheikh Abdullah’s release from jail.

Indeed the Government of India went out of their way to abstain from any acts which might be interpreted as inducement. As a particular example, when the Kashmir government requested them for 5000 gallons of petrol which Pakistan had been unable to provide, they sent only 500 gallons as the minimum amount necessary to prevent a complete breakdown in Srinagar.

The Incursion by Raiders

It was on October 24, when I was dining with Pandit Nehru, that I heard the first reports that a column of tribesmen had entered Kashmir in buses from the direction of Peshawar, and were already on the outskirts of Uri.

A Defence Committee meeting was summoned for the following morning (October 25) and took place in my presence. The main decision taken at this meeting was that efforts should be made to fly supplies of arms and ammunition to Srinagar, so as to give the forces defending the city a chance of repelling the tribesmen. The question of accession was mentioned, as was the possibility of Sheikh Abdullah being brought into the Kashmir government.

But no final decisions on these matters, nor on the question of Indian troops being sent to Kashmir were reached. It was also decided at this meeting to send the secretary of the states ministry, accompanied by the Army and Air Force Staff officers to Kashmir. They returned the following day with the information that the raiders were already advancing on Baramulla, and that only immediate action would prevent them from taking Srinagar. They also brought a request by the Maharaja for military help and his offer of accession.

At a further Defence Committee meeting on October 26, again in my presence, these were considered. Agreement was reached at this meeting that the accession should be accepted only subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in Kashmir when the law and order situation allowed this; and that a responsible government should be immediately established. So far as military help was concerned, it was at this meeting on October 26 that it was finally agreed that an infantry battalion should fly to Srinagar.

The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India had been signed in Jammu just before these troops left. Before this operation took place the three chiefs of staff and I pointed out its very grave risks to my ministers, but they headed by Pandit Nehru, took the line that a possible alternative to sending in troops and to allow a massacre to take place in Srinagar, (which could have resulted in a major holocaust in India), through failure to respond to the appeal, was that the Government of India might fall, that an extremist government might take its place, and that war between the two Dominions might result.

Possibility of  Sending Troops without Accepting Accession

Another question which has arisen is whether it would not have been possible for the Indian government to have sent troops to Srinagar without accepting the accession of Kashmir. In my view this would surely have ended up in war. There would have been nothing to prevent Pakistan from sending their troops in. I must point out that Mr Jinnah, when he heard that Indian troops were being flown Srinagar, did in fact give an order for a Brigade of Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir and occupy the Banihal Pass, in order to cut the landline of communications of the Indian troops. When this order was conveyed on the telephone to General Gracey, the latter insisted on first obtaining Field Marshal Auchinleck’s permission for the move, as he considered it probable that it would bring between the two Dominions. And British officers were involved. It was not until Auchinleck’s visit to Lahore the following day that the order was rescinded. The only thing that enabled him to induce Mr Jinnah to do this.

Absence of Prior Planning to Send Troops to Kashmir

I have made it clear that no steps were taken to plan the dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir before October 25. I have had great difficulty in persuading Pakistan leaders that this operation was not pre-planned.

Incidentally this SECRET brief was prepared by the Governor General for the Indian delegation to the UN Security Council. For good measure, he got the three chiefs of staff – Gen. RNN Lockhart, commander in chief of the Indian Army, Air Marshal TW Elmhirst, commanding the Royal Indian air Force and Rear Admiral JTS Hall to sign that no plans were made for sending Indian forces before October 25, three days before the tribal incursions began.

Festering sore

Though the accession was complete and the marauding raiders were being contained in a desperate situation through a series of desperate measures, a new problem was simmering to become a festering sore for all times to come. The accession of Kashmir and ascertaining the will of the people of Kashmir are inextricably interlinked. This now came to the fore in different dimensions soon after the accession. It was as if unfinished agendas were now slowly being unraveled. Maybe that is why Kashmir is called the unfinished business of Partition by Pakistan.

Why was this happening? In an Indian state, the ruler was sometimes of a different community than the large masses of his people and if he was of the same community, he usually bore a different caste name than that of the majority of the people of the state. In Kashmir’s case, the ruler regarded his own community or caste nearer to him and thereby alienated the synthetics and attachments of the large masses of the people. Being autocratic and irresponsible, he created a special vested interest within the public life of the state and thus, set up one community against another. This gave rise to a peculiar problem known simply as the communal problem.

In Kashmir, the ruler unfortunately happened to be Hindu and the large majority of the people Muslims. The ruler preferred his own community to the rest and sought to identify his interests with the interests of the communities nearer to him.

Pandit Nehru’s private and political secretary, DN Kachru, in a confidential note to him tried to analyse this problem in the run up to the accession (June 1947). He wrote: “Higher administrative jobs are generally given to the members of his community and the Army is almost exclusively preserved for his own people. Thus the conflict within the state between the common people who incidentally happen to be Muslim and the few privileged communities who belong to the Maharaja’s religion.

“The problem assumes a communal shape because of the differences in religion between the ruler and the ruled and because of the forces created by the ruler’s personality. The problem is thus exploited and aggravated into a complicated one because it serves the interests of those who wish to postpone the introduction of far reaching reforms both in government and socio-economic life of the people”.

The problem in Hyderabad, for instance, was dramatically opposite, for the ruler was Muslim and the majority Hindu. The conflict in states like Kashmir and Hyderabad thus had strong political overtones. Kachru writes: “It is a conflict between irresponsible governments and large masses of subjects who wish to have (a) share of the government. This reactionary attitude of the classes and the revolutionary character of the masses complicated the issue of the States because life and economy in these areas is predominantly feudal. In short, the role of the classes represents only a search for security which leads them to take shelter behind communalism”.

And this was at heart of the joust between the Maharaja of Kashmir and Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. These came to a head at the inauguration of the Jammu Radio Station on December 1, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh opened a Pandora ’s Box all over again. In a speech delivered at the occasion, the Maharaja spoke about the accession to the Indian Union as being a decision arrived at in a state of emergency owing to acts of aggression ‘committed on our integrity’. In a missive to Pandit Nehru from Sheikh Abdullah the very next day, he wrote: “Obviously this implies that accession to the Indian Union was not considered a voluntary act on the part of His Highness. This to say the least is an unfortunate position he has taken”.

Sheikh had a bone to pick with Pandit Nehru at this stage and he chose to use this opportunity. He wrote: “His Highness seems to rivet his attention entirely on his prime minister and even in the matter of formation of the interim government; he thinks it enough to direct his prime minister to take immediate steps for its formation, without wishing to consult anyone else in this connection. My position as head of administration in the context of this directive seems to be entirely meaningless”.

Then the tone of Abdullah’s missive grew bolder and tougher:

“Having regard to all that has been happening in the state during the last three or four months, and having regard also to the fact that along with you, we are fighting a strategically difficult war, it is time we reviewed the whole position and arrived at decisions which would put the advantage on our side.

“From the account that Bakshi gave me last night, which I need not mention in detail here, it is apparent that we are being made to lose on all fronts – both political and military – by the policy pursued by the Maharaja and his clique. Their policy has as its main objective foisting or more correctly refoisting of Hindu domination in the state consistent with their self interest for which purpose they bank upon local communalists as well as the support of those elements in India who are against the setting up of a secular state for which you and Gandhi are fighting so bitterly in India.

“The Pakistani leaders are fighting for Muslims domination in the state. So far as I and my organization are concerned, you are aware that I am against both these ideologies, my main aim being the achievement of democratic self determination for the people of the state without distinction or creed.

“I feel my responsibility greater today as the Indian Union is using money and men so lavishly in the campaign in Jammu & Kashmir. It would be my greatest sorrow were we to lose the political war after winning the military war. It would be an even greater sorrow were the result of all our efforts to be the refoisting of the Maharaja’s autocratic rule on the state.

“As you are aware, it is the desire of all of us to turn the scales quickly in our favour, thereby relieving the Indian Union of the tremendous strain to which it is being put by circumstances in the state. Side by side, it is our desire to convert the state into a bastion for India.

“In this direction, we are being bogged down at every step. We are being mistrusted and misinterpreted. We are being spited and ignored. Yet we are being given the task of dealing with the emergency. It is still not too late and the position can be retrieved if proper action is taken now”.

ACTION PLAN

“To my mind the only way out seems to be to request the Maharaja to abdicate in favour of his son, leaving the governance of the State in the hands of a Council of Regency to rule the State in the name of the people of the State. This will have a tremendous effect in improving our position politically vis a vis Pakistan.

“The Pakistan invasion will lose all its argument as far as the liberation of the people from the Dogra autocracy is concerned, and it would make it easier for me to muster the Muslim masses who have suffered greatly at the hands of this Ruler.

“I could mobilize local resistance even in areas like Poonch and Mirpur, which have thanks to the policies of the present Maharaja been practically lost to Pakistan. The abdication of the Maharaja would bring about a psychological change all over the State. It would also serve as the real beginning of the transfer of power to the people.

“If even after the setting up of the Council of Regency and the transfer of power to the people, the Pakistan government would persist in its attacks on our State, it would be a war fought not against Dogra oligarchy as they make it out at present, but a war against the people of J&K State. Of course the Maharaja’s clique of Mahajan, Batra & Co would have to disappear immediately

“Times are grave and the exigency great. It is impossible for me to continue as I am doing at present. I cannot be a spectator to the immense waste of men and material of the Indian Union in the campaign on acco9unt of the suicidal policy followed by the Maharaja and his advisers.

“It is better that before things get worse I clear out and go to the front at the head of my people to fight both the Maharaja and his notion of Hindu domination and Pakistan with their notion of Muslim domination”.

POLICY OF DRIFT

Sheikh’s unequivocal demand was also communicated to Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh. But the battle was afoot between Maharaja Hari Singh on one side and Sheikh Abdullah on the other. In this cauldron which was boiling over stepped in Ram Manohar Lohia who, after a visit to Kashmir, wrote a confidential note to Gandhiji and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar. The socialist leader, in a detailed and insightful exposition, wrote this letter on December2, 1947, more or less around the same time as Sheikh wrote his. It was clear that Kashmir had suddenly become the epicenter of geo-politics. More importantly, there were underlying messages:

“In case Pakistan decides to keep on encouraging the raiders, Kashmir threatens to become a running sore. Already the number of Pakistani raiders in Kashmir is variously computed to be between 50,000 and a lakh. The question arises, what is better – to continue fighting Pakistan in Kashmir or to strike it at its heart? In any case, we have to put a much bigger force into Kashmir, much larger numbers and more firepower.

“While the battle of arms is not at all such a light adventure as might appear on the surface, the battle of ideas, in particular, diplomacy is being waged still more curiously. On Kashmir’s frontiers are the Sinkiang Chinese, NWFP Muslim, Afghans, Russians and I am excluding the British factor at the moment. No further time should be lost in finding contacts in Afghanistan and Sinkiang. This work is to be done from Delhi. Whether via Afghanistan or in any other way, the Khudai Khidmatgar must know our plans as we have to know theirs. That Hunza, Nagar and other tribes invading Kashmir is an additional reason why other tribes inimical to these and other frontier Pathans could be persuaded to strive for paralyzing the League administration.

“The whole Pathan land could be made restive. Given a plan, Kashmir could dig Pakistan’s grave in the frontier. Astonishingly enough, however a transmitting set is found in Baramulla, obviously in Pakistan’s service, but no Indian has a similar service in the Pathan land.

“The battle of ideas is rather obscured in Kashmir today. The presence of Indian troops awakens either fear or artificial hopes, so that the mind of Kashmir is difficult to read. One fact is nevertheless indisputable. Almost nothing is being done from our side to win this battle. Pakistan Radio has already started a news bulletin in Kashmiri. All India Radio is considering the question. Neither the Indian Army nor the Indian government has any publicity machinery in Kashmir.

“Whatever publicity apparatus the National Conference possesses is aimed at showing the infamy and brutality of raiders, the vices of Pakistan and has no positive aspect of showing in details or in argument that Kashmir is a part of the Indian Union and will remain as such.

“Undoubtedly the most significant factor in the battle for Kashmir is Sheikh Abdullah. While narrating to me the difficulties of the only land route between Kashmir and east Punjab and the fact that Muslim traders were not safe in this route, Sheikh Abdullah suggested that the best way out would perhaps be for India and Pakistan to achieve an understanding on Kashmir’s neutrality and independence. The Sheikh’s Communist assistant encouraged him in this idea. I was amazed.

“I was willing  to make concessions for the enormous pressure being put on Sheikh, for the trade of Kashmir is all bottled up illustrated by the apples which are selling at Rs.7 to Rs.8 per hundred as against Rs.70 to 80 in Delhi. And yet I reminded Sheikh Saheb that the die was already cast and there was no turning back and that such an idea only caused weakness.

“I do not believe that his idea of Azad Kashmir reduces Sheikh’s hostility for Pakistan. But without in the least doubting Sheikh’s intention, this idea of Azad Kashmir even in a weak moment shows the great need for aggressive watchfulness and support. The best way out, I told Sheikh Abdullah would be to throw as much of our resources as we could by way of building roads on the one hand and improving men’s minds on the other; into making trade routes between Kashmir and other parts of India safe.

“No political conclusion must, however be drawn, but a purely technological conclusion about roads and routes with redoubled resources to keep them safe. I would suggest that a Survey mission be sent out immediately from the Indian government to make a comprehensive plan of all possible roads, river ways, railways and air routes and the coordination of one to another.

“Sheikh Abdullah’s mind seems to be working on some kind of trade syndicate that would operate from Kashmir rather than individual traders. This is a good idea. But in requires to be worked out in consultation with Indian groups.

“As I do not doubt Sheikh’s hostility to Pakistan, I would also not doubt his attitude to the Hindu-Muslim relationship inside Kashmir. In his conscious thoughts, he is probably clean on either question. I could see in many different ways and talks that Sheikh Saheb has a fixed idea of Hindus being rich and Muslims being poor. This idea needs to be kept in check, but the Sheikh’s Communist assistants are continually encouraging it. I suggested to the Hindus that met me that they begin thinking in terms of cooperative trade ventures.

“Another idea suggested by Sheikh Saheb was the dissolution of the Kashmir State Army, the taking over of Kashmir’s defence by the Indian Army and encouragement of the national militia. This idea is worth exploring provided, of course that the national militia of Kashmir is properly and definitely described as internal home guards, is rid of its Communist leadership and is put on a basis that will equal opportunity to the Hindus and Sikhs with the Muslim to serve on it.

“Among the most significant suggestions which he has already made to our PM is the Sheikh’s plan for a Regency Council. Under this scheme, the Maharaja would go and his son would be proclaimed Ruler and a Regency consisting of the mother of the Ruler, Sheikh Abdullah and an Indian cabinet’s representative would be formed to rule during the Ruler’s minority. I gather from Kashyap Bandhu, an emergency minister, that such a Regency Council would also reassure Hindus. I believe myself that such a Regency Council would be of immense benefit assuming of course, that the Indian cabinet representative on the Regency Council would be strong enough to intervene effectively in the internal policies of the government and to give it an unalterable direction towards democracy and the Union.

“The method of appointing a resident minister in Kashmir whose status would be the same as that of any other cabinet minister resident in Delhi, somewhat on the lines of the British practice during the war may be considered.

“The Muslim politicians whose names I heard frequently are Mohd Said, general secretary of the National Conference, Mohd Sadid, Mohiuddin Kara, Afzal Beg. In fact, beg is tipped as the future PM of J&K, for Sheikh Saheb, I gathered, would like to operate on an all India stage. I hope that his does not happen. Sadiq is a Communist, is in charge of the national militia, and it is probably through him that a very large number of Communists are managing and officering the cultural, publicity and women’s fronts.

“Curiously, most of these Communists are emigrants from Pakistan. The general Communist position is only too well known, but in Kashmir they are acquiring a good influence. The keenness with which they advocated self determination and are still advocating it, so as to satisfy the separatist sentiments of a great many sections of people, as also their pro-Pakistan attitude in the past has given them a favourable position in Kashmir Muslim politics.

Kashmir Communists have been in a habit of suggesting different types of solutions:

Kashmir Valley to Azad Kashmir
Dogra areas of Jammu to go to Indian Union
Kotli and other areas to Pakistan

“Such solutions are orally canvassed and can often satisfy various trends of opinion. It is quite obvious that at any given moment that solution may be emphasized which suits the Communist party best. The union and democratic idea, can of course not count on continuing Communist allegiance.”

Unfortunately for India, Kashmir has proved to be a life-long ulcer, one that refuses to go away. Finding the key to resolving Kashmir has eluded us. Equally defining it hasn't happened and controlling it through security forces has remained the only way forward. Integration with the rest of India can only happen through mobility which remains the most perilous thing for Kashmiris in the Valley who reckon their identity would be imperilled. That is the broth called Kashmir as it lurches from one crisis to another; a policy of drift allowing it to careen out of control. 

@sandeep_bamzai