Pakistan's tactical tipping point

The book brings together a diverse range of issues pertaining to Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons in a coherent manner, says Kapil Patil

Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon

Author: Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria (ed)

Publisher: KW Publishers, Rs 740

Is South Asia a nuclear flashpoint? The recent developments in Pakistan’s nuclear strategy enabled by new technological innovations and offensive postures tempt one to view the region as a potential nuclear flashpoint. While the analogy of nuclear flashpoint is unacceptable to many analysts in the region, Pakistan’s quest to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to deter Indian conventional response is undoubtedly a dangerous portent for deterrence stability in the region. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, in this very timely and important book, explore multiple facets of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear force drive.

The book raises several pertinent questions on Pakistan’s motivations behind acquisition of TNWs. It examines the doctrinal underpinnings of Pakistan’s TNWs and exposes several fallacies in its Army’s thinking on what TNWs can and cannot achieve in the event of war against India. The strength of the book, however, lies in detailing some possible Indian doctrinal responses and laying the ground for wider debate on how best India can respond to Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship.

Many analysts now argue that India appears to be constrained by the dynamics of nuclear escalation in responding to Pakistan-sponsored terror acts such as the Parliament attacks in 2001 and the Mumbai attacks in November 26, 2008. While it is difficult to refute such arguments in the absence of an equally compelling logic, what is worrisome for India is the Pakistan Army's support to future terror strikes under the nuclear shadow. Complicating the situation further, Pakistan's TNWs not only lower the nuclear threshold but also aim to handcuff India in conventionally responding to 26/11-style terror attacks. The book thus intrigues the reader about Pakistan's relentless nuclear force modernisation and the consequent challenges it poses to India.

One of the central issues that the book attempts to tackle is how at best India can maintain a sustainable and effective deterrence posture that is perceived credible by Pakistan. The authors distinctly problematise India's precept of 'Massive Retaliation' in the light of Pakistan's use of TNWs. Although respected Indian voices have sought to convey in an unambiguous albeit unofficial manner (Ambassador Shyam Saran's Speech delivered on April 24, 2013) that India does not accept any differentiation between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, the credibility of India's "massive retaliation" posture against Pakistan's use of TNWs comes under serious doubts.

While India cannot completely ignore Pakistan's TNWs, it has also not been able to conventionally respond to Pakistan-sponsored terror strikes. Thus, rather than dismissing these as mere debating points, India's national security planners will have to urgently address these problems with greater deft and care. Indian deterrence dilemmas are further aggravated by China's continued clandestine support to Pakistan's nuclear programme at the cost of overlooking its implications for deterrence stability in the region. The China-Pakistan nexus continues to be an inescapable security dilemma for India. The editors have devoted an entire chapter, and rightly so, in examining the gamut of the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation and its various dimensions.

The book, however, has its own share of weaknesses. The chapters on command and control, and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal include several non-falsifiable assertions. While it is reasonable that there are serious concerns over the pre-delegation of launch authority to the theatre commanders in case of the TNWs, there is no conclusive evidence at this stage to assume that Pakistan has already done so or would do so in future. Second, it is more than obvious to assert that the problems of command and control in Pakistan are political and thereby easily discounting the Pakistan Army's professionalism in safeguarding its atomic arsenal. The concerns over security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are unlikely to diminish anytime soon; however, it must be borne in mind that Pakistan has taken numerous steps to safeguard its atomic arsenal. These chapters thus, appear somewhat biased and do not offer any fresh insight into the command and control issues in Pakistan.

The book is premised on the assumption that Pakistan is committed to "full spectrum of deterrence including the use of TNWs". At present, there is little information available on Pakistan's ability to miniaturise warheads for the NASR and other short-range missiles. There is a clear need to deepen the analysis in this regard, although such evidence would be difficult to come by.

Nevertheless, given the range of issues that the book covers, it is a welcome addition to the existing literature on India's nuclear strategy. The editors bring together a diverse range of issues pertaining to Pakistan's TNWs in a neat and coherent manner. Setting the stage for further discussion, the book will be of immense interest to students, analysts, and practitioners of nuclear strategy in India.

The reviewer is a research associate at the Indian Pugwash Society