Diet of Brexit leaves sour taste as battle is joined

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She also said MPs would get a vote on the final agreement but it would not stop Britain leaving the EU; in other words, it would be a take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Across from Westminster, the UK Supreme Court ruled MPs should have a vote to trigger the Article 50 process, contradicting the Government’s line.

But the court noted how MSPs should not have a vote, given the so-called Legislative Consent Motion, whereby Holyrood votes to agree to Westminster legislating on devolved matters, was merely a “political convention”; it meant there was no Scottish veto.

Within days, the Scottish Parliament passed a symbolic motion, rejecting the Government’s decision to trigger Article 50 and begin the process of leaving the EU.

The Prime Minister chaired a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee, sitting opposite Nicola Sturgeon. She pledged to “intensify” the talks on Brexit with the increasingly frustrated devolved administrations while the First Minister warned time was “fast running out” on an agreement; the threat of indyref2 hovered in the background.

In February the Government published its White Paper on Brexit, setting out its 12 "principles," including migration control and "taking control of our own laws". David Davis, the Brexit Secretary, insisted the country’s "best days are still to come" - outwith the EU.

The European Union Bill enacting Article 50 zipped through Westminster with MPs backing it by 498 votes to 114. But among those defying their leader were 47 Labour rebels, who voted against.

As Tony Blair urged opponents of Brexit to "rise up" and fight to reverse the referendum vote, the first EU bill became law with Mrs May activating Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty; Britain would leave the bloc on March 29 2019.

The PM declared this was "the moment for the country to come together". But three weeks later, she announced her fateful U-turn, calling a snap general election, ostensibly to increase her Commons majority to get the Brexit legislation through Parliament; but others suspected it had more to do with her party’s 20-point lead in the polls and her attempt to crush Labour.

Amid the tragic backdrop of two terror attacks, the election was played out and proved disastrous for a hubristic premier; she saw Jeremy Corbyn bolstered, her parliamentary majority rubbed out, and her government beholden to Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionists.

During the campaigning, the PM hosted Jean-Claude Juncker to help reverse the increasingly fractious relationship between London and Brussels.

Later, it leaked the European Commission President was astonished by Mrs May’s “deluded” approach.

The phase one talks began, covering the divorce settlement, citizens’ rights and the Northern Irish border but it was money that became the initial hurdle with Brussels said to be looking for £100 billion. Boris Johnson, the Foreign Secretary and chief Brexiteer, cocked a snook at the EU27, saying it could “go whistle”.

Fractious press conferences ended with Michel Barnier, the EU chief negotiator, urging Britain to “get serious”.

As Westminster returned MPs backed the EU Withdrawal Bill, which would transpose all EU law into domestic law but the Scottish and Welsh Governments pointed to a constitutional crisis ahead, claiming the legislation was a “naked power-grab”.

David Mundell denied the charge, insisting some powers returning from Brussels would need to be subject to common frameworks to protect the UK’s internal market but the Scottish Secretary promised Holyrood a “powers bonanza”.

With relations with Brussels still frosty, Mrs May travelled to Florence to begin the diplomatic thaw. Using more emollient language, she suggested there should be a two-year implementation period, which would ease the UK’s departure from the EU. Britain, she stressed, would “honour its commitments” to the EU27; the opening offer was £18bn.

Yet the PM’s friendlier tone did not meet the October deadline for the phase two talks to begin as concern grew about the Irish border issue.

While the Tories were accused of being deeply split between soft and hard Brexiteers, Labour too came under fire for sending out mixed messages.

With its constituency more evenly split between Remainers and Leavers, Mr Corbyn had to tread a fine line but with different colleagues sent out conflicting messages about the means to the end of a “jobs-first Brexit”.

Sir Keir Starmer sought to clarify the party’s position but left many questions unanswered.

If Labour were in power, Britain, explained the Shadow Brexit Secretary, would have a “single market variant,” would be in “a” customs union, and there would be “easy movement” of people rather than the current free movement.

December proved another Brexit high watermark.

Mr Juncker issued a deadline of Monday December 4 to get agreement on phase one before a crunch European Council summit 10 days later, when EU leaders were to decide if “sufficient progress” had been made to proceed to transition and trade.

Tensions mounted. The PM, desperate to salvage the talks and her own premiership, went to Brussels for lunch with the Commission President to agree a diplomatic fudge that recognised the need for some post-Brexit “regulatory alignment” between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

But once a horrified Arlene Foster, the DUP leader, got wind of the compromise, she rang Mrs May during her Juncker lunch to voice her concern and veto the proposal; thus exercising her party’s leverage on propping up the Tory Government.

The following morning, Ruth Davidson, the Scottish Tory leader, telephoned the PM and left her in doubt that any separate deal for Northern Ireland would “unpick the thread of the Union”.

Ms Sturgeon quickly intervened to insist if Northern Ireland could have a separate EU deal to keep it in the single market and customs union, so too should Scotland.

Later, Mrs May made clear any deal with the EU would be UK-wide.

As talks intensified, the PM later that week flew to Brussels for breakfast with Mr Juncker and Mr Barnier, where it was announced, finally, a deal had been reached.

A week later at the year’s final European Council, the EU27 applauded Mrs May and agreed “sufficient progress” had been made to move the talks onto transition and trade.

The nub of the deal was: the rights of all three million EU citizens living here would be enshrined in law and enforced by UK courts; a divorce bill of up to £39bn and a guarantee of “no hard border” with the Republic. Some details were fudged but Mrs May had her political breakthrough.

But the Year of Brexit was not over yet as MPs defeated the Government on giving them a “meaningful vote” on the final agreement and ministers avoided another one by agreeing to include the ability to extend the date of departure if need be.

Following concerns raised by Scottish Tory MPs, Mr Mundell agreed the Withdrawal Bill would be changed to make clear it would in no way undermine devolution.

As another JMC with the Scottish Government ended, the Scottish Secretary revealed he had wanted to publish a list of powers the UK Government wanted swiftly to transfer to Holyrood but had not done so – at Edinburgh’s request.

An incensed Michael Russell, the SNP administration’s Brexit Minister, forcefully denied the claim. Relations between London and Edninburgh, publicly at least, remained strained.

Meanwhile, Ian Blackford, the SNP leader at Westminster, made it clear his Scottish Government colleagues would demand Holyrood would have to give its consent to the promised EU Implemention Bill, which would put the withdrawal agreement into law. Thus, the potential for another constitutional crisis loomed.

Just before Christmas, Brussels announced the UK’s implementation period would end after only 21 months in December 2020; not 24. But Downing Street insisted this was merely an opening negotiation move and the UK still wanted it to last two years to March 2021.