The aerial combat of 1971

Eagles over bangladesh

Author: Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra

Publisher: HarperCollins,Rs 499

The authors’ careful research has made for an interesting account of the Air War in 1971 but the analyses are still not enough to call it military history, explains Dipankar Banerjee

This collaboration between an Air War historian and a philosophy professor in the United States, has resulted in a remarkable story of the Air War in 1971 over Bangladesh. The authors’ meticulous research detailing almost every sortie flown during the war makes for a riveting reading; as if the reader is present in the cockpit with the pilots sharing their trials and tribulations. The book  details an aircraft held, the move of squadrons and their holdings on both sides, the chatter of the pilots and their after-action reports, with some good contemporary photographs.

Yet, it is not quite military history. There isn’t enough analyses as to what happened and why. Or how might the Indian Air Force respond in different circumstances? The information from Pakistan too is less detailed even though the narration of the evolution of the Bangladesh Air Force comes out well.

The reality indeed is that this is a war that Pakistan would rather forget and pretend that it never took place. The Hameedur Rahman Commission Report is a frank self critical account of the Pakistani failures of 1971 and is not known in much of Pakistan even today. India has made the mistake of not learning from its own history, by trying to shut out the 1962 military disaster from its institutional memory and has paid a price. Pakistan has fared even worse, for its subsequent actions in supporting insurgency in the Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and the war in Kargil, misread entirely India’s policy and capabilities.

For Delhi, the 1971 war was a complete success. Perhaps that is also why we had not realised until recently, how closely fought it actually was. The biggest genocide in the world after the Second World War, it did not receive global sympathy or even recognition. Concepts of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and global refugee protection norms had not evolved till then. Though humanity called for a more balanced global response, it got responses based on respective national interests. India at the time was not a favourite nation of the West too.

Many in India believe that the 1971 war was Delhi’s humanitarian intervention. However, it was in international law, a legitimate response to a blatant external attack. The US global geo-strategic considerations sided with Pakistan and Kissinger would not have been affected if the Chinese responded aggressively in the north.

Two recent publications highlight these issues. One is by (Major) Srinath Raghavan, titled A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh and it mentions the formidable international challenges India faced. The other is Gary Bass authored The Blood Telegram — India’s Secret War in East Pakistan. The latter narrates the duplicity of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy and its determined support to General Yahyya Khan in its interest of opening up to China.

With the near total rejection by the people of East Bengal to the Pakistan Army’s brutal suppression, it appeared that a victory for Indian arms was assured. In India we have not quite acknowledged the full and glorious campaign by a heavily disadvantaged Bangla Mukti Bahini. But, in reality the uncertainties of a northern attack from China and the role of the USS Enterprise and the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, left considerable uncertainties regarding the final outcome. India knew that its southern flank in the seas was vulnerable to the massive Seventh Fleet presence should it materialize. But, someone forgot to tell that to the Indian Navy. Instead they stood resolute and were determined to counter whatever came their way.  At the end fortuitously and through sound advance planning everything was in place. It was up to the Indian Air Force to execute the coup-de-grace. 

Details of the IAF’s final attacks in tho book are well described. All the flutter and response in the Governor’s residence to strafing, the loss of nerve and disorder of the Pakistan Army leadershipis described in detail. The IAF role in the Air was decisive. Its total domination of the sky above, fiercely coercive attacks on the top leadership in Dhaka and finally close support to ground forces compelled the Pakistan Army to surrender without condition.

But then, how did the IAF fare in aerial combat? What was its combat capability in comparison to Pakistan’s US-supplied advanced aircraft? How did the overall planning could have been improved? Indeed, operating from a single base at Tezgaon (Dhaka), one squadron of Pakistan’s F-86 held larger numbers of IAF fighters and bombers at bay for a significant time. Of course, loiter time over Tezgaon was always inadequate for Indian fighters operating at maximum ranges. But, could this deficiency have been over come? These are questions about which a military historian has to be judgmental.

This was one war where the Army did not feel neglected? Close air support was ensured and made rapid advance in a totally riverine terrain possible. The improvised and quick arrangements for heli-lift and para-drop ensured, that when time was of the essence final victory was achieved earlier than may have otherwise been possible. This finally changed the course of the war. Victory went not only to the brave, but to the more skillful in all facets of modern war including diplomacy. Manekshaw’s final address to lay down arms and surrender without condition succeeded and Bangladesh was born. Finally, one looks forward to further detailed accounts from the authors of other Indian aerial wars. Particularly, the 1971 War in the west and in Kargil.

The reviewer is Major General, AVSM