Apex maritime security body still missing, nine years after 26/11 terror strikes
NEW DELHI: The government is yet to get cracking on a national maritime authority (NMA), which was strongly recommended after the 26/11 terror strikes in 2008 and promised by the NDA government soon after it came to power in 2014, even as Phase-II of the coastal surveillance network (CSN) was finally approved on Tuesday.
The defence acquisitions council, chaired by defence minister Manohar Parrikar, accorded the initial nod or “acceptance of necessity” to the Rs 803 crore project for Phase-II of the CSN. This will involve setting up 38 more radar stations with static radars and electro-optic sensors, four mobile surveillance stations and integration of VTMS (vessel traffic management systems) sites in the Gulfs of Kutch and Khambat.
This follows Phase-I at a cost of Rs 600 crore, under which 36 radar stations on the mainland, six in Lakshadweep and Minicoy and four in Andaman and Nicobar are now operational after several delays, say officials. The CSN, incidentally, was first mooted almost two decades ago but gained momentum only after the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai rocked India like never before.
Similarly, while several measures ranging from setting up of state marine police stations and the Sagar Prahari Bal to the naval NC3I (national command, control, communication and intelligence) network have been implemented, the overall progress on revamping the country’s entire coastal security architecture has been excruciatingly slow.
A glaring example is the NDA government’s failure to act on its own promise, made during the President’s address to Parliament in June 2014, of setting up the NMA to ensure effective coordination among the multiple authorities dealing with maritime and coastal security issues in the country.
The urgent need for an apex federal body to coordinate and bring synergy among the different stakeholders, ranging from central ministries and state governments to the Navy, Coast Guard, customs, intelligence agencies and port authorities, was even stressed way back in 2001 by the high-powered Group of Ministers on “reforming the national security system” after the 1999 Kargil conflict.
But much like the chief of defence staff (CDS) post in the armed forces, the proposed NMA or the maritime security advisory board (with a maritime security advisor as its chief) has also proved elusive.
Instead, the National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), under the cabinet secretary, meets just two to three times a year to decide on measures to plug gaps. “The NCSMCS does not fit the bill for cohesive planning and implementation of coastal and maritime security measures. A NMA is desperately required,” admitted an official.
The defence acquisitions council, chaired by defence minister Manohar Parrikar, accorded the initial nod or “acceptance of necessity” to the Rs 803 crore project for Phase-II of the CSN. This will involve setting up 38 more radar stations with static radars and electro-optic sensors, four mobile surveillance stations and integration of VTMS (vessel traffic management systems) sites in the Gulfs of Kutch and Khambat.
This follows Phase-I at a cost of Rs 600 crore, under which 36 radar stations on the mainland, six in Lakshadweep and Minicoy and four in Andaman and Nicobar are now operational after several delays, say officials. The CSN, incidentally, was first mooted almost two decades ago but gained momentum only after the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai rocked India like never before.
Similarly, while several measures ranging from setting up of state marine police stations and the Sagar Prahari Bal to the naval NC3I (national command, control, communication and intelligence) network have been implemented, the overall progress on revamping the country’s entire coastal security architecture has been excruciatingly slow.
A glaring example is the NDA government’s failure to act on its own promise, made during the President’s address to Parliament in June 2014, of setting up the NMA to ensure effective coordination among the multiple authorities dealing with maritime and coastal security issues in the country.
The urgent need for an apex federal body to coordinate and bring synergy among the different stakeholders, ranging from central ministries and state governments to the Navy, Coast Guard, customs, intelligence agencies and port authorities, was even stressed way back in 2001 by the high-powered Group of Ministers on “reforming the national security system” after the 1999 Kargil conflict.
But much like the chief of defence staff (CDS) post in the armed forces, the proposed NMA or the maritime security advisory board (with a maritime security advisor as its chief) has also proved elusive.
Instead, the National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), under the cabinet secretary, meets just two to three times a year to decide on measures to plug gaps. “The NCSMCS does not fit the bill for cohesive planning and implementation of coastal and maritime security measures. A NMA is desperately required,” admitted an official.
