Are the ECI- EVMs hackable?
No. M1 (model one) EVM machines were manufactured till 2006 and had all necessary technical features making them non-hackable contrary to claims made by some activists. On the recommendations of the Technical Evaluation Committee in 2006, M2 model EVMs produced after 2006 and upto 2012 incorporated dynamic coding of key codes thereby enabling transfer of the key – press message from Ballot Unit (BU) to Control Unit (CU), in an encrypted form as an additional security feature. It also contains real time setting of each key press so that sequencing of key presses including socalled malicious sequenced key presses can be detected and wrapped.
Further, the ECI-EVMs are not computer controlled, are standalone machines and not connected to the internet and /or any other network at any point of time. Hence, there is no chance of hacking by remote devices.
The ECI-EVMs do not have any frequency receiver or decoder for data for wireless or any external hardware port for connection to any other non-EVM accessory or device. Hence no tampering is possible either through hardware port or through wireless, wi-fi or bluetooth device because the CU accepts only encrypted and dynamically coded data from BU.
Can ECI-EVMs be manipulated by manufacturers?
There is very stringent security protocol at the manufacturer level regarding software security. After manufacturing, the EVMs are sent to different districts within a state. The manufacturers are in no position to know several years ahead, which candidate will be contesting from which constituency and what will be the sequence of the candidates on the BU. Also, each ECI-EVM has a serial number and the Election Commission by use of an EVM-tracking software can find out from its database which machine is located where. So, any manipulation at the manufacturing stage is ruled out.
Can a Trojan Horse be incorporated into the CU chip?
Stringent security measures and the sequence of voting in EVM eliminates the possibility of injection of a Trojan Horse. Once a ballot key is pressed in CU, the CU enables BU for registering the vote and waits for the key pressing in the BU. During this period, all keys in the CU become Inactive till the entire sequence of casting of that vote is complete. Once any of the keys (candidates vote button) is pressed by a voter in BU, the BU transmits the key information to CU. The CU gets the data and acknowledges it by glowing the corresponding LED lamps in BU. After the enabling of ballot in CU, only the ‘first key press’ is sensed and accepted by CU. After this, even if a voter keeps on pressing the other buttons there will not be any communication between CU and BU, nor will BU register any key press.
Are old models still in use?
M1 model of EVM machines produced up to 2006, were last used in the 2014 general elections. There is a standard operating procedure laid down by the ECI to discard EVMs. The process of destruction of an EVM and its chip is carried out in the presence of Chief Electoral Officer of the state or his representatives inside the factory of manufacturers.
Can ECI-EVMs be physically tampered with?
In addition to the existing security features in M1 & M2 models of ECI-EVMs, the new M3 EVM produced after 2013 have Tamper Detection and Self Diagnostics. These tamper detection feature make an EVM inoperative the moment anyone tries to open it. The self diagnostic feature checks the EVM fully every time it is switched on. Any change in its hardware or software can be detected. A prototype of a new model M3 with above features is being readied. Once a technical experts committee examines it, production will commence.
What technological features make ECI-EVMs tamper proof?
The ECI-EVMs use some of the most sophisticated technological features like one time programmable (OTP) microcontrollers, dynamic coding of key codes, date and time stamping of each and every key press, advanced encryption technology and EVM-tracking software to handle EVM logistics, among others to make the machine competely tamper proof. In addition to these, new model M3 EVMs also have tamper detection and self-diagnostics as added features. Since, software is based on OTP the program cannot be altered, re-written or re-read. If anyone attempts it, the machine will become inoperative.
Do the ECI-EVMs use foreign technology?
Contrary to misinformation, Indian EVMs are produced indigenously by Bengaluru’s Bharat Electronics and Hyderabad’s Electronics Corporation of India. The software programme is then converted into machine code and given to the chip manufacturer abroad because we don’t have semi-conductor microchip producing capability in India. Every microchip has an ID number embedded into memory and the producers have their digital signatures on them. So, the question of their replacement does not arise at all because microchips are subjected to functional tests with regard to the software. Any attempt to replace microchip is detectable and can make EVM in-operative. Thus, both changing existing programme or introducing new one are detectable.
Any chances of manipulation at the place of storage?
At the district headquarters, EVMs are kept in a double-lock system under appropriate security. Their safety is periodically checked. The officers do not open the strong room, but maintain regular checks.
