Post Doklam, India and China have again entered into a familiar scuffle on the border; this time the Indian side has the upper hand, having seized Chinese road building equipment. The latest divergence of perception about the border took place late last year and caps a bad 2017 for Sino-India bilateral ties. The year had started off with India turning up its nose at the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); more bitterness was injected with the Doklam standoff and India’s strategy of “theatre switching” – piling pressure in a different region (in this case, the South China Sea) – to relieve Chinese pressure on the land border by holding formal level discussions with the US, Australia and Japan on forming a “Quad” (alliance). However, India’s force levels and military preparedness have seen quantum jumps in the past 15 years. Its improved capabilities have led to much more frequent and vigorous patrolling schedules than those of the Chinese. The days of Chinese military dominance on the border are over. However, the resultant frequent contact between patrols also escalates the chances of a miscalculation or igniting a conflict. It increases the need to closely reexamine the existing protocols at the 16 places where the patrolling limits of both armies overlap. The current Chinese ruse of en masse entry of its forces at critical moments – usually during summit meetings – is more of a political signal, intended to force India into reciprocal freezing of the border construction work to prevent it from undertaking further infrastructure development and enhanced force levels. Yet, the Sino-Indian border remains the most peaceful border; in fact, it is the anti-theses of the border with Pakistan because of the complete absence of cross-border terrorism and cross-border firing. China claims to have already settled its land borders with 12 out of 14 neighbours: India and Bhutan are the only standouts. The political and strategic challenge is for India and China to find a common ground. The two sides need to revive the earlier policy of quarantining differences on hard security from the usual ebb and flow of bilateral interaction.
