
Two days after Maoists blew up a mine protection vehicle (MPV) in Chhattisgarh, leaving nine CRPF personnel dead, The Indian Express has learnt that intelligence agencies issued multiple warnings prior to the attack, alerting security forces about the presence of Maoists in the area, carrying out reconnaissance for a strike that appeared imminent.
Letters written by the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) made specific references to Palodi, the most forward camp on the Kistaram axis, and advised districts across Bastar not to use vehicles, as far as possible, during the annual tactical counter offensive campaign (TCOC) of the Maoists which sees them stepping up attacks.
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In a letter dated February 18 — it was marked to senior CRPF and police officers in Bastar — D M Awasthi, Special Director General, SIB and Anti-Naxal Operations, said: “Since a couple of days, a large congregation of armed CPI Maoist cadres (120-150) of Telangana along with PLGA BN 01 is camping in between Sakler and Gudrai village under PS Kistaram. Reportedly a contingent of aforesaid group assigned task of recce of Palodi camp on daily basis. As per information, they are contemplating to attack security force deployed at Palodi camp. Please take necessary steps. Urgent action is required.”
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In another letter written earlier, the Special DG had specified the subject: ‘On the targeting of the Palodi camp by Maoists’.
“Dakshin Sukma ke battalion core kshetra mein Kistaram-Chintalnar axis par khole gaye Naveen forward post Palodi ko Maovadiyon ke dwara target kiye jane ke sambandh mein IB evam SIB ke sutron se lagaatar suchnayein prapt ho rahi hai,” it stated. (In South Sukma, with reference to the new forward camp on the Kistaram-Chintalnar axis at Palodi, there is continuous information from the IB and the SIB that this could be targeted).
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Recalling the recovery of an IED and injuries to a COBRA jawan in an IED blast on the Kistaram-Palodi stretch — near the Kasaram Nala where the blast Tuesday killed nine personnel — and arson of 13 road construction vehicles by Maoists in December, the letter even sought opinion on whether the camp should remain.
“Palodi camp is a straight challenge to the Maoist battalion in their core area. It is clear from the above examples that the Maoists can make every possible attempt to target the camp. Therefore, it is recommended that safety procedures in the camp be reviewed immediately, and keeping the tactical scenario in mind, please notify if the camp should continue or not,” Awasthi wrote.
Another letter, written by D Ravishankar, SP, SIB — this was in the context of the Chief Minister’s annual Lok Suraj campaign during which he travels to different parts of Chhattisgarh — notified all SPs about Maoist intentions during the TCOC. In the 19-point letter, the last three points stood out: “17 — On 11 March 2017 during the TCOC, 12 personnel died during an exchange of fire at Bhejji in Sukma. Currently as well, the TCOC period is underway. 18 — After the end of the programme, during their return to the camp, please be careful and aware. 19 — Where it is possible, don’t use vehicles.”
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When The Indian Express sought his comments, Awasthi confirmed that such letters had been written. “There is no dearth on the intelligence front. Multiple agencies are working in tandem, such as the central IB, state SIB, the state intelligence wing, the CRPF network, and even the SP of the district. We have been getting specific inputs and relaying them to the personnel on the ground,” he said.
It is learnt that 45 different intelligence inputs on the presence of Maoists in a 10-km radius around Kistaram and Palodi were sent out by the SIB in the last three months. These include the presence of top Maoist commanders and leaders such as Ramanna, Savitri, Sodi Sudhakar and Nagesh.
A senior CRPF officer, who did not wish to be named, said: “In areas like Kistaram, there is always an intelligence input every few days. The problem is that once this input is given, everyone is on alert. For months on end, either the intelligence input is neutralised, or does not happen because of change in Maoist plans. So there can be a sense of laxity in taking them seriously after a period of time.”