The 'Act East' counter: Why PM Modi's visit to the East Asia, India-ASEAN summits matters so much

The idea that India could play the role of a counterweight to China in its backyard has always been more fantasy than based on ground realities. It's true that many of the 10 members of ASEAN are embroiled in maritime disputes with China, most notably Vietnam and the Philippines, but this hasn't stopped any of them from rushing headlong into China's economic orbit. China's trade with ASEAN was near $350 billion last year; India's less than $60 billion.

In Manila and Jakarta, the common refrain among officials is that India enjoys enormous goodwill, drawing on historical and cultural links, but has generally punched below its weight. That's a perception Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be looking to correct when he travels to Manila on November 12 for the East Asia Summit and the 25th India-ASEAN Summit. The Manmohan Singh government had, to some extent, injected vigour into India's 'Look East' policy, first initiated by P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1991, and signed a landmark ASEAN-India Free Trade Area agreement in 2009.

The Modi government has since upgraded it to 'Act East', to signal greater intent. The PM has invited all 10 ASEAN leaders as special guests for the Republic Day parade in January. It is also speeding up work on the 3,200 km India-Myanmar-Thailand highway from Moreh, envisaged as long ago as 2002 as a key artery to bring ASEAN closer to India. (Beijing is already at work on a bullet train from Kunming that connects Bangkok and Singapore.) Perhaps the biggest shift in the Modi government's approach is its realistic appraisal of the limitations of acting alone in 'Acting East'. Delhi no longer appears shy, and less mindful of China's sensitivities, in leaning over towards Tokyo and Washington in its engagement with the region.

This appears logical. When ASEAN's linkages with Japan and the US are considered, the region looks far less dependent on China. The region's total trade with India, Japan ($239 billion) and the US ($212 billion) combined is one-and-a-half times its commerce with China. The Donald Trump administration, for its part, has more prominently emphasised India as a vital partner in the region, describing its Asia policy as emphasising "a free and open Indo-Pacific region", a broader conception than Barack Obama's 'Asia pivot'. In Manila, the three countries and Australia will hold their first meeting since 2007, when the 'quadrilateral' dialogue was short-lived in the face of strong Chinese opposition. The jury is out on whether this closeness will translate into demonstrable action in security cooperation or in providing an economic alternative to China.

This shift is being closely watched in Beijing. Xi Jinping's first term saw Beijing have a free run. It successfully bolstered its military presence in the South China Sea with 'island building' activities, and thwarted a unified ASEAN response with nimble diplomacy. It has turned around ties with the Philippines and healed a rift with Vietnam, all the while keeping its wallet open. Trump, meanwhile, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal-the biggest effort yet to counter China's economic dominance-with one of his first acts in office.

Many in Beijing believe Trump will be an unreliable partner for India. "I see nothing coming from Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy," says leading strategist Shen Dingli. "The Indo-Pacific has always been free and open. Oceans can't be divided. China is an Indian Ocean player, and the Indian Ocean doesn't belong to anyone-to China, India or the US. Obama's work will be undone by Trump, and all Trump is doing will be undone by his successor. By wasting American time, energy and resources, they are successfully bringing China to the top of the world."