Patricia Pereira-Sethi
Across the globe, we are witnessing the rise and spread of a disturbing trend on the international scene: illiberal democracy, a concept coined in the late 90s by pundit Fareed Zakaria. Democratically elected regimes appear to be routinely ignoring constitutional constraints on their power and depriving their citizens of fundamental rights and freedoms. In the past, democracy implied a liberal democracy—a political system manifest not just in free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. This latter group of freedoms, labelled constitutional liberalism, is considered by political scientists to be different and distinct from democracy. Democracy is the process for choosing leaders; liberalism embraces the norms and practices that shape and mould a political entity. A truly liberal nation is one in which individual rights are paramount. It protects the individual not only against the abuses of a tyrant but also against malice and mistreatment by democratic majorities. The two strands of liberal democracy are being polarised today: democracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not.
Two-thirds of the world’s nations are democratic with democracies encompassing a majority of the global population, but many of these political bodies have surrendered to illiberal reforms, corroding the glue which binds the established tradition of democracy and liberalism together. The fear of terrorism and terrorist activity, counter-balanced with a hyped-up, exaggerated, flag-waving nationalism, are two of the driving forces which have been utilised to clamp down on individual freedoms. Thus, wherever and whenever it surfaces, illiberalism assumes its familiar form: greater restrictions on assembly and speech, constraints on the press, retribution against political opponents, oppression of minorities and the rise of fanatical elements.
Donald Trump’s presidency, the Brexit vote in the UK, the electoral sweep by other populist governments in Europe, Latin America and Asia have underscored the threat posed by “illiberal democracy”—a kind of authoritarian politics featuring popular elections on the one hand, with less respect for the rule of law or the rights of minorities on the other. In this kind of politics, populism and demagoguery rear their hideous heads as rulers become insulated from democratic accountability by a panoply of restraints constructed by bureaucratic bodies and autonomous regulators to fight real or perceived “threats” from foreign or internal “Nemeses”.
According to the literati, illiberal democracy is a bad form of government because it slowly deprives its citizens of their inalienable rights and civil liberties as granted by the Charter of the United Nations. Since almost all countries are comprised of an ethnic diversity which spontaneously splinters a society into numerous groups, the festering minority could rise up against a government for refusing to comply with their rights and liberties, creating chaos, rebellion and possibly civil war. “Political competition that is so divisive can rapidly degenerate into violence,” says Zakaria. “Opposition movements, armed rebellions, and coups in Africa have often been directed against ethnically based regimes, many of which came to power through elections. This is just one of many examples in which a country’s illiberal government can be the cause of genocide and war.”
Emory University professor Jennifer Gandhi contends that many autocrats encourage elections to be an integral part of their governance in order to stabilise and reinforce their regimes. She argues that elections help autocrats resolve threats from both the elites and the masses, by appeasing those capable of usurping power with money on the one hand and mollifying the general public with political concessions and promises of creating an idyllic paradise on the other. Gandhi also claims that illiberal tendencies serve other useful purposes: providing repressive and domineering leaders with information about their citizens, even as they establish legitimacy both domestically and in the international community. She cites Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s rule as one example of regime durability fashioned by illiberal democracy. During Mubarak’s lengthy tenure, elections provided a mechanism through which elites bought votes to support the government (by distributing needed goods and resources to the poorer sections of the public) to acquire regime-enforced parliamentary immunity. This enabled them to accumulate illicit wealth and draw from state resources without legal consequences.
Another classic case of an illiberal democracy is Singapore. When the city-state acquired full independence from the British and Malays, it was structured as a relatively liberal democracy, except for internal security laws that permitted detention without trial. Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party government consolidated power in the 1960s and 1970s, and enacted a number of edicts and policies that curtailed constitutional freedoms (such as the right to assemble or form associations, arguing that they were needed to quell race and religious riots at the time), slowly extending its influence over the media, unions, NGOs and academia. Consequently, although technically free and fair multi-party elections are regularly conducted, the political reality in Singapore (including fear and self-censorship) makes participation in opposition politics extremely difficult, leaving the dominant ruling party the only credible option at the polls. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also become a textbook model of illiberal democracy: through a referendum in April 2017, the President has legally acquired immense governing powers which trample on individual and minority rights. By the yardstick of America’s Freedom House, Honduras, Bangladesh and Pakistan are the three most illiberal democracies after Turkey; Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia follow closely behind.
International political gurus insist that the world should end its obsession with balloting; instead they should promote the liberalisation of societies. Or the original belief that the democratic experiment is destined to end in liberal democracy will remain an abstract concept. Since there is nothing inevitable about the logic of democracy, it could well culminate in tyranny behind a mask of democratic procedures. Illiberal democratic governments will convince themselves and the majority that they have a mandate to act in any way they see fit, so long as they hold regular elections. Hence, citizens have to remain watchful about the slow erosion of their fundamental rights. Constitutional liberalism alone can bring about an authentic democracy, not vice versa.