President Trump’s hope for a geopolitical detente with Russia was perhaps the most intriguing foreign policy position of the new U.S. administration.
At a first glance, the Kremlin also seemed to embrace the possibility of standing alongside its North American partner as both nations prepared to intensify their anti-terrorism campaigns and broaden cooperation in the sphere of Middle Eastern security.
Suppressing bilateral hostilities between the two Cold War rivals, however, proved much more difficult than many observers initially speculated. In 12 short months, the flurry of cordial compliments between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin quickly deteriorated into relentless verbal artillery that was forcefully backed by acute geopolitical stratagems.
What happened to Trump’s vision of friendship with Russia and how could such an optimistic plan of rebuilding Russo-American diplomacy trigger the worst period of bilateral relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union?
1. Putin wants parity, Trump expects superiority.
One key obstacle that prevented Trump from striking a bargain with Putin is a lack of mutual long-term objectives.
One year ago, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov clarified Moscow’s foreign policy goals, stressing that the Russian leadership welcomes normalized relations with its former rival but only in accordance with a “principle of parity.” Others, including Putin, have also reiterated that Moscow expects a foundation of equality and “strategic balance” before the two nuclear juggernauts can improve bilateral ties.
Therefore, the inherent problem with the notion that U.S. and Russia could establish friendly relations is its inevitable contradiction with Trump’s bold promise to “make America great again.” After all, unlike the U.S. president, Putin never appeared overly jubilant about any additional growth of America’s greatness.
To prevent Russia from suffering the same fate as the Soviet Union, Putin strives to craft a world in which his country is capable of consistently matching America’s tactical might. To Putin, the current international arrangement is not simply skewed in favor of Washington, but is entirely inconsistent with his understanding of war and peace.
2. Russia seeks to undermine U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Throughout the course of his presidency, Putin has also repeatedly stressed that Russia feels threatened by the missile defense program in Eastern Europe, “because everyone understands that if one nation is more successful at developing nuclear defense systems than the other, that nation obtains an advantage and temptation to use the weapon first.”
According to the Russian leader, the rapid expansion of the U.S. missile defense program significantly violates the established “strategic balance” in the world, and forces Russia to develop means of retaliation.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Moscow has harshly criticized Trump’s move to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear advancement by deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea. From the Russian perspective, expanding U.S. missile defense capabilities does nothing to re-establish the “strategic balance” between the superpowers, and is, consequently, inconsistent with the “principle of parity.”
“We will continue to do everything that is required to secure strategic balance of force,” Putin vowed in November 2016, while announcing an array of new military technologies and upgrades. “Any attempts to change or break it will be viewed as highly dangerous.”
3. U.S. Congress and key allies play a stronger role in dictating foreign policy.
Trump’s decision to quickly change his approach toward Putin, however, was also largely influenced by other factors. William Courtney, an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and a former ambassador to Georgia, told the Washington Examiner that “Congress and U.S. allies also [played] key roles influencing U.S. foreign policy.”
Courtney explained that when Trump was considering a move to substantially ease Ukraine-related sanctions, several prominent lawmakers and foreign leaders pressured him to abandon the idea.
“Congress, and especially [Arizona Sen.] John McCain on the Republican side, and a part of a Democratic side, warned him not to do that,” Courtney said. “And then among the allies, François Hollande, Angela Merkel, and Theresa May also warned him not to do it. In Theresa May’s case … she was at the White House the day before [Trump’s] first phone call with Putin.”
Given Trump’s rhetoric on the campaign trail, Putin likely expected his American counterpart to offer good news about lifting sanctions. But when the Trump administration refused to satisfy Moscow’s demands, Russia quickly reverted to its default aggressive posture.
“Since then, both the Congress and the allies played stronger roles in seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy,” Courtney explained. “And in the past, Congress and the allies played lesser roles. That’s changed.”
4. Painting the U.S. as the enemy is the cornerstone of Putin’s domestic strategy.
Much like the U.S. president, Putin’s attitude toward Washington is also driven by a vast array of internal political pressures.
Since first taking power in 2000, the Russian leader has successfully used the U.S. as a political tool to stoke Russian nationalism and distract voters from the staggering underperformance of the country’s economy. The method, which has also been successfully utilized during the Cold War, relies on pushing anti-American propaganda through state-owned media outlets in order to generate domestic outrage.
For that reason, the focus of Russian politics has noticeably shifted outward, with the general population caring more about Moscow’s performance in outwitting the U.S. than almost any other domestic issue that would otherwise dominate the interest of the average American voter.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Russia temporarily abandoned its anti-American propaganda as both countries worked closely on a number of bilateral initiatives. During that time period, the attention of Russian voters turned to domestic issues which contributed to a drastic decline of then-President Boris Yeltsin’s popularity and an eventual shift of power to the young Putin. Today, the Russian leader is unlikely to repeat the same mistake.
Nikita Vladimirov (@nikvofficial) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential blog. He is founder of Inside Geopolitics and also an investigative reporter for Campus Reform.
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